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ABSTRACT
STILL DIRTY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS:
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, KNOWLEDGE, AND SOCIALIZATION AND
REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA

MAY 2014
INKYOUNG KIM, B.A., SUNGKYUNKWAN UNIVERSITY
M.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter M. Haas
This dissertation examines the microprocesses of regime creation in Northeast
Asia regarding transboundary environmental problems. Despite the growing need for
international environmental cooperation and policy coordination at the regional and
global levels, Northeast Asia has not yet succeeded in reaching any binding regional
agreement on any environmental issue, even though it has developed various
environmental cooperative mechanisms regarding transboundary pollution. Rather than
characterizing regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia as
“non-regime,” this study unpacks the varying forms of collective action in terms of the
speed of development of cooperative mechanisms and the substantive content of the
development undertaken by states in the region. The causal relationships between specific
forms of political leadership, knowledge, and socialization and the degrees and forms of
regional collective action is explored regarding the transboundary air pollution issues of
the region, including acid rain, dust and sandstorms, and various long-range
transboundary air pollutants. In addition to comparing the participation of countries in
viii

this region in broader Northeast Asian cooperative mechanisms, the study also analyzes
the differences between European and East Asian experiences on this topic.
An analysis of the three cases indicates that all three independent variables are
only partly associated with varying degrees of collective action as measured by formal
features and concrete collective action in Northeast Asia. The study’s comparison of the
varying degrees of collective action in Northeast Asia and Europe and among the three
studied Northeast Asian environmental cooperative mechanisms discovers two useful
insights.
First, the analysis supports the hypothesis on social mechanisms among political
leadership, shared knowledge, and socialization, which asserts that the stronger the
political leadership and the greater the shared knowledge in the region, the more likely
participants in regional cooperation are to engage in the learning process of socialization
and thereby create the most formal and concrete collective action. The study finds that
strong political leadership is not itself sufficient to lead member countries to engage in
the learning process of socialization and that a lack of shared scientific knowledge is
positively associated with the adaption process of socialization among participants in the
cooperative activities of these three regional mechanisms.
Another insight is that the lack of shared knowledge and of the learning mode of
socialization helps explain why all three regional cooperative mechanisms have failed to
advance to become the legally binding regional environmental regimes rather than the
comparatively higher degrees of collective action in terms of formalization and
concreteness among regional entities within the UNEP’s second category of regional
action. This study argues that knowledge and socialization barriers are key determinants
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of the development of regulatory regional environmental regimes. Without shared
scientific knowledge and engagement in the learning process of socialization, even given
strong political leadership by a participating country, it is not likely for a region to
develop a legally binding regional environmental regime. Therefore, this study concludes
that to make the transformation from the least formal and concrete collective action to the
most formal and concrete depends on creating shared knowledge and the learning process
of socialization.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: LEADERSHIP, KNOWLEDGE, AND SOCIALIZATION

Research Questions
There has been a growing consensus on the need for international environmental
cooperation and policy coordination at the regional and global levels. Global warming,
ozone depletion, and tropical deforestation are typically acknowledged as global
environmental problems requiring global cooperation, while acid rain, haze, and regional
water pollution are typically viewed as regional issues. In response to these problems,
more than a thousand multilateral environmental agreements have been made between
1950 and 2010. 1 Northeast Asia, however, has not yet succeeded in reaching any binding
regional agreement even though it has developed various environmental cooperative
mechanisms regarding transboundary pollution, as shown in Table 1.1. It is also notable
that none of the countries of this region have accepted a binding dispute resolution
mechanism in the numerous bilateral agreements they have made (Henry, Kim, & Lee,
2012).
Table 1.1
Participation of Northeast Asian Countries in Environmental Cooperative Programs
Issue areas

Acronyms

Starting Region/
Year
Sub-region

Full name

1

Level of
actors

This number includes conventions, treaties, agreements, accords, or their non-English
equivalents and protocols and amendments to such instruments and excludes “soft law” such as
action plans, agreed measures, codes of conduct, declarations, resolutions, and similar policies
(Mitchell, 2002-2011).
1

Regional Cooperationa

APEC

Asia-Pacific
Economic
Cooperation

1989

AsiaPacific

State

ASEAN+3

ASEAN Plus
Three

1997

East Asia

state, IO

ASEAN+6

ASEAN Plus Six

2005

AsiaPacific

State

EAS

East Asia Summit

2005

East Asia

State

Tripartite
Summit

Trilateral Summit

2008

Northeast
Asia

State

2005

Asia

State

2002

Asia and
Pacific

State

1991

Asia and
Pacific

State

1996

Northeast
Asia

Local
governments

2009

Asia and
Pacific

IOs

1992

Northeast
Asia

State

AECEN

Project ABC

Asian
Environmental
Compliance and
Enforcement
Network
Project
Atomospheric
Brown Cloud

Comprehensive

ECO-Asia

Environmental
Congress for Asia
and Pacific

NEAR

The Association
of Northeast Asia
Regional
Governments

-

NEAC

Joint Meeting of
the
Intergovernmenta
l Networks on
Regional Air
Pollution in Asia
and the Pacific
Northeast Asian
Conference on
Environmental
Cooperation

2

NEASPEC

TEMM

APN

TPM
ENVIROASIA

EANET

TDGM

Air
Pollutionb
LTP Project

Northeast Asian
Sub-regional
Program of
Environmental
Cooperation
Tripartite
Environment
Ministers
Meeting
Asia-Pacific
Network for
Global Change
Research
Tripartite
Presidents
Meeting
Eco-Peace
Network in
Northeast Asia
Acid Deposition
Monitoring
Network in East
Asia
Tripartite
Director General
Meetings
for yellow
sand/Dust sand
storm among
China, Japan and
ROK
Joint Research
Project on LongRange TransBoundary Air
Pollutants in
Northeast Asia

1993

Northeast
Asia

State

1999

Northeast
Asia

State

1995

AsiaPacific

State

2004

Northeast
Asia

national
research
institutes

2001

Northeast
Asia

NGOs

1998

East Asia

State

2007

Northeast
Asia

State

1995

Northeast
Asia

State

NEAFF

Northeast Asian
Forest Forum

1998

Northeast
Asia

NGOs

TEEN

Tripartite
Environmental
Education
Network

-

Northeast
Asia

NGOs

3

Water
Pollution

NOWPAP

Northwest Pacific
Action Plan

1994

Northeast
Asia

State

EABRN

East Asian
Biosphere
Reserve Network

1995

Northeast
Asia

state, IO

1997

Northeast
Asia

State

2002

Northeast
Asia

State

1992

Asia and
Pacific

NGOs

Crane
Network
Biodiversity
APMWCS

NAPEP

Northeast Asian
Site Network
Center
Asia-Pacific
Migratory
Waterbird
Conservation
Strategy
Northeast Asian
and North Pacific
Environmental
Forum

a

These five cooperative mechanisms were not explicitly developed for environmental cooperation
and have been more focused on general cooperation, particularly economic cooperation, although
they have set up side meetings for environmental issues. For example, APEC has held meetings
of ministers responsible for the environment. Some meetings tend to be sporadic rather than
consistent. For example, the meeting of environmental ministers at APEC in 2012 was held 15
years after the previous meeting in 1997.
b

There are two other international cooperative mechanisms that deal with air pollution in Asia or
East Asia: Environmental Monitoring of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) in East Asian
Countries and Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities (CAI-Asia). However, China has not
participated in the POPs monitoring project since 2005, and the ROK has not participated in CAIAsia at the governmental level.

Previous research studies addressing this issue have strived to identify the factors
that determine the emergence, persistence, and dissipation of international regimes
regarding the environment (Hasenclever et al., 1997; Krasner, 1983; Young, 1989;
Young and Osherenko, 1993). For the successful development of such regimes, scholars
have suggested the following contributing factors: efficient leadership (Chung, 1999;
Haas 2000); scientific consensus (Chung, 1999; Haas, 2000; Kim, 2007; Nam, 2002); the
4

influence of public concern and NGOs (Haas, 2000; Komori, 2010); previous
institutional experience regarding regional cooperation (Nam, 2008; Valencia, 2008); and
coordinating mechanisms among various overlapping initiatives (Komori, 2010).
Northeast Asia has been characterized as a region where the development of
environmental regimes has been slow. Most researchers have concluded that
environmental regime-building in this region has remained elusive, or remains at most in
an embryonic stage, because the main factors that promote regime creation have not yet
sufficiently developed to trigger real international cooperation.
This dissertation project focuses on the variations among different regional
environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia. This does not mean that it
disregards the regional characteristics of Northeast Asia in explaining regional
environmental cooperation, as some factors may be more closely related to regional
characteristics than to characteristics of the issues themselves. However, the focus of this
project is on the variations among issue areas in Northeast Asian environmental
cooperation despite general regional characteristics so as to avoid deterministic
explanations.
This examination of cooperative mechanisms developed to address environmental
issues related to air quality is motivated by several driving questions with relevance to the
field of international relations and policy making that it hopes to answer. If countries aim
to reduce transboundary air pollution through international cooperation, why have
various cooperative mechanisms developed different forms and degrees of collective
action within a region? What determines the forms and degrees of collective action? Why
do countries participate more actively in certain cooperative mechanisms than in others?

5

What driving forces are contributing factors for regional cooperation to produce
behavioral changes among participating countries?
Thus, rather than stating that the cooperative efforts of Northeast Asia have been
failures by defining them as nonregime cooperation, 2 I ask why collective actions
through various cooperative mechanisms have developed at variant speeds and degrees
even though regional characteristics are specific and significant enough to explain
regional environmental cooperation. In doing so, instead of asking what factors are
missing in the region that could contribute to developing successful environmental
regimes, this study analyzes the causal relationships between the degrees and forms of
regional collective action and the existence of political leadership, shared knowledge, and
socialization.

Background of Research and Purpose
The comparison of annual anthropogenic sulfur dioxide (SO2) in 2000 from ten
continental regions in Figure 1.1 shows that East Asia, encompassing Far East Russia,
Mongolia, China, the Republic of Korea (hereafter ROK), and Japan, records the highest
emissions. 3 It is astonishing to see that the small number of Northeast Asian countries
recorded the highest emissions of SO2 in the world.

2

Nonregime cooperation is defined as “transnational policy arenas characterized by the absence
of multilateral agreements for policy coordination among states” (Dimitrov et al., 2007, p. 231).
3
Liu and Mauzerall (2007) define the ten continental regions as follows: North America (NA),
South America (SA), Europe (EU), the former Soviet Union (FSU, excluding part of Russia in the
European domain), Africa (AF), the Indian subcontinent (IN), East Asia (EA), Southeast Asia
(SE), Australia (AU), and the middle East (ME).
6

Figure 1.1. Annual anthropogenic SO2 emissions in 2000. Adapted from
J. Liu & D. L. Mauzerall, D. L., 2007, “Potential Influence of Inter-continental Transport of
Sulfate Aerosols on Air Quality,” Environmental Research Letters, 2: 045029, p. 3.

Despite its ecological interdependence due to geographical proximity, which is
considered a primary condition for multilateral environmental cooperation (Soroos, 1997,
pp. 266-267), Northeast Asian countries have shown relatively slow progress toward
creating cooperative environmental regimes. Throughout their history, China, Japan, and
the ROK have been the most interactive parties and thus those most recognized as having
influenced one another through various channels. It is therefore puzzling that the
Northeast Asian countries seem to be less active in solving common environmental
problems than countries of other regions such as Europe and even other subregions of
Asia.
Since the first wave of regionalism began in Western Europe in the 1950s,
regionalism has undergone many ups and downs (Kim, 2004). After fizzling out in the
1960s and 1970s, a second wave of regionalism came in the late 1980s and 1990s,
initiated by the Single European Act of 1986. 4 Finally, the so-called new regionalism has

4

Mansfield and Solingen identifies four waves of regionalism: the first wave during the second
half of the 19th century as “largely a European phenomenon” which “was associated with the
emergence of a liberal international trading system”; the second wave after World War I as “more
economically discriminatory” phenomenon; the third wave between the 1960s and the early
1970s; and the fourth wave during the 1990s (2010, pp. 147-148).
7

blossomed due to the extensive discontents of globalization, such as the Asian financial
crisis of 1997-1998, the collapse of the 1999 World Trade Organization talks in Seattle,
and the push of European Union toward more rigorous integration through the launching
of a common currency in 1999. In fact, regionalism is seen as an emerging notion against
a backdrop of rapid globalization that contains the triumph of democracy, open financial
movements, and the comprehensive battle against terror (Rozman, 2004). Under these
circumstances, looking at a region to better understand international interactions seems
inevitable.
Social science scholars, including those in international relations, have recently
paid extensive attention to regions. This attention derives from the growing number of
formal institutional arrangements such as the European Union (EU), the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Central
American Common Market, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Southern
Common Market (Mercosur) (Pempel, 2005) as well as the less formalized efforts of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Southern African Development
Community (SADC) (Breslin & Higgott, 2000). It has been argued that a focus on
regions can help us better understand changes in and processes of world orders because
regions are “social constructions created through politics” rather than natural, or
“determined by geography” (Katzenstein, 2000, pp. 353-354).
Northeast Asia is under construction as a region. The two competing views
among scholars regarding Northeast Asian regionalism are what Rozman called “liberal
openings and realist suspicions” (2004, p. 12). The liberal political economists argue that
economic integration based on soaring intraregional trade will soon lead to regionalism,
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whereas realists doubt that regionalism will form because of insecurity in Northeast Asia.
Some scholars have focused on the lack of integration within the region based on the
political actions of governments (Frankel & Kahler, 1993; Mansfield & Milner, 1997).
Others have highlighted increased “cohesiveness” or “interconnectedness” in the region
based on nongovernmental actions such as popular culture (Cohen, 2002) and the
development of “open regionalism” in “more peaceful East Asia” than in “more conflictprone Middle East” (Solingen, 2007, pp. 774-775). Thus, there appear to be both positive
and negative prospects for regionalism in Northeast Asia, and this study is intended to
shed light on how the core participant countries have responded to common
environmental issues under these circumstances.
Examination of this topic is complicated by the fact that there is little consensus
on the boundaries of this region. Scholars have included different sets of countries
depending on the topic of their research (Mack & Ravenhill, 1995). For example, Hong
Kong and Taiwan are typically included as main actors in economic discourses on
Northeast Asia, while Russia is generally excluded from the region in cultural studies due
to a lack of racial and cultural commonalities (Nam, 2002). As most studies regarding
Northeast Asia name China, Japan, and the ROK as the core states (Kim, 2004; Rozman,
2004) of the region, this study also focuses primarily on the interactions of these three
countries.
As shown in Figure 1.2, this dissertation defines Northeast Asia as containing six
countries: the Russian Federation, Mongolia, China, Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (hereafter DPRK), the ROK, and Japan. 5

5

For further discussion of this region, see Inkyoung Kim, 2007.
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Figure 1.2. Map of Northeast Asia. Adapted from NEASPEC. http://www.neaspec.org/envirimpera.asp.

Northeast Asia as a region is also quite diverse. It includes not only substantially
different political systems but also various levels of economic development: an economic
superpower, Japan; the rapidly developing ROK and east coast areas of China; and the
poor and largely unindustrialized DPRK, rural China, Russian Far East, and Mongolia.
Given these different levels of economic development, international cooperation within
Northeast Asia can serve as a model to the whole world.
The Asian and Pacific region is worthy of study because it is “home to 60 percent
of the global population, accounts for over 40 percent of the global economy” (UNEP,
2011). There are several subregions in the Asian Pacific: Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia,
South Asia, Central Asia, and Pacific Islands. 6 Among them, Southeast Asia has
developed the most environmental cooperation through numerous legal instruments and
policy statements. This successful institutionalization is attributable to their extensive
6

The classifications of subregions in Asia Pacific may vary across studies and organizations.
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cooperative experiences through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
since the 1960s (Nam, 2008). The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment was
established in 1981 as one of 30 ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies. As shown in Table
1.2, ASEAN has reached agreements on 16 environmental issues. For example, the
implementation of the Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution signed in 2002 by 10
ASEAN member countries (ASEAN, 2010) was accomplished smoothly by designating
the ASEAN Secretariat as its secretariat. 7 This arrangement is quite different from some
cooperative mechanisms of Northeast Asia that have struggled with problems such as
duplication and delays in designating secretariats, as discussed in the following chapters.

Table 1.2
Agreements and Declarations of Southeast Asia
-

ASEAN Declaration on the 13th session of the Conference of the Parties to the
UNFCCC and the 3rd session of the CMP to the Kyoto Protocol (2007)
Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy, and the Environment (2007)
ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability (2007)
Cebu Resolution on Sustainable Development (2006)
Agreement on the Establishment of ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity (2005)
ASEAN Declaration on Heritage Parks (2003)
Yangon Resolution on Sustainable Development (2002)
ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (2002)
Jakarta Declaration on Environment and Development (18 September 1997)
Bandar Seri Begawan Resolution on Environment and Development (1994)
Singapore Resolution on Environment and Development (1992)
The Kuala Lumpur Accord on Environment and Development (1990)
Jakarta Resolution on Sustainable Development (1987)
Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (1985)
Bangkok Declaration on the ASEAN Environment (1984)

7

Haze pollution is defined as “smoke resulting from land and/or forest fire which causes
deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and
ecosystems and material property and impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses
of the environment.” (ASEAN, 2010).
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-

ASEAN Declaration on Heritage Parks and Reserves (1984)

Note: Adapted from ASEAN, http://environment.asean.org/index.php?page=agreements.

Of course, ASEAN also has faced a few challenges, such as weak enforcement
due to the “ASEAN Way” based on non-intervention, lack of ratification, and limited
national capacity (Nam, 2008). In fact, Indonesia, the key polluter, has not ratified the
Haze Pollution Agreement yet, unlike nine other member countries, namely, Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
and Viet Nam. The House of Representatives of Indonesia rejected ratification in 2008,
stating that the agreement threatened Indonesia’s state sovereignty and that it feared other
countries interfering in their domestic issues (Jakarta Globe, January 23, 2011).
Despite these difficulties in implementation, ASEAN’s institutional experience
with transboundary air pollution is way ahead of Northeast Asia’s environmental
cooperation because of its more highly developed administrative structures. Considering
that Northeast Asia includes countries with more advanced economic capacity than those
in Southeast Asia, a lack of national capacity is not a sufficient explanation for the
limited institutionalization of environmental cooperation. In 2009, the total GDP of
China, Japan, and the ROK formed more than one sixth of the world’s total GDP, more
than the U.S. GDP of US$10 trillion: US$4.985 trillion in China, US$5.069 trillion in
Japan, and US$832.512 billion in the ROK (World Bank, 2011). Despite its rapid
economic development, this region has not yet developed international regimes to deal
with transboundary environmental problems even though it has endeavored to build
regional cooperation since the early 1990s. Bilateral environmental cooperation
flourished in the 1990s: between the ROK and China (1993), the ROK and Japan (1993),
12

the ROK and Russia (1994), and China and Japan (1994). However, these bilateral
agreements have been stalled and ineffective due to geopolitical characteristics,
leadership issues, domestic circumstances, and other such issues (Ye, 2011).
It is commonly understood among policy makers and experts in Northeast Asia
that successful European experiences in dealing with transboundary pollution are less
likely to be transplanted to this region due to “substantially different political and
economic systems” and “various levels of economic development” (Kim, 2007). In
addition, little scientific consensus (Chung, 1999; Nam, 2002) and political antipathies
shaped by historical memories (Yoshimatsu, 2010) have been obstacles to regional
governance.
It is easy to assume that these unique characteristics of Northeast Asia may have
prevented the region from building regional institutions. However, it is puzzling to see
how the European countries managed to create the 1979 Long Range Transboundary Air
Pollution despite the distrust between the West and East during the Cold War (Farrell and
Keating, 2006), how the Mediterranean countries were able to reach agreements on the
Med Plan despite economic gaps and political dissimilarities (Haas, 1990), and how
ASEAN countries have reached the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze
Pollution despite even greater cultural diversity. According to previous studies of
regional environmental governance, this difference can be explained by leadership
(Chung, 1999, 2010; Haas, 2000), former experiences with regional institutionalization
(Nam, 2008), and weak organizations and the limited influence of public concerns and
NGOs (Haas, 2000). To make this study useful for policymakers in the region, however,
more attention needs to be paid to the specific elements within each of these factors
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needed for this region to successfully expand its existing cooperation. General
explanations have flourished, and what is now needed are specific lessons that this region
can apply to its own surroundings. Thus, this study attempts to shed light on the
microprocesses of each factor in regime creation within current regional cooperation
efforts.

Why Study Transboundary Air Pollution?
Social scientists, policy makers, and concerned citizens should care about
transboundary air pollution in Asia simply because the emissions of Asian countries are
so extensive and cross national borders. The size of the region’s total economy and the
resulting emissions has grown at a dramatic speed. For example, the ROK has faced air
pollution problems that started in the late 1960s due to the nation’s development of heavy
industries and reached their peak in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the increasing use of
low-sulfur oil and liquefied natural gas has brought a significant decrease in emissions.
Various domestic measures were taken in the 1980s, including the 1981 Standard for
Sulfur Content, the 1985 Prohibition of Solid Fuel Use, and the 1988 Clean Fuel Use
Duty (Chang et al., 2008). As a result, emissions of SO2 in Seoul have continuously
declined (Chang et al, 2008). The emission reductions for nitrogen oxides (NOx) are not
as significant as for sulfur, but it is notable that emissions have been kept at a certain
level, 125 thousand tons, since the sharp reduction between 1989 and 1990 (Chang et al.,
2008). For particulate matter (PM), Seoul has met the standard of an atmospheric
environment of 50µg/m³ as of November 2010, for the first time since the
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countermeasures for improvement of metropolitan atmospheric environments were
implemented in 2005, recording a 17% improvement. 8
The most recent 2012 Environmental Performance Index indicates the successful
management of pollution of the ROK to some extent. 9 The ROK is ranked 43rd out of 132
countries classified as “strong performers” 10 which is quite different from 2002, when the
ROK was ranked 135th among 146 countries and its air quality 120th among 122
countries, evaluated on the performance of urban SO2, NO2, and Total Suspended
Particles (TSP) concentrations (World Economic Forum, 2002). 11 This poor record
resulted from “rapid urbanization and the exponential growth of the vehicle fleet in the
Seoul Metropolitan Area 12” (Kim, 2010, p. 3). However, the dramatic improvement is
shown clearly by its ranking of 13th out of 132 countries of Pilot Trend EPI, which
represents “the change in their environmental performance over the last decade” and
“who is improving and who is declining over time” (Yale Center for Environmental Law
and Policy et al., 2012, p. 4).
In the case of Japan, since modernization in the middle of the 19th century, it has
achieved rapid economic growth through industrialization and urbanization. In 1955-64,
8

This data was provided by a Korean governmental official of Ministry of Environment in an
interview.
9
“The 2012 EPI rankings are comprised of both a snapshot of performance based on the latest
available data (the 2012 EPI) and a trend rank based on performance over the last decade”
(http://epi.yale.edu/epi2012/rankings).
10
Japan is ranked 23rd in the group of strong performers, and China 116th in weak performers. EPI
classifies countries into five groups; strongest performers, strong performers, modest performers,
weaker performers, and weakest performers.
11
TSP is the particle diameters approximately less than 50-100 microns (µm) which is different
from PM10, inhalable particles less than 10 microns in diameter which penetrates through the
nose, and PM2.5, “fine fraction” less than 2.5 microns in diameter which penetrates to the lungs.
12
From 1990 to 2000, the population of the Seoul metropolitan area, covering 12% of the
nation’s entire area, increased by 20% to almost 22 million, accounting for 46% of all South
Koreans. More impressively, the number of vehicles in the Seoul metropolitan area increased by
211%, from 1.8 million in 1990 to 5.6 million, in 2000 (Ministry of Environment, Republic of
Korea, 2004).
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the economic development of Japan was supported by tripled energy consumption, which
resulted in various air pollution problems that were at their peak in the 1960s. However,
Japan’s technological innovation, institutional development, and collaboration between
government and industry led to the significant decrease of sulfur dioxide emissions, by
nearly 40% between 1974 and 1987 (UNEP, 2001, p. 32).
Northeast Asia has been not an exception to the growing global ecological
interdependence, which is known as one of systemic process changes that have
contributed to emerging restrictions on air pollution. In ecological science the term
“ecological interdependence” refers to the fact that the loss or weakening of an ecosystem
service, such as the soil’s retaining ground moisture, can harm many species that rely on
the ecosystem. In environmental politics, however, the term “ecological interdependence”
is typically used to refer to common environmental problems shared by several countries.
But as Nam has observed, “Geographical proximity and climate contiguity may seem to
constitute what shapes a region into a single ecological community, but that is not
necessarily the case. Rather, deterioration of regional common pool resources drives the
region to become a destined ecological community” (2002, p. 169).
Thus the efforts made by the ROK and Japan in the region have been diluted by
China, which has followed the same pattern of development taken by most developed
nations, including the United Kingdom, United States, and Japan: “pollute first, control
later.” Under this model, countries consider environmental protection only after they
achieve a certain degree of economic development (Wang, 2006-2007). China has
developed its economy at a dramatic speed since the advent of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform
and opening” in the late 1970s. Between 1979 and 2011, China recorded a 9.6% average
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annual GDP growth rate. Its urban population increased by 4.2% annually between 1990
and 2003, even though the total population growth rate remained under 1%, and urban
dwellers accounted for 40.53% of the total population in China (OECD, 2006). The total
population in China comprises 20% of the global population, although China possesses
only 6.8% of global arable land. See Figure 1.3 for the remarkable decrease in arable land
in China between 1996 and 2002.

Figure 1.3. Change in arable land area in China between 1996 and 2002. Adapted from
Environmental Information Center, SEPA. (2004). Analysis Report on the State of the
Environment in China. http://english.mep.gov.cn/SOE/analysis/index.htm#wastegas1.

Moreover, China’s “desire for self-sufficiency has exerted large pressures on the
ecosystem” (OECD, 2006, p. 12). This economic development has led to several key
problems in China: contamination of fresh water resources; air pollution by particulate
matter and other pollutants; soil erosion and desertification (“desert now covers 25% of
China’s territory”) due to degradation and destruction of forests; and the loss of
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cultivated land due to unsustainable agricultural practices and expansion of urban and
industrial areas; and biodiversity loss (OECD, 2006, p. 11).
A 1999 study by the World Bank estimated that “air and water pollution damage,
especially the dangers that fine airborne particulates pose to human health, have been
estimated to be at least USD 54 billion a year--nearly 8% of China’s GDP” (OECD,
2006, p. 11). Another report by the Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning for the
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) in 2006 states the cost of air
pollution at CNY 219.8 billion (OECD, 2006, 12). In fact, the amount of emitted
industrial waste gas has shown a gradual increase, as seen in Figure 1.4, even though the
rate of increase has slowed to some extent since 1997.

Figure 1.4. Change in amount of discharge of waste gas in China, 1990–2002. Adapted from
Environmental Information Center, SEPA. (2004). Analysis Report on the State of the
Environment in China. http://english.mep.gov.cn/SOE/analysis/index.htm#wastegas1.

Chinese efforts to deal with these environmental problems can be seen in (a) its
institutional framework for environmental regulation, (b) environmental legislation, and
18

(c) Five-Year Environment Plans in line with Five-Year Social and Economic
Development Plans (FYPs). 13 It should be noted that the national-level institutional
framework for environmental regulation has been improved. The China’s first top-level
environmental body was the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB), set up in 1974 with
a staff of 20 as a unit under the State Council. Since then, the status of the EPB has
improved gradually. After subsequent reorganizations of the governmental system, SEPA
was set up as a ministry at the end of March 1998, upgraded from the National
Environmental Protection Agency and promoted from a sub-ministry to a ministry. SEPA
was placed directly under the State Council as one of its ministries, and at the time “its
head reports directly to the Vice Premier in charge of environmental protection, has the
status of Minister and participates in State Council meetings when environmental matters
are discussed” (OECD, 2006, p. 15). SEPA had around 2,200 employees including
administrative staff in Beijing and in various SEPA-affiliated national offices and centers.
Although this number was a great increase over EPB’s staff of 20 in 1974, it remained
quite small relative to the size and population of China and “still considered a relatively
weak agency,” as suggested by its not having a permanent seat in the State Council
(Wang, 2006-2007, p. 199).
In 2008, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) was established to
replace SEPA. The Ministry of Environmental Protection is the current national-level
administrative body that prepares and implements national policies, legislation and
regulations; formulates environmental quality criteria and pollutant discharge/emission
standards at the national level; organizes environmental quality monitoring; and initiates
13

FYPs have been the basis for coordinating Chinese public policy priorities, developed by the
Chinese government and approved by the Chinese Communist Party and the National People’s
Congress.
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enforcement activities together with local environmental authorities. However, its
autonomy seems limited due to the large number of ministries and agencies of the State
Council that have to manage separately a range of environment-related issues.
The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) plays a key role as
the body responsible for developing and implementing FYPs. In this capacity,
NDRC integrates environmental issues into the overall planning system in China
and into sector-specific policies (e.g., on energy). The key ministries engaged in
the implementation of environmental policies include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Ministry of Water Management: watershed management, soil erosion,
groundwater quality;
Ministry of Land and Resources: land use planning, mineral and marine
resource management, land rehabilitation;
Ministry of Agriculture: management of agricultural chemicals, aquatic
natural reserves, agro-biodiversity and grasslands;
Ministry of Forestry: forest management and protection and nature
conservation;
Ministry of Health: monitoring the quality of drinking water and the
incidences of related diseases;
Ministry of Construction: environmental infrastructure, including water
supply and wastewater treatment plants and solid waste management;
Ministry of Communications: shares responsibility with SEPA on vehicle
emissions control;
Ministry of Supervision: takes part in environmental enforcement campaigns
carried out by SEPA.
Other government agencies concerned with environmental policy include:
State Forest Administration: forest conservation, afforestation, biodiversity
and wildlife management;
State Oceanic Administration: management of coastal and marine waters,
including marine biodiversity conservation; and
China Meteorology Administration: regional air quality management, climate
change issues. (OECD, 2006, pp.15-16)

Along with the national-level institutional framework for environmental
regulation, the sub-national-level framework has improved. Around 2,000 Environmental
Protection Bureaus (EPBs) employ some 60,000 people “at the provincial,
prefecture/municipal, district/counties, and township administration levels” to oversee
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environmental impact assessment (EIA), to monitor pollution releases from industries, to
assess fees for pollution discharges, to initiate legal action against violations by firms,
and to raise public awareness (OECD, 2006, p. 17). These sub-national level EPBs are
subordinate to provincial and local governments both institutionally and financially, even
though they receive guidance from SEPA. The EPBs’ dependency on these more local
governments has led its low ranking in the government hierarchy, as economic
development has been favored over environmental considerations by local governments
(OECD, 2006, p. 18). To overcome the low profile of environmental protection, in 2007,
the State Council adopted a policy that stipulates that performance in energy saving and
emissions reduction are two of the deciding factors for promotion of leaders and heads of
local government. Thus, poor performance on either of these two factors will prevent
governmental officials from being promoted even if the economic performance of the
region is good (Koyanagi, 2008; Miyajiri, 2009).

Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia
In the mid-1990s China began to embrace multilateralism, moving away from a
preference for bilateralism, because of its status as a “primary mover of regional
economic and security cooperation in East Asia” (Zhao, 2011, p. 53). In May of 2012,
China released a white paper titled China-Japan-ROK Cooperation (1999-2012) to
review “the history of trilateral friendly exchanges, showcase the achievements of
trilateral practical cooperation and envision the broad prospects of tripartite relations”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, 2012). 14 As it shows, the three key countries of
14

China’s motive for this white paper was as the coordinator for 2012 trilateral cooperation,
hosting the Fifth Trilateral Summit Meeting. In addition, the year 2012 “marks the 40th
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Northeast Asia have developed significant cooperation on a variety of issue areas,
including political and security affairs, trade and finance, sustainable development, and
social and cultural exchanges. Based on Hidetaka Yoshimatsu’s compilation of trilateral
cooperative mechanisms on various issue areas (2010, p. 232), Table 1.3 demonstrates
that environmental cooperation has a longer history in Northeast Asia.
Table 1.3
Summits and Ministerial Meetings Among China, Japan, and ROK
Start
Date

Major Features

1999

The meeting was not held in 2005 due to
political tensions. The meeting,
independent of ASEAN + 3, has been held
annually since 2008.

Environment

1999

Framed as Tripartite Environmental
Ministers Meeting (TEMM, and issued a
joint communiqué.

Finance

2000

Held just before the annual ASEAN + 3
Finance Ministers meeting.

Economy and trade

2002

Organized on the sidelines of the ASEAN
+ 3 meeting. The meeting was not held in
2005.

Information technology
(IT)

2002

The formation of director-general
meetings in various sub-fields.

Logistics

2006

The publication of a concrete action plan.

Tourism

2006

The issuing of a joint declaration.

Policy Field

Summit

anniversary of normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, the China-Japan
Year of Friendly Exchanges, the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations
between China and the ROK, and the Year of China-ROK Friendly Exchanges” (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of China, 2012).
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Health

2007

The issuing of the joint action plan on
pandemic influenza in 2008.

Science and technology
(S&T)

2007

The establishment of 'China-Japan-Korea
Trilateral S&T Cooperation' at
governmental and institutional levels.

Foreign Affairs

2008

The Three-Party Committee was held
before 2007.

Note: Adapted from Yoshimatsu, 2010, p. 232.

As noted earlier, cooperation among Northeast Asian countries regarding
environmental issues has not brought concrete regulations through the creation of
environment regimes yet. Unlike many studies that ask why Northeast Asia has not built
any legally binding international regime despite considerable effort to institutionalize
cooperation since the early 1990s (for example, Kim, 2007; Lee, 1999; Ohta, 2008), this
dissertation intends to explain the variation in the extent of environmental cooperation
around different issue areas, and asks what factors can explain the variations among issue
areas even under the same power relations, economic relations, and cultural surroundings.
Rather than characterizing regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast
Asia as “non-regime,” the study unpacks varying forms of collective action undertaken
by states in the region regarding transboundary air pollution in terms of the substantive
content of their cooperation. In doing so, this study examines the causal relationships
between degrees and forms of regional collective action and political leadership,
knowledge, and socialization.

Case Selection
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China, Japan, and the ROK have participated in more than 20 environmental
cooperative programs since the mid-1980s as shown in Table 1.1. Some programs include
Asia-wide cooperation, and others are exclusive to Northeast Asian countries. For this
study, three cases were selected according to the four following criteria: issue-specific,
involving a problem with transnational effect related to air pollution, currently operating,
and participated in by the core three countries of Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and the
ROK). The three cases that met these criteria are the EANET (Acid Deposition
Monitoring Network in East Asia), developed to monitor acid deposition among 13 East
Asian countries; the Tripartite Director General Meetings (TDGM), developed to address
yellow sand and dust sandstorms among China, Japan, and the ROK under the Tripartite
Environment Ministerial Meetings (TEMM); and the LTP (Joint Research on Long-range
Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia), developed to cooperate on issues of air
pollution among the same three countries. Selecting cooperative mechanisms among the
same countries and in the same issue area (transboundary air pollution) is intended to
control for other possible independent variables.
Two other cooperative mechanisms met the first three criteria but not the last
criteria of participation of the three core countries and thus were not included. These are
the Environmental Monitoring of Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) in East Asian
Countries, and the Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities (CAI-Asia). In December 2002,
10 East Asian countries (Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) established the Workshop on
Environmental Monitoring of POPs in order to identify the levels of POPs remaining in
East Asia as required by the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. The
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Convention was ratified or accepted by most Asian Countries, including China, Japan,
and the ROK (UN Treaty Collection, 2013). Although China participated in workshops in
its early years—2002, 2003, and 2005—it has not attended any meetings of the
organization, such as expert working group meetings and policy group meetings, since
2006 (Ministry of Environment in Japan, 2013).
The second of these rejected mechanisms, the Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities
(CAI-Asia), was established in 2001 by the Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and
USAID to “promote better air quality and livable cities by translating knowledge to
policies and actions that reduce air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from transport,
energy and other sectors” (CAI-Asia, 2013a, 1). CAI-Asia has various partnership
members, including 45 cities, 33 government agencies, 112 nongovernmental and
academic organizations, 17 international development agencies and foundations, and 36
members from the private sector (CAI-Asia, 2013b). Both the Ministry of the
Environment in Japan and the Ministry of Environmental Protection in China have been
participating governmental agencies, but no governmental agency from the ROK has
been involved in CAI-Asia. Only a few Korean academic institutes have participated in
CAI-Asia, such as Seoul National University, International Environmental Analysis and
Education Center, and Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology.

Dependent Variables
The dependent variables of this study are the forms and degree of collective
action in regime-building processes. Collective action is typically categorized into three
categories: legally binding, structured and science-focused, and less structured
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cooperative mechanisms. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
classifies regional environmental action and initiatives into three different categories: (a)
“regional entities with established infrastructure and a policy focus”; (b) “regional
entities with permanent structure and a science focus”; (c) “other initiatives” that “have
no permanent structures, but provide viable policy making fora for regional cooperation”
(UNEP, 2011, 36-37). Most regional cooperative mechanisms regarding transboundary
air pollution in East Asia fall into UNEP’s second category, including the three cases that
this dissertation examines
The first and highest level is “regional entities with established infrastructure and
a policy focus,” which includes “detailed regional legal instruments and infrastructure”
(UNEP, 2011, p. 36). Among these, the UNEP recognizes the Convention on LongRange Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) as “the most established example” of
these entities as it “mandates legally-binding national emission ceilings for different
pollutants” (ibid.).
The UNEP’s second category of regional action is regional entities with
permanent structures and a science focus. These have permanent structures such as a
secretariat but have not reached any legally binding agreements and are focused largely
on developing a regional scientific base by promoting or undertaking regional monitoring
and modeling projects. The UNEP includes in this category the Acid Deposition
Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) and the Malé Declaration on Control and
Prevention of Air Pollution and its Likely Transboundary Effects for South Asia.
Its third category includes regional initiatives that “provide viable policy making
for regional cooperation” without permanent structures or legally binding measures
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(UNEP, 2011, p. 37). The UNEP includes several regional initiatives in this category:
ministerial declarations of Sub-Saharan African governments, such as the Lusaka
Agreement for southern Africa, the Nairobi Agreement for eastern Africa, and the
Abidjan Agreement for west and central Africa, which “lay out common policy, set
regional priorities and offer a framework for future cooperation”; the intergovernmental
Network on Air Pollution in Latin America and the Caribbean, which “was created and
given a mandate from the Regional Forum of Environment Ministers of Latin America
and the Caribbean to develop a regional work plan”; and the Joint Forum on Atmospheric
Environment Issues in Asia and the Pacific, which draws together several institutions and
intergovernmental initiatives (UNEP, 2011, 37).
None of the Northeast Asian environmental cooperative mechanisms have created
regional legal instruments and infrastructures with legally binding national emission
ceilings for transboundary air pollutants. Instead, they have all built permanent structures
with a scientific focus to promote and undertake regional joint monitoring and modeling
projects. This study compares the experiences of these Northeast Asian cooperative
efforts to those of Europe in terms of their political leadership, knowledge, and
socialization processes to explain the reasons for these differences.
At the same time, there are differences in the degree of collective action among
these three cases even though they all fall into UNEP’s second category. To compare
different forms and degrees of collective action in Northeast Asia, this dissertation
classifies the forms and extents of collective action according to three characteristics:
their formalization, concreteness, and legalization. Given that none of these Northeast
Asian cooperative mechanisms have reached legally binding agreements, the
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formalization and concreteness of their collective action are classified in more detail to
compare the cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia.
The dissertation investigates the UNEP’s second category in more detail. To
determine the formal forms of collective action, it examines not only whether a regional
cooperative mechanism has permanent structures such as a secretariat but also whether
those permanent structures are working in practice. For this, this study analyzes the
division of labor of each entity within a regional cooperative mechanism, such as its
secretariat, governing body, and scientific advisory body, as well as formal financial
structures shared by member countries. To illustrate the concrete degrees of collective
action, the study examines the existence of agreed-upon shared formats and guidelines
for joint monitoring and modeling activities. Based on these criteria, the three cooperative
mechanisms under study demonstrate different forms and degrees of collective action
dealing with different transboundary air pollution issues.
Of the three cases, the EANET has developed the most formal and concrete form
and degree of collective action. It has a structured, concrete, and specific organizational
scheme with a clear division of labor among four key entities: a secretariat,
intergovernmental meetings as a governing body, a scientific advisory committee as its
source of knowledge, and the network center to control monitoring activities. Moreover,
the EANET has established formal standards for the financial structures of the EAENT,
even though they are still on a voluntary basis. In addition to these formal characteristics,
the EAENT has established the highest degree of collective action through developing
common and concrete monitoring guidelines and quality assurance and quality control
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measures to confirm the comparable quality of monitoring data among its 13 member
countries.
In contrast, the TDGM has a formal form of collective action that contains a clear
division of labor among its organizational entities, but it has inspired a lesser extent of
collective action due to lack of concrete and agreed-upon methods for DSS monitoring.
The steering committee that serves as a governing body has determined two working
group activities: Working Group I for “joint research on a regional network for DSS
monitoring and early warning system” and Working Group II for the prevention and
control of DSS. These TDGM objectives were also clarified in a joint announcement of
the 2007 TDGM. However, the participants of the TDGM have not created commonly
shared monitoring methods and indicators for DSS, as the three governments’ agencies,
mostly national meteorological agencies, have used their own methods and indicators for
DSS monitoring.
The LTP has developed neither a formal nor concrete form of collective action
despite engaging in cooperative efforts for two decades. Little clarification of financial
structures and the division of labor between its organizational entities have reduced its
formalization as a regional cooperative mechanism. Moreover, the three participating
countries have all used different monitoring and modeling methods, which has made it
difficult to compare their research results in a useful way. Table 1.4 summarizes the
variations among these three cases. The following sections discuss what analytical
approaches this dissertation uses and adopts can explain these variations among three
East Asian cooperative mechanisms.
Table 1.4
Variation Among Dependent Variables
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Since

Initiator

Formal

Concrete

Legal

EANET

1993

Japan

Yes

Yes

No

DSS

2007

ROK

Yes

No

No

LTP

1995

ROK

No

No

No

Note: The “formal” degree of collective action is measured through examining the permanent
structures of cooperative mechanisms, such as a secretariat, and the division of labor of their
entities, such as the secretariat, governing body, and scientific advisory body, as well as formal
financial structures shared by member countries. The “concrete” degree of collective action is
measured through examining the existence of agreed-upon shared formats and guidelines for joint
monitoring and modeling activities. The “legal” form of collective action is measured through
examining the existence of legally binding agreement among participating countries.

Analytical Frameworks, Independent Variables, and Hypotheses
The starting premise of this study is that international cooperation is a form of
social interaction and, furthermore, that each factor that determines the form of
cooperation itself can evolve along with the social interaction. Mainstream international
relations theories accept that social interaction can change state behavior (Johnston,
2008). For structural realists, the social interaction of states tends to occur among
countries through balancing against rising power in order to maximize security under
anarchy (Mearsheimer, 1995; Waltz, 1979). Neoliberal institutionalism at the
international level (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 1984; Keohane & Martin, 1995; Keohane &
Nye, 1977; Oye, 1986; Powell 1991; Snidal, 1991) and rationalist institutionalism at the
domestic level (Milner, 1998) regard social interaction inside institutions as a key driver
of actors’ behavior through altering cost-benefit analyses based on fixed preferences. For
them, strategic interactions within political institutions and among domestic constituents
can explain how diverse domestic preferences are aggregated into collective choices.
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In contrast, constructivists do not treat preferences as inherent in states or within
the international system and as generated from states’ material conditions and functional
needs. Rather, they claim that social interaction in international relations can change
actors’ interests through such social structural elements as shared beliefs, norms,
institutions, identities, and discourse (Wendt, 1994). In particular, constructivists suggest
that “there is a causal link between the presence of particular normative structures
embodied in institutions and the incorporation of these norms in behavior by the
actor/agent at the unit level” (Johnston, 2008, p. xx). Following the constructivist view,
this study assumes that interactions among countries within international institutions can
change their interests and strategies. Thus, the focus of this research is the interactions
among participating countries through the processes of the studied regional cooperative
mechanisms.
In contrast to the constructivist view, neorealist and neoliberal scholars share an
unproblematized assumption of pre-specified state preferences of states as actors. For
them, what states want in the foreign policy arena and international interactions is the
result of the relevant actors’ actions to maximize their material capabilities. Unlike these
theories, constructivists pay more attention to how national interests get defined and have
evolved and treat national interests endogenously rather than exogenously. For them, an
understanding of national interests is molded by social structural elements, such as shared
beliefs, norms, institutions, identities, and discourse. This study also dismisses what Haas
and Stevens called the “standard rationalist account that major problems create the
incentives for their resolution, and thus modern bureaucracies . . . either develop effective
responses almost automatically or are so powerfully constrained by the strategic interests
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of powerful member states or participants” (2011, pp. 127-128). Instead, this study
highlights the social interactions between states of the region and assumes that
interactions among countries within international institutions can change their interests
and strategies throughout the processes of the regional cooperation.
To analyze these international interactions, this study examines the independent
variables of leadership, scientific knowledge, and socialization. As discussed below,
political leadership and knowledge serve as structural girders, and socialization is
associated with the process.
Independent Variable 1: Political Leadership
The first independent variable of this study is leadership, which Underdal has
defined as “an asymmetrical relationship of positive influence in which one actor directs
the behavior of other actors toward a certain goal, based on a collective pursuit of
common good or joint purpose” (Underdal, 1994, pp.178-179). Positive influence
excludes veto collective action, and thus “being the first to defect from a joint
undertaking would not qualify as leadership” (Underdal, 1994, p. 179). Unilateral
behavior without shared interests and beliefs also would not qualify as leadership due to
the lack of collective pursuit of a common good. Similar to the leadership of religious
leaders who inspire followers and business leaders who lead explosive performance in
industrial transformations, political leadership in the international cooperation arena can
be defined as ability to inspire or lead member countries to reach agreements on proposed
policy arrangements (Underdal, 1994).
Previous scholars have asserted that the emergence of leadership is a necessary
condition for success in efforts to gain agreements at the international level (Young,

32

1991). Once these regimes develop their structure and dynamics, leadership may not be
important anymore because the systematic arrangements of regimes can run the
institutions. Until regimes can proceed autonomously, however, “when a regime is
clearly in a process of evolution, when the principles underlying the regime are still in a
process of being articulated, when the division of responsibilities between countries is
still a critical negotiating point, there is a clear role for leadership” (Grubb & Gupta,
2000b, p. 17). This study presumes that political leadership is a product of international
interactions rather than granted based on the status of countries’ relative material
capability. Realists presume that leadership can only come from the most powerful
country in the region, which in this case would be China. Instead, this study presumes
that various modes of leadership are contributing factors. When countries organize
international cooperative mechanisms, considerable expenses need to be borne to
complete their objectives; complicated communication must take place to hold
international meetings; and intellectual systems (ideas) need to be generated to guide the
direction of their cooperation. To meet these requirements, it has been asserted that the
emergence of leadership is a contributing factor for successful generation of agreement at
the international level.
As shown in Table 1.5, the modes of leadership have been differently categorized
by various authors (Grubb & Gupta, 2000b; Malnes, 1995; Underdal, 1994; Young,
1991). 15 Notable is the clear correspondence between these various typologies. Despite
differences in vocabulary and scope, these scholars’ definitions of leadership all fall into
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In addition, Haas classifies leadership in the following ways for the Mediterranean Action Plan,
based on “regional economic, scientific, and diplomatic resources” (Haas, 1990, 167).
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three similar main categories. This study adopts the terms structural, instrumental, and
directional for these three modes, each of which is discussed in more detail below.
Table 1.5
Typologies of Leadership Modes
Authors and Terms for Modes

Mode of exercising
leadership
use political and
economic power to
provide incentives
craft structures and
apply diplomatic skills
use ideas and example
of own domestic
implementation to
influence others’
perception

Young (1989)

Underdal
(1994)

Malnes
(1995)

Gupta
&Grubb
(2000)

structural

coercive

carrots and
sticks

structural

problemsolving

instrumental

directional

directional

entrepreneurial instrumental

intellectual

unilateral

Structural Leadership
The first category of leadership typologies is what this study is calling structural
leadership. Structural leadership comes from the ability to wield economic and political
power that stems from that state’s material resources and is used to affect “the incentives
of others to accept one’s own terms or at least make a concession” (Underdal, 1994, p.
186). Structural leadership “is exercised through the commitment of financial, technical
and scientific resources necessary for environmental assessment and policy-making with
the intent of shaping agendas and policy outcomes” (Selin, 2012, p. 216).
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It is hard to say that any single country holds regional hegemonic power in
Northeast Asia. There is considerable competition for power between China and Japan
and a solid awareness of the ROK as a middle power, leaving the power of other
countries such as Mongolia and North Korea far behind within this region. Grubb and
Gupta argue that pure hegemony, considered the extreme of structural leadership, is not
relevant to global environmental issues because a single country – even the United States
or the European Union – “could not impose a global solution that would last; nor would
they be willing to bear the full and long-term costs of providing enough carrots to bring
the rest of the world along” (2000, p. 19). Adler and Barnett posit that power, as one of
structural girders for the development of a security community, is “an important factor in
the development of a security community by virtue of a core state’s ability to nudge and
occasionally coerce others to maintain a collective stance” (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p.
39). They argue that the “existence of core states or a coalition of states will be necessary
for providing leadership, side payments, and perhaps protection to the other members of
the group” (p. 52). This approach has been appropriated by power theorists who stress the
role of a hegemon that possesses preponderant material resources in the regime formation
processes.
This study, however, asserts that the simple existence of power in a region would
not necessarily lead to effective cooperation on transboundary environmental issues. No
matter what country might have the ability to coerce others to create and maintain a
collective action, 16 actually exerting political leadership is a different story. This is
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This approach to power is based on the famous Dahl’s definition of power, which is the ability
of A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do (1957, pp. 202-03). However, Barnett and
Duvall (2005) generated a fourfold taxonomy of power based on two dimensions: “the kinds of
social relations through which power works, and the specificity of the social relations through
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particularly the case in Northeast Asia, where no one major country would be regarded as
a regional hegemon or dominant power.
Accordingly, this dissertation assumes that any state in the region could exercise
any form of leadership if it is willing to, which is a significantly different approach from
most leadership literature, particularly regarding structural leadership. As many previous
studies have already proven, active participation of a hegemonic power is not a necessary
condition for success in dealing with international environmental problems (Young,
2011), and different forms of leadership have been wielded in global environmental
politics.
The corresponding typologies of structural leadership mentioned above tend to
focus on the role played by states with the ability to exert economic and political power
driven by their material resources to shoulder most of the considerable costs of
cooperation under an assumption that only great powers can succeed in exerting
structural leadership. This corresponds to the realists’ assertion that leadership can come
only from the most powerful country in the region.
This dissertation pays special attention to the material contributions that member
countries make to regional environmental cooperation as a proxy variable, as we cannot
see political leadership directly but can see spending. This study treats spending as
evidence of structural leadership by assuming that states wanting to exercise or actually
exercising structural leadership will be spending more in that effort. It also argues,
which power’s effects are produced” (12). They argued that “compulsory power exists in the
direct control by one actor over the conditions of existence and/or the actions of another.
Institutional power exists in actors’ indirect control over the conditions of action of socially
distant others. Structural power operates as the constitutive relations of a direct and specific,
hence, mutually constituting, kind. And, productive power works through diffuse constitutive
relations to produce the situated subjectivities of actors” (p. 12).
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however, that the states of the region decide whether to exercise structural leadership on
their own, based on their national goals on particular issue areas. As mentioned above,
this study contends that these national goals or interests are not predetermined but
changeable throughout international interaction. Thus the study does not regard structural
leadership as predetermined by a state’s material capabilities. As noted, structural
leadership may be exercised by powerful countries, but may also be exercised by willing
countries regardless of their material capabilities. Bill Gates, for instance, is one of the
largest donors in the world, but there are a large number of willing donors who have
limited income but are eager to share with others. Thus, structural leadership measured
by dominant material contributions to regional environmental cooperation is, for the
purposes of this study, a matter of choice of the states in the region rather than a gift or
burden determined by the international setting. In this sense, China or Japan would not be
the only countries who can wield structural leadership in the Northeast Asian context.
This study argues that any country in the region can try to exercise structural leadership if
it is willing, based on its national goals for specific issue areas and international
interactions among member countries.
Instrumental Leadership
The second form of leadership examined by this study is what it terms
instrumental leadership, which refers to “negotiating skills to frame issues in ways that
foster integrative bargaining and to put together deals that would otherwise elude
participants endeavoring to form international regimes through institutional bargaining”
(Young, 1991, p. 293). Actors exercising instrumental leadership can “function as (1)
agenda setters shaping the form in which issues are presented for consideration at the
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international level, (2) popularizers drawing attention to the importance of the issues at
stake, (3) inventors devising innovative policy options to overcome bargaining
impediments, and (4) brokers making deals and lining up support for salient options”
(Young, 1991, p. 294).
In Europe, the Nordic countries exerted considerable instrumental leadership
through active participation in various bodies of the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP). Several Norwegian and Swedish participants
presided over the meetings of the executive body and the working group on strategies as
well as leading the CLRTAP secretariat in the 1980s. Along with the Nordic countries,
Germany also exerted instrumental leadership after the “catalytic change in German air
policies” (Wettestad, 2011, p. 51). This instrumental leadership exerted by these
European countries for CLRTAP, played an important role for strengthening and
developing the environmental regime further.
In the case of the Mediterranean Action Plan (Med Plan), UNEP took over
instrumental leadership from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (Haas, 1990)
and from the chairman, Stjepan Keckes (Haas, 1990) in mid 1970s. Even though the FAO
continued to be involved in organizing meetings on monitoring and principles, it “lost the
leadership and coordination of Mediterranean pollution control to UNEP”:
In August 1974 UNEP informed the FAP that UNEP, after receiving a formal
proposal from Spain, had decided to convene a meeting of government
representatives in December 1974 or January 1975 to discuss the preparation of a
framework convention, based on the FAO consultations. (Haas, 1990, p. 91)

UNEP exerted its instrumental leadership through mobilizing scientific support
for the exercise and elaborating the FAO’s early efforts for monitoring. UNEP
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cosponsored the International Workshop on Marine Pollution in the Mediterranean with
other agencies in September 1974, and the Workshop “served to set the agenda for all
subsequent pollution discussions” (Haas, 1990, p. 91). Through this process, UNEP was
able to create “agreement on an extremely comprehensive list of sources and channels of
pollution” (Haas, 1990, p. 91).
In the case of the three Northeast Asian cooperative mechanisms on
transboundary air pollution issues examined in this study, Japan and the ROK have
exercised instrumental leadership to a limited degree particularly within the cooperative
mechanisms that they initiated. In addition, the scientific focus rather than policy
innovation of the cooperative mechanisms has limited the development of instrumental
leadership in Northeast Asia.
Directional Leadership
The third form of leadership is what this study is terming directional leadership,
the ability to produce “intellectual capital or generative systems of thought that shape the
perspectives of those who participate in institutional bargaining” (Young, 1991, p. 298).
This directional or intellectual leadership “relies on the power of ideas, norms, and
knowledge to shape the way other participants involved in regime formation perceive
issues and conceptualize policy alternatives,” and thus intellectual leaders “often seek the
adoption of particular policies by trying to secure broad assimilation and acceptance of
new ideas, norms, and knowledge” (Selin, 2012, p. 216). Examples of ideas that have
played a significant role in building international regimes are the “embedded liberalism”
that provided coherent support of free trade and establishment of a new system of
adjustable exchange rates (Ruggie, 1982) and the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin,
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1968) that showed the dilemma of common property resources. This form of leadership is
generally considered one that middle powers and even small and weaker countries a can
also exert (Kanie, 2005). The active role played by the Scandinavian countries in building
CLRTAP in Europe is a case that demonstrates this form of leadership.
In addition to the intellectual influence of knowledge, another aspect of
directional leadership is the ability to persuade other countries. Social persuasion is “the
possibility of states leading by a combination of internal and external initiatives that seek
to influence the perception of other countries as to what is desirable and what is possible”
through demonstrating successful domestic policy (Grubb & Gupta, 2000b, p. 20). States
can serve as a good example for other countries to follow in two ways. The first way is
through advocacy “groups of environmentalists who claim that by unilaterally imposing
on one’s own society strict standards of pollution control a government may help
strengthen public demands in other countries for equally strict measures,” and the second
is through a government who “can strengthen demand within its own society for
international regulations” “by imposing or threatening to impose unilateral environmental
protection measures” (Underdal, 1994, p. 185). Kanie anticipates that the EU can exert
this form of leadership on the post-2012 international climate-change regime-building
process through demonstrating the successful implementation of the EU Emissions Trade
Scheme (Kanie, 2005).
This study examines these three modes of leadership as practiced by national
(rather than individual) leadership under the assumption that states operates as aggregate
political entities. Despite having different political systems, the three core countries of
Northeast Asia—China, Japan, and the ROK—share “a strong orientation of
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developmentalism” (Yoshimatsu, 2010, p. 231). 17 Democratic Japan and South Korea
with their capitalist economies and state-party-dominant China with its socialist market
economy all allow their governments to exert “strong influences on the market in order to
attain steady economic development” (Yoshimatsu, 2010, p. 231).
This study does not discuss the role of environmental NGOs for the development
of regional environmental cooperation as transboundary pollution has not attracted much
public attention in Northeast Asia. It is true, however, the quantity of environmental
NGOs in the three countries has grown significantly. In particular, increased
democratization in the ROK has led to the rapid growth of the environmental movement
there since the late 1980s (Schreurs, 2002, p. 61). The issues that the Korean
environmental NGOs pay attention to have also diversified, from political and economic
concerns with compensation from the government through the mid-1990s to ecological
concerns with neighboring environments after the mid-1990s (Cho, 2010). In a regional
scale, chemical management and e-waste management systems have been developed with
strong support from NGOs in Northeast Asia (Yoshimatsu, 2010). However,
transboundary air pollution issues still have not captured much public attention in these
countries. According to Komori, for example, the “environmental NGOs and the public
in South Korea have focused more on domestic environmental problems than regional
and global issues” (2010, p. 11). Some researchers have acknowledged the role played by
the public and NGOs regarding the problems of dust and sandstorms (Ohta, 2008), but
their effect remains less impressive than it might due to their tendency to organize
sporadic events without long-term strategies.
17

The developmental state is “characterised by the strong state with autonomous power to
achieve economic development through direct intervention in the market” (Yoshimatsu, 2010, p.
231).
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Given the strong influence of states and limited influence of NGOs, this study
focuses on the national leadership played by each country rather than leadership exerted
by individuals or groups who participate in cooperative environmental mechanisms.
Other studies that have examined national leadership in this way include that of Kanie
(2005) on the successful leadership of the middle-power countries of Australia and
Canada in the Cairns Group at the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT and of
Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994) on the leadership of Canada, Australia, Switzerland, and
the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden in the negotiations
regarding stratospheric ozone depletion.
Considering the importance of political leadership played by particular states in
the region, this study analyzes the exercise of three forms of leadership on three different
cooperative mechanisms on transboundary air pollution in Northeast Asia. This study
hypothesizes that the strong political leadership exerted by a particular country or
countries, the more formal and concrete we can expect collective action to be. Stronger
political leadership by any country in the region can increase the likelihood of
development of more formal and concrete collective action.
Thus, these analytical frameworks and previous research lead to the first
hypothesis of this study:
Hypothesis 1: The stronger the leadership, whether structural, instrumental, or
directional, by a participating country (not necessarily a hegemon or the
regionally dominant state actor) or a group of countries in a form of regional
environmental cooperation, the more formal and the more concrete will be the
collective action developed in the region.
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Independent Variable 2: Knowledge
Regarding the role of ideas in political action and cooperation, international
relations theory has been divided into two varying approaches, which various scholars
have given different names: “cognitive” versus “constructivist” (Bieler, 2001; Yee,
1996); “weak” versus “strong” cognitivism (Hasenclever et al., 2000, 10-12); or “topdown” versus “bottom-up” approaches (Knopf, 1998). According to Bieler, the main
focus of cognitive approaches is the causal effects on policy exerted by ideas, or in other
words, “the transmission of ideas into policy,” while constructivism emphasizes the
constitutive role played by “intersubjective meanings” in constructing part of the social
totality (2001, p. 94), although this distinction is somewhat elusive because cognitive and
constructivist approaches often seem to be incorporated into each other. Adler also
recognized that constructivism should be complemented by a cognitive approach, such as
a “cognitive evolution” theory, to explain why certain ideas succeed in being accepted
more generally than others (1997).
The contrast between “weak” versus “strong” cognitivism seems a clearer
categorization. According to Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, both strands of
cognitivist thought agree that actors’ preferences should not be treated as exogenous
“givens,” as realists and neoliberals simply assume (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger,
2000). Nonetheless, they also argue that there is a significant difference between the
weak and strong strands of cognitivism. Strong cognitivists are concerned with
intellectual knowledge, like their weak counterparts, but they stress the underpinnings of
social knowledge such as norms and identity rather than the causal beliefs that are the
focus of weak cognitivists (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 2000). In this sense, strong
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cognitivism can be viewed as a “bottom-up” approach, while weak cognitivism can be
seen as a “top-down” analysis. Weak cognitivism tends to be state-centric, as scientific
knowledge groups create new interpretations of state interests and try to convince state
leaders why cooperation is more desirable through the leverage of knowledge.
Weak cognitivists stress the role of causal beliefs. They argue that decisionmakers face high levels of uncertainty in many issue areas and the necessity of complex
learning. In particular, a high degree of uncertainty about causal relationships leads
decision-makers to seek reliable issue-specific knowledge, and in turn those who supply
it can exert a significant political influence. Numerous works have explored the interplay
between science and politics and the conditions under which policy processes are
influenced by information (Dimitrov, 2006).
Among others, the epistemic community approach examines this mechanism of
knowledge and policy-making (Haas, 1989, 1992, 2004). Haas has defined epistemic
community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that
domain or issue-area” (1992, p. 3). He asserted that a community that shares
consummatory values or principled beliefs, causal beliefs or professional judgments,
common notions of validity, and common policy enterprises can contribute to
formulating state preferences. In Haas’s view, contemporary politics and international
relations are highly interdependent and global, which make them highly complex. In turn,
this complexity increases uncertainty about goals and preferences and limits substantive
rationality. Accordingly, “embedded and institutionalized beliefs about the nature of
collective response” rather than rationally formulated state preferences play a more
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important role in national/international politics and policy choices (Haas, 2004, p.
11579). Therefore, growing demands for information and specific knowledge to frame
policy debates make it possible for an epistemic community to play an eminent role as “a
principal channel through which consensual knowledge about causal connections is
applied to policy formation and policy coordination” (Haas, 2004, p. 11579).
In the example of the Med Plan, few countries were aware of the degree of their
coastal pollution at the beginning. Only a few LDCs, such as Egypt and Lebanon,
possessed domestic monitoring capabilities. Given this lack of knowledge regarding
pollution, countries were reluctant to take a positive position toward regional
cooperation. As Haas pointed out, the Algerian case demonstrates the importance of
national knowledge, which also has significant implications for Northeast Asian efforts
Algeria was so opposed to controlling industrial pollution that a United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) consultant’s demonstration of the extensive
pollution of Algerian harbors was denied by the government. It was only after
Algerian marine scientists with access to the government could produce similar
evidence were its implications accepted, and Algeria came to support the Med
Plan. (Haas, 1990, p. 84)

Engaging in cooperative action to deal with transboundary air pollution also
requires “much scientific knowledge on the definition of the problems, the identification
of dangerous substances, the monitoring of possible damages, the understanding of causal
mechanisms, and the analysis of policy responses and their impact on ecosystems”
(Siebenhüner, 2011, p. 93). As Adler has asserted, “the political influence of
transnational epistemic communities . . . is most likely to rest on the transfer from the
international to the domestic scene of the ideas that national scientists and experts raise at
their transnational meeting” (2005, p. 150). For him, national experts and through them
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national governments are the decisive “customers” of such knowledge from domestic and
international political perspectives, even though both national and international epistemic
communities may contribute to the evolution of international cooperation under
conditions of technical uncertainty and complexity.
Considering the potential roles played by the epistemic communities who share
scientific knowledge and policy options, this study analyzes the status of knowledge and
policy suggestions on specific transboundary air pollution issues in Northeast Asia to see
whether this region has been able to create epistemic communities for particular issues.
As most regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia have focused
on data gathering through joint monitoring and research, few policy options have yet
been suggested by scientists, and in turn this study anticipates few epistemic
communities. Thus this research emphasizes the development of scientific knowledge on
particular issues rather than the development of epistemic communities themselves. As a
result, this study posits the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The greater the commonly shared knowledge among participating
countries in regional environmental cooperation efforts, the more formal and the
more concrete will be the collective action found in the region.
Independent Variable 3: Socialization
The third independent variable of this study is socialization, defined for the
purposes of this dissertation as “the internalization of the values, roles, and
understandings held by a group that constitutes the society of which the actor becomes a
member” (Johnston, 2008, p. 22), a process that in this context occurs through
participation in regional cooperative mechanisms. According to Johnston, there is
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“general agreement across the social sciences that socialization is a process by which
social interaction leads novices to endorse ‘expected ways of thinking, feeling, and
acting’” (Johnston, 2008, p. 20) and to therefore engage in cooperative efforts.
Many political scientists have adopted a narrow notion of socialization based on
neoliberal institutionalism that holds that nations develop strong international institutions
when they perceive that the payoff or benefits of doing so will outweigh the costs
(Keohane & Axelrod, 1993). Thus, for instance, Schimmelfennig views international
socialization as “a process of rational action in a normatively institutionalized
international environment”:
Rational state behaviour is constrained by value-based norms of legitimate
statehood and proper conduct. Selfish political actors conform to these norms in
order to reap the benefits of international legitimacy, but as instrumental actors
they also calculate whether these benefits are worth the costs of conformity and
how they can be reaped efficiently. (2000, p. 109)
The problem with adopting this view for investigating the development of international
environmental cooperation is that there are few mechanisms through which the scientists
and policy makers within a given country can discuss and assess the complex costs and
benefits of their government’s involvement in such efforts.
This study, in contrast, adopts a broader notion of socialization that holds that
institutional processes and mechanisms also play a role in the adoption of common
values, roles, and understandings that lead states to become more accountable and
transparent to others. According to this view, socialization occurs through a set of
learning processes and international institutions that together have the effect of
constraining participating states from engaging in free riding because they become more
densely interdependent with one another (Ikenbury & Kupchan, 1990). In other words,
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socialization is a whole process of interaction among states beyond one particular issue
area, which shows that if states are more economically interdependent and they know one
government is depending on another government, then they are more likely to cooperate
in other areas as well. This is a much thicker notion of socialization.
This thicker conception of socialization was adopted as more appropriate for this
study in large part because of two particular characteristics of Northeast Asia. First, the
three countries examined in this study have developed a significant economic
interdependence, as shown by the intraregional trade among them, which accounts for
more than 50% of their total trade. This number is high in comparison to the ratio of
intraregional to total trade in ASEAN and South Asian countries, which is 20-25% and
5%, respectively (Nam, 2008). Second, in contrast to the narrower understanding of
socialization, the countries in the region, particularly Japan, would seem to have had
comparatively little to gain scientifically from the cooperative efforts of the studied
mechanisms, as they had already accumulated adequate funding for their scientists and
considerable scientific knowledge of their own.
To better understand how socialization processes may shape the forms and extent
of regional environmental cooperation, this study examines two different processes of the
internalization of norms that operate within these regional cooperative mechanisms:
adaption and learning. According to Haas (1990), adaptation refers to the acceptance and
adoption of preexisting, external norms and behaviors, while learning is a more
transformative process, which Levy described as “a change of beliefs (or the degree of
confidence in one's beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a
result of the observation and interpretation of experience” (1994, p. 283). Describing this
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difference metaphorically, Johnston observed that while “adaptation refers to tactical
shifts in cooperation, say, by a player with prisoners’ dilemma preferences, as the
exogenously imposed relative costs of defection increase,” learning can be viewed as “a
change in the basic preferences of the player, a shift away from one type of preferences
through intensive socialization processes” (Johnston, 2008, p. xxiv).18 Within this
framework, adaptation can lead actors to change their behavior in response to new events
without questioning their own preexisting values or understanding of basic causal
mechanisms. Learning, in contrast, yields “behavior changes as actors question original
implicit theories underlying programs and examine their original values” (Haas, 1990, p.
3). In other words, through the adaptation process, the broad goals of countries do not
change even though their means do as a result of their social interaction with other
participants at meetings among them. In contrast, through the learning process,
international actors can change their behaviors through new thinking that reflects “a
process more fundamental than adaptation” (Johnston, 1996, p. 29).
To determine which of these two processes of socialization the participating
countries have engaged in, this study qualitatively assesses the participation patterns of
member countries in international meetings of the studied cooperative mechanisms in
terms of two criteria. First, for each of the three studied cooperative mechanisms, the case
studies investigate whether the participation of countries in the region has been prompted
by indirect, rather than intrinsic, concerns about particular transboundary air pollution
issues. Countries are considered as having engaged in the adaptation process of

18

Valencia, using the terms “tactical learning” and “complex learning” to explain these processes,
argued that the former, “in which behavior toward cooperation changes,” needs to be replaced by
the latter, “in which values and beliefs about reaching goals through cooperation change,” if
Northeast Asia is to build cooperative security (2008, p. 158).
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socialization if indirect political concerns have led them to participate in regional
environmental cooperation on such issues; they are considered as having engaged in the
learning process of socialization if they have found intrinsic motivations for their regional
cooperation.
Second, each of the following case studies analyzes the participation patterns of
delegates to international meetings of that particular cooperative mechanism as a proxy
for socialization. This study assumes that social interaction among delegates attending
international meetings can enhance their understanding of the objectives and issues of the
meetings, which they can then share with colleagues and policy makers in their home
country and which can in turn lead to continued international cooperation. Given that the
learning process of socialization typically requires extended exposure to the expected
norms, values, and practices, the case studies assume that delegates are more likely to
have engaged in the adaptation process of socialization if they have had the opportunity
to attend international meetings for only a short period or in a sporadic manner, and to
have engaged in the learning process of socialization if they have been able to attend
international meetings for an extended period in a consistent manner.
Based on the above assumptions regarding socialization processes as they relate
to political action and cooperation, this study poses a third and final hypothesis, as
follows:
Hypothesis 3: If participating countries in regional environmental cooperation
efforts adopt learning rather than adaptation as a process of socialization, they
are more likely to create formal and concrete collective action through regional
cooperation.
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Interaction Among Variables
Socialization is a process that is a consequence of the interplay between sets of
independent variables, and thus socialization processes can be viewed as the intervening
variables or “social mechanisms” (Hedström & Swedberg, 1998) that link the
independent variables to my dependent variable of the forms and degrees of collective
action. Mechanism-based explanations like this one search for systematic relationships
between variables or events and aim to “specify the social ‘cogs and wheels’ . . . that
have brought the relationship into existence” (ibid., p. 7), unlike black-box explanations
that search for mere systemic covariation under the assumption that “the link between
input and output, or between explanans and explanandum,” is “devoid of structure, or, at
least, whatever structure there may be is considered to be of no inherent interest” (ibid.,
p. 9). In short, they assume that a mechanism (M) can provide a plausible account of how
input (I) and output (O) are linked to one another:
I

→

M

→

O

This study calls for attention to the causes and consequences of collective action
rather than mere associations between variables, as “it is actors and not variables who do
the acting” (ibid., p. 24). Table 1.6 demonstrates the hypothesized social mechanism
between the other variables of leadership and knowledge in which the stronger the
political leadership and the greater the shared knowledge in the region, the more likely
participants in regional cooperation are to engage in the learning process of socialization
and thereby create the most formal and concrete collective action.
Table 1.6
Social Mechanisms Among Variables
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Knowledge

Leadership

No Knowledge

a) Learning

a) Learning/adaptation

b) Most formal and concrete

b) Less formal and less

collective action

No Leadership

concrete collective action

a) Learning/adaptation

a) Adaptation

b) Less formal and less concrete

b) Least formal and concrete
collective action

collective action

As the arrow in Table 1.6 illustrates, to make the transformation from the least
formal and concrete collective action to the most formal and concrete depends on
creating the independent variables that are present in the uppermost left-hand box. This
study examines whether this transformation can occur if participating countries of the
region develop both or either strong political leadership and shared scientific knowledge
among participating countries. In doing so, it also examines two additional questions:
whether political leadership and shared scientific knowledge are necessary or sufficient
factors for the engagement in the learning process of socialization of participating
countries in the first place, and whether the learning process of socialization can lead the
region to achieve more formal and concrete collective action.

Research Methods
To test these three hypotheses, this research study employs content analysis and
semi-structured interviews. Reports on meetings of the target cooperative mechanisms
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are the main source of information for the content analysis. Most of this information was
available on the organizations’ websites; where those groups have not created their own
websites, I examined reports from the sponsoring or umbrella organizations that deal with
the issues addressed by the cooperative mechanisms. All of the reports on meetings,
proceedings, and other information are indicated in the reference.
For semi-structured interviews, more than 40 interviews were conducted with
governmental officials from ministries of environmental and foreign affairs and experts
from national research institutes and universities in China, Japan, and Korea. For the full
list of interviewees, see Appendix I. Delegates to the international meetings from
Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, were also interviewed, as were a few
participants from Europe to examine the transfer of knowledge and experiences from
Europe to East Asia.
To identify key participants in the policy-making meetings, I used snowball
sampling or a chain referral sample. The crucial feature of this sampling strategy is the
direct or indirect linkage through which each person or unit is connected with another,
which allows for the verification of the respondents’ accounts through third parties. This
triangulation increases the validity of the interviews with relevant decision makers that
would otherwise be unavailable. The semi-structured interviews used open-ended
questions because this approach let the interview subjects provide detail, depth, and an
insider’s perspective and to organize their answers within their own frameworks. In
structured interviewing in which investigators define the question and problem and looks
for answers within the bounds set by their presuppositions, the cognitive processes of the
respondents could not be teased out as successfully.
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At the same time, this technique can also decrease the likelihood of achieving
good triangulation, as snowball sampling can be a source of biased inference. It is risky
to sample only self-selected parts of the government apparatus if a researcher speaks only
with officials who recommend one another, which could result in missing out on
dissident perspectives within that government apparatus. To avoid this selection bias, I
tried to diversify the verification process beyond snowball sampling by interviewing
several authors of peer-reviewed journal articles to cross-check the validity of
information gained from the interviews and by choosing some interviewees among
participants of international meetings who were not referred by others. These efforts can
widen our understanding of the scope of internal competition regarding policies.

Overview of the Dissertation
Before presenting the substantial case studies of the selected cooperative
mechanisms, chapter 2 is a background chapter that shows a big picture of Northeast
Asian environmental cooperation. It introduces two comprehensive and three issuespecific environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia that have been
designed to tackle transboundary air pollution. For comprehensive cooperative
mechanisms, it focuses on the participation by the ROK as a middle-power state in the
North-East Asia Sub-regional Program for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) and
the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among the ROK, China, and Japan
(TEMM); for issue-specific cooperative mechanisms, it examines EANET, TDGM, and
LTP. This chapter finds the role played by the ROK promising in that it creates some
positive competition between member countries, but it also points out challenges that
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Northeast Asian countries have to deal with in order to create solid regional
environmental cooperation.
The following three chapters examine the three cooperative mechanisms
examined for this study. Chapter 3 discusses the development of Acid Deposition
Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET). Even though EANET has developed into the
most formal and concrete form and degree of collective action among the various
regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in which Northeast Asian countries have
participated, this chapter argues that EANET is largely a failure in terms of generating
broader cooperation and producing useful measurement data that could lead to the
creation of a regional environmental regime. It concludes that political leadership is the
only variable positively associated with this highly formal and concrete collective action
as Japan’s much greater financial contributions to the EANET budget have enabled
EANET to enhance capacity building and the quality of monitoring data in a practical
sense. However, the lack of shared and new scientific knowledge regarding acid
deposition among the participating countries of EANET and the adaptation process of
socialization that they have taken fail to show that EANET’s highly formal and concrete
form and degree of collective action are attributable to shared scientific knowledge and
the learning process of socialization.
Chapter 4 discusses regional environmental cooperation through the Tripartite
Director General Meeting (TDGM) on Dust and Sandstorms (DSS). This chapter argues
that TDGM has become a formal cooperative mechanism, yet it has neither developed
specific obligations that participating countries are required to fulfill for the joint research
program nor largely proven a success in generating broader cooperation and useful
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measurement data for the region. This study concludes that political leadership is the only
variable positively associated with highly formalized collective action. The lack of shared
scientific knowledge about DSS among the participating countries of TDGM and the
adaptation rather than learning process of socialization in which they engage cannot
explain why TDGM has succeeded in creating the first governmental-level, multilateral
cooperative mechanism that focuses exclusively on DSS issues in Northeast Asia in a
relatively short period of time, from 2007 to the present.
Chapter 5 discusses Joint Research on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants
in Northeast Asia (LTP). Despite the active involvement of working-level governmental
officials from the ministries of environmental affairs of China, Japan, and the ROK, the
LTP project has achieved little formal form and little concrete collective action. This
study argues that this can be attributed to a lack of political leadership, particularly
instrumental and directional leadership; little development of shared scientific knowledge;
and little development of adaptation as a socialization process among delegates to the
LTP meetings, particularly among governmental officials.
Chapter 6 compares the current state of regional environmental cooperation
regarding transboundary air pollution, particularly on emission reductions, in two regions,
Northeast Asia and Europe. This chapter argues that Europe has succeeded in reducing
air pollution through developing better air quality management with regional regulatory
regimes, whereas Northeast Asia has encountered increasing air pollution due to the rapid
growth of energy consumption in China. A comparative analysis between cooperative
efforts in Northeast Asia and Europe demonstrates that the Northeast Asian cooperative
efforts through EANET, TDGM, and LTP have failed to generate broader cooperation
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and produce useful measurement data that could lead to the creation of a regional
environmental regime with a solid infrastructure and a policy focus such as that which
European cooperative efforts have achieved through CLRTAP. This chapter also finds
that shared scientific knowledge and the learning process of socialization are key
determinants of the success or failure of regional environmental cooperation. The small
amount of conclusive scientific knowledge shared by member countries and the adoption
of the adaptation process of socialization among participating countries may explain why
all three of Northeast Asia’s regional cooperative mechanisms on transboundary air
pollution issues have been unable to advance beyond the UNEP’s second category of
regional action, regional entities with permanent structures but a scientific rather than a
policy focus.
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CHAPTER 2
MESSAGES FROM A MIDDLE POWER: PARTICIPATION BY THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
ON TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION ISSUES 19

Introduction
Since regime studies began in the 1980s, a few scholars have used negative cases
of policy creation in order to understand the obstacles to regime creation. Nonregime is
defined as “transnational policy arenas characterized by the absence of multilateral
agreements for policy coordination among states” (Dimitrov et al., 2007, p. 231). These
so-called “nonregime” studies regard the absence of policy coordination in certain issue
areas as a result of a collective decision, and try to respond to why institutions for
collective action do not come into being (Dimitrov, 2006).
In order to understand why Northeast Asian countries have not created any
agreements on transboundary air pollution issues, less-developed cases of collective
action must be examined to understand why there have not been agreements on
transboundary air pollution issues, despite various regional efforts for around two
decades. Successful cases of European experiences with transboundary pollution are not
applicable to Northeast Asia due to its diverse political systems, different levels of
economic development, and mutual distrust drawn from historical memories. However,
19

This chapter was published in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and
Economics in 2014, entitled “Messages from a Middle Power: Participation by the Republic of
Korea in Regional Environmental Cooperation on Transboundary Air Pollution Issues” (14(2):
147-162). This paper is based on a draft presented the International Experts Workshop on
International Framework and Co-benefits Approach to Promote Air Pollution Control in East
Asia, January 17-18, 2011, Hayama, Japan. This research was supported in part by the Global
Environment Research Fund of the Ministry of Environment, Japan (S-7-3) and the Institute of
Global Environmental Strategies (IGES). The author would like to thank Dr. Mark Elder and Mr.
Xiaofeng Zhou at the IGES as well as three anonymous reviewers for useful comments and
discussion.
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even if Northeast Asia has not succeeded in creating any regulatory regime yet, this
region has created various cooperative mechanisms in order to deal with transboundary
pollution issues since the early 1990s. It would be too simplistic to state that their efforts
have been failures through juxtaposition of regime vs. nonregime. Rather than stating that
Northeast Asia has not built any regime to manage environmental challenges driven by
transboundary issues, we need to understand how countries have participated in a variety
of channels of regional cooperation in varying degrees in different issue areas.
In doing so, this study will focus on the participation by the ROK as a middle
power of the region in regional cooperative mechanisms particularly regarding
transboundary air pollution issues. The study examines the extent to which the ROK as a
middle power has contributed to regional cooperation, illustrating the ROK’s diplomatic
ability and limitations on regional environmental cooperation. During the Cold War
period, Canada and other smaller Western states “defined themselves as middle powers
through their staunch support of international institutions, their ability to mediate, and
their limited relative power” (Collins, 2012). David R. Mares does not provide a clear
definition of middle powers when presenting “a model of the international behavior of a
middle power located in a regional hegemony” (Mares, 1988, p. 453). He treats lesser
powers vis-à-vis greater powers as middle powers, such as Brazil and Mexico in Latin
America.
In the post-Cold War era, the definition of middle powers has been discussed
more diversely. Melissa Rudderham (2008) describes middle powers as states that are
“politically and economically significant,” leaving the meaning of “significant” wide
open. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (1993) assert that states have to act as middle powers
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in order to identify themselves as middle powers in specific attributes such as economic
issues, environmental issues and human rights, taking passive actions on issues like
security. As Collins points out, however, middle powers are neither “a homogenous
group of states” nor do they act in the same way. Thus, these definitions are challenging
to apply. Due to these difficulties, some studies make the simple assumption that material
variables determine whether states are middle powers or not. For example, Sohn simply
states:
Based on material variables such as gross domestic product, population and
military capability, it [the ROK] is, indeed, a middle power. In 2010, South
Korea’s GDP ranked 15th in the world, while its military budget ranked 12th. Its
population, meanwhile, is about 50 million. (Sohn, 2012)
Despite the simplicity of Sohn’s definition, the ROK’s categorization as a middle power
is useful because of the ROK’s power relative to other regional countries such as China
and Japan, which are considered as greater powers distinguishing from middle powers.
For these reasons, this article follows Sohn’s identification of the ROK as a middle
power.

Northeast Asia
Geographic proximity, shared perceptions of the region, and intensity of
interactions have been the three common conditions for defining regions (Katzenstein,
1997; Nam, 2002). However, there is no consensus on the boundaries of the Northeast
Asia region. Based on the conditions of geography and ecological interdependence, this
study defines Northeast Asia as six countries: People’s Republic of China (China),
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan, Mongolia, the ROK, and the
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Russian Federation (primarily the Far East). Seen from the composition of countries,
Northeast Asia as a region has great diversity in terms of political and economic
development.
This region has not developed any legally binding international regime yet to deal
with transboundary environmental problems, even though it has endeavored for regional
cooperation since the early 1990s. Some might argue that this lack of formalization is the
salient characteristic of the region. In fact, East Asia has been summarized in two points:
underinstitutionalization and disjointedness, compared to ones of other regions such as
Europe and North America (Lee, 2012). For underinstitutionalization, realists focus on
historical mistrust or power rivalry as the legacy of the Cold War, and argue that the
“hub-and-spoke” bilateral security system organized by the United States has led the
region to have little necessity of formal institutionalization of East Asian regionalism
despite increasing economic interdependence (Acharya, 1991; Aggarwal & Koo, 2007;
Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002).
For disjointedness of East Asian regionalism, it is argued that East Asian
institutions are lacking of systematic linkages (Pempel, 2010), even though East Asian
countries have searched for many regional institutions for various regional issues on
security, economy and environment. Instead of sticking with overarching institutional
arrangements, East Asian institutions have evolved in decentralized, overlapping and
sometimes contradictory regionalism. Some scholars name this feature “thin gruel
(Friedberg, 1993)” or “informal regionalism” (Katzenstein, 1997). All has led Asia’s
characteristics of “marginal adjustments, insistence on state sovereignty and a preference
for bilateralism” (Katzenstein, 2005, p. 103).

61

These characteristics of Northeast Asia might have prevented this region from
building regional institutions. Interestingly enough, these blocking factors for regional
security are quite similar to ones that explain the lack of environmental cooperation in
Northeast Asia. It is commonly understood among policy makers and experts in
Northeast Asia that successful European experiences in dealing with transboundary
pollution are less likely to be transplanted to this region due to “substantially different
political and economic systems” and “various levels of economic development” (I. Kim,
2007). In addition, there is little scientific consensus (Chung, 1999; Nam 2002, p. 168)
and due to historical memories, political antipathy (Yoshimatsu, 2010) has been an
obstacle to regional governance.
Particularly, this paper pays considerable attention to the disjointed regional
efforts as Pempel pointed out. It is argued that “characteristics of complexity,
disconnection, and lack of an organization hub” have been key features of regional
environmental cooperation in dealing with Northeast Asia yellow sand, implying “a lack
of a coordinating mechanism to eliminate project overlap” (Jho & Lee 2009, p. 69). In
addition, a more “holistic approach” is necessary for “subregional/regional framework in
East/North-East Asia” to cover “all components of transboundary air pollution
management” (NESPEC, 2012a, p. 3).
Under these fragmented circumstances, it is crucial to shed light on each
cooperative mechanism. Thus, this article divides the cooperative mechanisms into two
groups to discuss transboundary air pollution issues: comprehensive and issue specific
ones. Even though comprehensive cooperative mechanisms have included some issues,
the issue-specific mechanisms still bear stand-alone features to represent participation of
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member countries. The Northeast Asian environmental cooperation would be more so
due to the lack of interlinkages between various mechanisms.

The ROK’s Environment and Its Performance
The ROK faced air pollution problems which started in the late 1960s due to the
national development of heavy industries and reached their peak in the 1970s and 1980s.
However, the increasing use of low-sulfur oil and liquefied natural gas has brought
significant decrease of emissions. Emission reductions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) in Seoul
have been achieved continuously (Chang et al., 2008). For nitrogen oxides (NOx), the
emission reductions are not significant as much as sulfur, but it is notable that emissions
have been controlled at a certain level, 125 thousand tons, since the sharp reduction
between 1989 and 1990.
To improve air quality, the ROK took various domestic measures in the 1980s,
including the 1981 Standard for Sulfur Content, 1985 Prohibition of Solid Fuel Use, and
the 1988 Clean Fuel Use Duty (Chang et al., 2008). The ROK has also participated in
various multilateral cooperative mechanisms on transboundary air pollution since the
early 1990s. Global environmental efforts and regional cooperation of Europe and North
America have awakened the ROK’s concerns on transboundary pollution. Since Principle
21 of the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
clarified the right and responsibility of states regarding transboundary pollution, Europe
and North America have developed successful frameworks, protocols or provisions to
tackle acid rain in their respective regions since 1979. Paragraph 9.26 of Agenda 21 of
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the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development explicitly pointed
that European experiences should be shared with other regions.
Northeast Asia has tried to implement its learning from these international
experiences regarding transboundary pollution issues. In particular, the ROK has strongly
committed to regional environmental cooperation in Northeast due to its environmental
and geographic conditions that situate Korea as “a principal victim of transferred air
pollution from China, while its emissions also affect the region’s ecosystem to some
degree” (Yoon, 2006, p. 85). In contrast to the ROK, Japan has been active in developing
“broader regional cooperation” circumscribing East Asia or Asia-Pacific. Japan has
focused on the East Asia Acid Deposition Monitoring Network (EANET), which covers
both Northeast and Southeast Asia, and the Environment Congress for Asia and the
Pacific (ECO-Asia). It is revealing to see that the ROK has paid little attention to the
Eco-Asia and Regional Environmental Sustainable Transport (EST) Forum in Asia
established by the Ministry of Environment in Japan (MOEJ) 20.
Since the Basic Environment Plan was enacted in 1994, Japan has manifested its
leadership role as a key resource provider for regional environmental cooperation.
However, the Japanese “leadership raises suspicions in the region, due to its history of
military invasions of neighboring countries; and Japan itself seems reluctant to step out in
front” (Yoon, 2006, p. 84). In addition, Japan is “cautious and passive when it comes to
government-level multilateral cooperation” in Northeast Asia as it regards the multilateral
framework as redundant “form of development aid” which Japan has already been “active
in utilizing unofficial channels of cooperation through the Green Aid Plan” (Jho & Lee,
20

Interview with Gyu Il Kim, Deputy Director of Climate and Air Quality Policy Division at the
Ministry of Environment in the ROK on December 23, 2010.
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2009, p. 66). In fact, Japan has provided China with various lower-interest loans for
environmental projects through the Official Development Assistance. As such, bilateral
cooperation has been a major channel for Japan to deal with its “concern with and
enthusiasm for the acid rain issue” (Lai et al., 2001, p. 1848).
These Japanese preferences for bilateral cooperation have coincided with China’s
pursuit on “bilateral cooperation with Japan and Korea, which might enable it to have
more leverage in negotiations” and China’s opposition to “binding agreements that would
supersede the sovereign control of environmental policy-making” (Yoon, 2006, p. 85).
As a result, unlike Japan and China, the ROK as a middle power has promoted
environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia with a “strong incentive to pursue binding
environmental cooperation that would impose some constraints on its two powerful
neighbors’ unilateral interpretation of international agreement” (Yoon, 2006, p. 84).

Comprehensive Intergovernmental Cooperation Mechanisms
The ROK has participated in numerous multilateral environmental cooperation
mechanisms since the early 1990s. It can be argued that the following two mechanisms 21
have directly related to transboundary air pollution in Northeast Asia: the North-East
Asia Sub-regional Program for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) since 1993 and
the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among the ROK, China, and Japan
(TEMM) since 1999 22.

21

There is one more multilateral mechanism, the NEAC (Northeast Asian Conference on
Environmental Cooperation), which the ROK has participated since 1992. However, the activities
of NEAC have been discontinued since 2009 and it is not currently working.
22
The Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP), within the Regional Seas Programme of the
United Nations Environment Programme, also deals with air pollution issues to some extent in
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The NEASPEC
This mechanism includes six member countries: China, DPRK 23, Japan,
Mongolia, the ROK and the Russian Federation. At the 1996 Third Meeting of Senior
Officials (SOM3), the NEASPEC adopted the “Framework for the North-East SubRegional Program for Environmental Cooperation,” recognized as “a unique and
remarkable event and a significant milestone in the subregion as the six countries of
North-East Asian subregion for the first time came to a consensus and adopted an
agreement on subregional environmental cooperation” (NEASPEC 1996, p. 1). Currently,
the NEASPEC is implementing projects in the three areas: i) Mitigation of transboundary
air pollution from coal-fired power plants; ii) Cooperation mechanisms for nature
conservation in transboundary areas; iii) Implementing the regional master plan for the
prevention and control of dust and sandstorms. Transboundary air pollution, particularly
SO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants, has been considered in a greater degree in
the subregion. For Mitigation of Transboundary Air Pollution from Coal-Fired Power
Plants, the NEASPEC has undertaken the first and second phase (1993-2008) technical
assistance projects funded by Asian Development Bank (ADB).
The current third phase of the Mitigation Program is trying to achieve integrated
strategies for mitigating air pollution and greenhouse gases, standardization and
regulation of technology related to the management of SO2, demonstration projects and
knowledge transfer and dissemination. While the Mitigation program overwhelmingly
relation to marine deposition. However, this study does not include the NOWPAP due to its
extensive focus on marine environment. For the NOWPAP’s development, see Chung 2010.
23
The DPRK participated in only five out of 13 meetings of senior officials between 1993 and
2008. The years attended were 1994 (SOM2), 1996 (SOM3), 1998 (SOM4), 2000 (SOM 7), and
2007 (SOM12), which none of them were held in the ROK.
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relies on international institutions, two other programs (Prevention and Control of Dust
and sandstorms from Source Areas in China and Mongolia; and Cooperation Mechanisms
for Nature Conservation in Transboundary Areas) have been conducted through the
NEASPEC Core Fund. The NEASPEC has added most recently marine environment for
its expenditure (NEASPEC, 2012e) to the Nature Conservation and Dust and sandstorms.
The NEASPEC has tried to diversify its focus, reducing its previous concerns on
transboundary air pollution.
The annual revenue from the Core Fund consists of three sources: balance carried
forward from the previous reporting period, contribution from member countries and
interest income in previous years. As seen in Table 2.1, the Core Fund has been
composed of mainly Korean (the ROK) contribution, and in a less degree, Japanese (in
previous years) and Chinese (in recent years) contributions.
Table 2.1
Contributions to the Core Fund of the NEASPEC (Unit: US$)
ROK
Japan
China
Russia
Mongolia
2001
100,000
100,000
0
0
0
2002
100,000
0
0
0
0
2003
0
72,000
50,000
0
0
2004
100,000
57,600
0
0
0
2005
0
0
49,970
0
0
2006
100,000
0
49,985
0
0
2007
100,000
0
49,985
0
0
2008
100,000
0
49,985
0
0
2009
0
0
49,985
0*
0
2010
0**
0
50,000
0*
2011
100,000
0
50,000
0*
0
Total
700,000
229,600
399,910
0
0
* The Government of the Russian Federation has contributed $75,000 to the
Secretariat since 2009 to directly support a project on nature conservation.
** The ROK did not contribute to the Core Fund in 2010 as it was supposed to
contribute to the Secretariat of US$100,000-120,000 from the Korea Environmental
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Industry and Technology Institute and Suwon city for two joint activities: the
Meeting of Asia-Korea Carbon Footprint Partnership Program in 2011 and the
North-East Asian Forum on Eco-efficiency for Low Carbon, Green Cities in 2011
(NEASPEC, 2011).
Note: Adapted from SOM Reports.

Japan has provided financial and technical support for establishing a regional
network on environmental monitoring, data collection, comparability and analysis,
implemented by the Japanese agencies such as the Ministry of Environment and the
Japan Environmental Technology Association (JETA) (NEASPEC, 2004; 2011).
However, it is interesting to note Japan’s limited financial contribution to the NEASPEC
compared to other cooperative mechanisms, particularly the EANET, which Japan took
the initiative as this paper will examine in more detail later. Japan’s reduction in
contribution has been interpreted by the Koreans as a sign of Japan’s lack of willingness
to improve the NEASPEC as a legitimate regional comprehensive or far-reaching
cooperative tool. Under these circumstances, it is argued that the NEASPEC member
countries have not succeeded in showing “any great leadership in turning the sub-region
into a hotbed for environmental solutions and cooperation” (Chung, 2008, p. 161).
Particularly, during the most recent years the Korean initiative has not been impressive as
“China has been the only member State that sustains the annual contribution to the Core
Fund” (NEASPEC, 2011, p. 3).
Since the member states agreed to establish the Core Fund at the Sixth Meeting of
Senior Officials on Environmental Cooperation in North-East Asia in 2000, there were
two difficulties: establishing Trust Fund and creating a permanent secretariat. As of
November 2012, the NEASPEC has not succeeded in creating its Trust Fund. Instead, the
ADB and the Russian Federation have provided project-based funding (NEASPEC,
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2010). However, the concern on building a permanent secretariat has been solved to some
extent. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(UNESCAP) had acted as an interim secretariat for the NEASPEC until mid-2011. The
secretariat was relocated from the UNESCAP Headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand, to its
Subregional Office for East and North-East Asia (SRO-ENEA) in Incheon, the ROK,
during 2009-2010. The 67th UNESCAP Commission Session in 2011 decided to
“discontinue the interim nature of the NEASPEC Secretariat” and endorsed “the SROENEA to function as the secretariat” (NEASPEC, 2011). The Korean government
interprets this as other member countries have given the ROK the leadership for the
NEASPEC. 24 It could be a correct interpretation in the sense that the ROK and Japan
finally agreed on this issue, unlike in the past when they competed to build the Secretariat
of the NOWPAP and ended up creating two offices in Japan and the ROK. The ROK has
succeeded in establishing organizational foundations to exert its influence on regional
environmental cooperation as a middle power.
Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting among the ROK, China, and Japan
(TEMM)
This multilateral cooperative mechanism was initiated by the ROK at the 6th
Session of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development in May 1998.
Since then, it has been recognized as the highest-level environmental meeting in
Northeast Asia. The Ministers of the three countries have reaffirmed the needs of
promoting the existing activities under other mechanisms such as the EANET and joint
research on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP) through
24

Interview with Jang Min Chu, a senior researcher at the Korea Environment Institute (KEI) on
December 29, 2010.
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the TEMM. It also created new cooperative programs in 2009. The future 10 priority
areas for cooperation during the period of 2009-2014 have been selected and
implemented. Even though taking a lead on certain issue areas does not necessarily mean
that the lead country would have specific interests in it, it can show at least higher
degrees of concerns on certain issues among others. 25 In fact, the ROK has distinct
interests in dust sandstorms, and this will be elaborated in the later section on DSS as an
issue-specific mechanism. Japan prioritizes pollution management and has actively called
for more Korean governmental cooperation on marine litter or floating wastes on the
coasts of Japan from the ROK 26.
The TEMM has wider array of participating actors. For example, the Tripartite
Environmental Education Network (TEEN) program has built networks on environmental
education among research institutes, experts and NGOs of three countries. The TEEN
program has established a cornerstone for environmental education, which combines both
theories and practices. It is also notable that the TEMM is the highest-level meeting in
Northeast Asia. In fact, China, as the largest stakeholder country, pays the most attention
to the TEMM as an intergovernmental cooperative mechanism in the region 27.
However, the TEMM still has shown various limits in tackling transboundary air
pollution issues. First, even for information sharing activities, guidelines and formats
have not been agreed upon. This has led member countries to take only voluntary and
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Interview with Sang-Joon Lee, Deputy Director of International Cooperation Office in
International Affairs Division at Ministry of Environment of Korea on December 23, 2010.
26
Interview with Sangwoo Park, Third Secretary of Climate Change Team in Energy and Climate
Change Division at Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the ROK on December 29, 2010. And
Ministers also agreed to pay more attention to “marine litter” on the Tenth TEMM in 2008 (TEMM
2008).
27
Interview with Haibin Zhang, Professor at School of International Studies in Peking University
on January 18, 2011.
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spontaneous actions. Since the working group was established in 2004, based on the
agreement of the Sixth TEMM, they have worked to improve this problem and create
new programs. However, the TEMM still does not have any agreements on specific
responsibilities and action plans (Chu, 2005).
In terms of financing, the TEMM has established only a weak structure. The ROK
has provided the largest contributions and Japan has kept passive attitudes on resource
provision related to TEMM programs. China has provided resources only for holding
TEMM meetings without additional spending on cooperative activities (Chu, 2005).
Although the ROK has endeavored for establishing and promoting TEMM’s activities
within its limited financial capability, the ROK has exerted limited leadership due to the
competitive relationships with Japan regarding selections of cooperative programs.

Issue-specific Cooperative Mechanisms
The ROK has participated in the following three issue-specific cooperative
mechanisms related to transboundary air pollution. They not only deal with different
issues of transboundary air pollution, but they also have different focuses on activities.
The EANET tackles acidification in the region, and its main objectives are collecting
monitoring data through the compilation, evaluation and storage of data at the Network
Center. The LTP deals with more diverse air pollutants including PM and ozone, and its
main focus is to establish sound scientific explanation on source-receptor relationships
through modeling. The Tripartite Director General Meeting (TDGM) on Dust and
Sandstorms among Japan, China and the ROK aims to develop specific activities for both
control and prevention of dust and sandstorms and deforestation.
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Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET)
The ROK has been participating in the EANET since the very beginning
including four expert meetings between 1993 and 1997, and preparatory phase between
1998 and 2000. The three monitoring sites in the ROK for the EANET have reported
monitoring data on many air pollutants including SO2, O3 and PM10 (EANET, 2010a).
For these activities, the EANET has established a sound format for countries to provide
comparable data. At the Second Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting in 2000,
member countries approved the technical documents of the EANET, including technical
guidelines, manuals and data reporting procedures and formats. This provides specific
guidelines for monitoring, such as monitoring sites and interval, monitoring parameters
indicating first and second priority, and meteorological measurement. The creation of a
specific monitoring format for compatible data can be evaluated as strong advancement
of the regional environmental cooperation. It is also notable that the development of
Quality Assurance/Quality Control manual of the EANET activities has also enhanced
data compatibility among member countries.
The ROK has recognized EANET’s high status as an international program in the
region compared with other programs regarding transboundary air pollution. The EANET
has been equipped with the most advanced organizational setting in the region. Unlike the
TEMM, the EANET has developed specific statements on obligations of member
countries. Despite these achievements, EANET has faced two problems. First, Japan’s
unilateral leadership has caused the EANET to be regarded as a one-country-led program
rather than an international program in which other participating countries contribute on
an equal basis. The other problem of the EANET is its limited scope of activities and
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specific air pollutants. As a result of the specific objections of China, the scope of
activities has been limited to monitoring of acid deposition without moving toward
modeling. Monitoring itself must be a meaningful activity for future discussions on
enhancing transboundary air pollution. However, only monitoring acid deposition is
limited in its scope and could prevent the creation of complex solutions to acid
deposition. In addition to the limited scope of activities, the limited scope of air pollutants
is another problem for the EANET. Since the Gothenburg Protocol to Abate
Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-Level Ozone, adopted in the framework of the
UN/ECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution in 1999 and amended
in 2012, interconnectedness of various air pollutants has been discussed extensively.
Under these circumstances, the EANET’s focus on monitoring and acidification is
incomplete and outdated.
The ROK signed the “Instrument for Strengthening the Acid Deposition
Monitoring Network in East Asia” at the Twelfth Intergovernmental Meeting (IG12) in
2010. It was argued that concerns of the ROK and China on the Japanese dominant
leadership have reduced the status and scope of activities of the EANET (Chu, 2005).
However, through signing of the Instrument, the ROK acknowledges Japan’s leadership
on the EANET 28. This is meaningful for further development of the EANET as the ROK
is one of the major contributors to the Secretariat of the EANET.
The EANET’s financing capability is regarded as the highest among other
regional cooperative mechanisms. The EANET has put in a lot of effort to ensure
organizational principles for financial arrangement. After three sessions of the Working
28

Interviews with Jang Min Chu and LimSeok Chang at the National Institute of Environmental
Research (NIER) of the ROK on December 29, 2010.
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Group on Further Financial Arrangement for the EANET in 2002 and 2003, the Fifth
Intergovernmental Meeting adopted the Decision on the Further Financial Arrangement
for the EANET (EANET 2003). This decision mentions participating countries’
responsibilities to make financial contributions to the Secretariat and the Network Center
budgets on a voluntary basis but using the latest UN assessment scale-based burden
sharing as the first step. The Japanese government has played a vital role for this
development of the EANET. At the Eighth Intergovernmental Meeting in 2006, it was
agreed that a flat rate amount for a three consecutive year period (2008-2010) would be
applied for the voluntary financial contribution to the Secretariat budget from the
participating countries. In addition, the “Revised Procedures and Guidelines for
Voluntary Financial Contribution to EANET” was approved at the Ninth
Intergovernmental Meeting in 2007.
Japan’s contribution (US$382,262) comprised more than 90% of total
expenditures of the Secretariat (US$423,033) in 2009. Japan’s contribution to the
Network Center Core Budget (US$422,967) comprised more than 99% of the total
contribution from participating countries in 2009. In addition, more than 94% of total
expenditure of the Network Center in 2009 has been supported by the Japanese
government through various channels, including contribution to the core budget,
additional budget for technical support and training, and contracts for its Ministry of
Environment and National Institute for Agro-Environmental Studies 29.
Despite Japan’s status as the dominant resource provider, Korean researchers and
governmental officials have raised a “transparency issue” of the Network Center of the
29

The author calculated these figures, based on information provided at the IG 12 of the EANET
in 2010. These percentages far exceed the UN scale of assessment during the 2007-2009 period
(16.6%). For these scales, see EANET 2009.
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EANET. For this reason, the ROK has not yet transferred any contributions to the
Network Center Core Budget while it has contributed around US$18,000 to the
Secretariat annually in recent years. The ROK has asserted that it is necessary to
reorganize the Network Center of the EANET into a more international, rather than
Japanese, organization for the ROK to be motivated to contribute to the Network Center
core budget. 30 Even though this transparency issue has been raised quite a few times
during various meetings including the IG 12, no party has pushed the issue in detail and
this has led to many misunderstandings and unresolved disputes between members 31. A
Japanese delegate to the EANET points out that the language barriers are quite serious in
the international meetings of the region. Communicating in English must be a significant
problem as delegates speak all different native languages. The ROK has requested more
diversified participation in the Network Center which means hiring more international
researchers rather than relying on mainly Japanese researchers. Member countries need to
pay attention to how to reduce these disputes driven by miscommunication and often
language barriers.
Joint Research on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia
(LTP)
The LTP was initiated by the ROK in 1995 through the first Northeast Asian
Workshop on Long-range Transboundary Pollutants among China, Japan, and the ROK.
The three countries agreed to launch a working group, composed of both governmental
officials and experts, and to establish an interim secretariat at the National Institute of
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Interviews with Korean delegates, Professor Seog-Yeon Cho at Inha University in the ROK,
and LimSeok Chang at the NIER in the ROK at various EANET meetings.
31
Interview with Dr. Ken Yamashita, Head of Planning and Training Department at the Asia
Center for Air Pollution Research (ACAP) in Japan on February 8, 2011.
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Environmental Research (NIER) of the ROK. Since the first Expert Meeting in 1996
when participating countries agreed to perform a joint research on both monitoring and
modeling of the LTP, the Expert Meetings have been held annually mostly in the ROK
but sometimes in China or Japan. The Terms of Reference for Joint Research on Longrange Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia was adopted at the first SubWorking Group Meeting in 1999 (Secretariat of Working Group for LTP Project, 2010).
The LTP has achieved meaningful development in that it persuaded China to
participate in the monitoring and modeling activities despite its passive attitudes toward
transboundary air pollution (Chu, 2005). Even if main actors of the LTP activities are
environmental research institutes 32 of three countries, the LTP has reached a higher status
as an international cooperative program beyond research due to active involvement of the
countries’ respective ministries of environment. The participation of governmental
officials in the annual meetings as well as experts in the field has contributed to
increasing its status as an official international cooperation in the region 33 (Chu, 2005).
The funding of the LTP relies heavily on the ROK’s contribution, between 2000 and mid
the 2000s around US$600,000 and between 2007 and the present US$1,000,000 34. This
shows that the ROK has taken the greatest initiative for the LTP.
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The NIER of the ROK, the National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES) of Japan, and
the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Studies (CRAES) of China.
33
It is worth noting that China and Japan seem to have different perceptions on the LTP’s status.
The Chinese delegates to IG12 of EANET in 2010 seemed to understand that the LTP is only one
of many research activities that China has participated in. (Interviews with two Chinese delegates,
Jun Zhou from Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy and Shuyan Xie from the
China National Environmental Monitoring Center. Japan has rarely mentioned the LTP as one of
various cooperative mechanisms that the region is working currently in its projects. (For example,
see UNEP Regional Resource Center for Asia and the Pacific 2009)
34
Interview with LimSeok Chang at the NIER of the ROK, on December 23, 2010.
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It is notable that countries have been less resistant to the proposal of extending the
scope of air pollutants. The LTP has undergone three phases: the 1st phase between 1999
and 2004; the 2nd phase between 2005 and 2007; and the 3rd phase between 2008 and
2012. The first phase mainly focused on monitoring on the ground and aviation to
understand air quality in Northeast Asia. The second phase started modeling to figure out
source-receptor relationships regarding SO2, and the third phase is examining sourcereceptor relationships regarding NO, Ozone, PM focusing on their human health effects.
This expansion of scope of air pollutants might have been possible as the LTP is
more research-oriented without showing intensions on regime creation. 35 It is different
from the EANET in which member countries have been reluctant in expanding and
broadening scope of activities. It could be also because China does not seem to regard the
ROK as its competitor 36. This could be true to some extent in that both China and the
ROK have been categorized as developing countries unlike Japan 37. China seems to
apply the principle of the “common but differentiated” responsibilities to the regional
cooperation like the climate change discussions 38. However, China’s stance could
become a potential obstacle for future development of the LTP toward the EANET’s
direction. The EANET has wider array of member countries as well as more systemized
and clearer principles than the LTP.
The LTP has a stronger possibility for the inclusion of wider array of air
pollutants than the EANET as mentioned above. In addition, both cooperative
mechanisms deal with monitoring which can create duplication of work. This does not
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Interview with Gyu Il Kim.
Ibid.
37
Interview with Haibin Zhang.
38
Ibid.
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77

mean, however, that they share the same objectives or activities. The EANET focuses on
measuring pollution to establish a regional framework compatible to Europe’s with a
long-term purpose, while the LTP is aiming to establish common understanding on
modeling in the nearer future (I. Kim, 2007). However, it seems unavoidable to have
some overlapping activities on monitoring. In fact, a Japanese researcher at the Network
Center of the EANET has collaborated in monitoring for a LTP project by sharing data
from the EANET 39.
Due to this duplication of activities, the ROK proposed to combine the EANET and
the LTP for an ideal mechanism through reasonable division of labor in 2009. However,
the Korean proposal was rejected by both China and Japan. Northeast Asia needs to
consider any possibility and benefits of combining these two mechanisms to enhance
regional cooperation. As shown by the proposal, the ROK as a middle power can become
a good mediator for China and Japan for further environmental cooperation on regional
air pollution issues.
Dust and Sandstorms (DSS)
While DSS has been regarded as a natural phenomenon of wind carrying dust
from the Yellow River basin and deserts, the rapid increases of frequency and intensity
highlight the anthropogenic causes for DSS (MOEJ, 2008). Human factors in the
formation of strong sandstorm weather include population growth, the rapid development
of urbanization and irrational land-use such as excessive cultivation, deforestation,
grazing and the abuse of water resources (Longjun, 2001). Due to these anthropogenic
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Interview with Dr. Tsuyoshi Ohizumi, Head of Atmospheric Research Department at the Asia
Center for Air Pollution Research (ACAP) on February 8, 2011.
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causes, the number of storms in two source countries, China and Mongolia, has increased
significantly (Wilkening, 2006; Natsagdorja et al., 2003).
Various impacts by DSS have also been observed in the ROK. The frequency and
intensity of PM in Seoul have increased significantly. A study mentions that around
US$3-5 billion of financial damages are incurred per year due to “respiratory & mucous
membrane diseases, retarded growth of crops, difficulties in outdoor activities” (J. Kim,
2007). In addition, some industries have claimed damages on precision machines and
electronics which require very clean conditions, and food processing industries have also
complained of contamination by DSS.
To tackle these problems, the ROK has taken various domestic measures. In order
to build infrastructure for prevention of damages from DSS, a legal framework of the
“Comprehensive Measures for Prevention of DSS Damage” was introduced, and the
“Framework Plan for National Safety Management” deals with DSS response system at
the level of disaster management. These measures aim to strengthen standards for DSS
early warning, to improve DSS forecast through expanding monitoring stations, to share
observation information with source countries for early warning, to strengthen
monitoring and research on DSS, and to promote measures for certain areas. The serious
impacts of DSS in the ROK have led its government to place the issue in the forefront of
environmental concerns.
In addition to various domestic measures, the ROK created numerous bilateral
cooperative mechanisms. The bilateral cooperation has mainly focused on forestation on
desert areas in source countries, China and Mongolia. In fact, the ROK has supported
several plantation projects in China to plant trees for erosion control. Despite the
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impressive development of bilateral cooperation, various bilateral initiatives tended to be
limited to some specific fields and national boundary areas even though DSS is a
transboundary environmental problem at a regional scale (ADB, 2005).
The ROK has also participated in several multilateral programs. The United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) was enacted in 1994 to stop the
anthropogenic deforestation and desertification caused by excessive development through
providing developing countries with financial and technical assistance. China, Japan and
the ROK all signed and ratified the Convention in the 1990s. Since the adoption of this
convention, various multilateral programs have evolved. A preliminary investigation of
the Global Environment Facility (GEF) launched an ADB/GEF joint project on
Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in North-East Asia from January 2003 to
March 2005 (NEASPEC, 2009; MOEJ, 2008). This project is evaluated as “meaningful
in that it provided the basic framework for building the first regional cooperation scheme
with the aim of countering yellow sand in Northeast Asia” (Jho & Lee, 2009, p. 51).
Along with this project, the three countries agreed to create the Tripartite Director
General Meeting (TDGM) on Dust and Sandstorms at the Eighth TEMM in 2006. At the
first meeting of the TDGM on March 2007 in the ROK, three countries started to discuss
the Terms of Reference (TOR) of the Steering Committee for Joint Research on DSS. At
the second meeting of the TDGM in September 2007, the TDGM adopted the TOR for
Joint Research. The high political will of the Korean government for DSS is revealed in
the ROK’s efforts to create the TOR of the Steering Committee for Joint Research on
DSS.
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The ROK recognizes three important meanings of the creation of the Joint
Research on DSS (MOEK, 2007c). First, even though the Joint Research is a researchoriented cooperative body, it is the first governmental level multilateral cooperative
mechanism in Northeast Asia which was agreed at the TEMM and the TDGM. Thus, this
body can garner high levels of political commitments from each government. Second, the
Joint Research can be a channel for important policy dialogue for governments and
experts. Third, the Joint Research is expected to play a role of an incubator that helps the
region boost multilateral cooperation for DSS monitoring and network for early warning
and forecasting. Past bilateral channels and new multilateral mechanisms have revealed
several challenges such as “the lack of an irrigation system, quick-shifting sands,
destroying newly planted trees and shrubs, and limited local interests” (NEASPEC,
2009). New cooperative mechanisms must take into consideration these difficulties that
past projects have experienced.

Conclusions
The ROK has shown strong interests in developing an overarching regional
mechanism through playing a role of an initiator at various multilateral mechanisms such
as the NEASPEC, the TEMM, the LTP and the TDGM. Despite its initiatives in all of
these mechanisms, the ROK argues that regional cooperative mechanisms require more
even contributions and participation by member countries, rather than mainly being led
by one country. In this sense, the ROK has proposed to combine the EANET and the LTP
for an ideal mechanism through reasonable division of labor. It is worth noting that the
activities of the ROK as a middle power show its intention to create an institutional
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atmosphere for shared ownership without dominance by one country. However, the
proposal was not accepted by China and Japan. This shows that the Korean initiatives
have not been strong enough to construct a new direction of regional environmental
cooperation. The ROK needs to better strategize how to meet this challenge throughout
regime creation processes to become a successful middle power.
Northeast Asia has a far way to go in terms of institutionalization of a regional
environmental regime. Despite this lack of formal regime creation, this region has
developed a variety of cooperative mechanisms. Even though they are fragmented
without creative interlinkages between them, they are still under construction. The
ROK’s initiatives in the various cooperative mechanisms might have become an example
to other participating countries, and have led to a growing participation in financial
contributions from China and Russia in the NEASPEC. In this sense, the role of the ROK
as a middle power is promising.
The other side of the coin, however, tells us that no single country has grasped
strong leadership in any of the cooperative mechanisms and the unnecessary competition,
particularly between Japan and the ROK, might have interrupted institutional
development of environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia. It could be too early to tell
because the regime creation processes are still in the nascent stage despite two decades of
cooperation. The ROK will continue to contribute to developing current regional
environmental cooperation as a middle power, until a country in the region takes firm
leadership, probably China, once it is ready to pay more attention to regional
environmental issues.
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CHAPTER 3
ACID DEPOSITION MONITORING NETWORK IN EAST ASIA (EANET)

Introduction
EANET is an intergovernmental regional network in which 13 East Asian
countries currently participate to address acid deposition problems in the region (Figure
3.1). After holding four meetings of experts between 1993 and 1997, 10 countries,
including China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, ROK, Russia,
Thailand, and Vietnam, joined the EANET at the First Session of the Intergovernmental
Meeting on the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia in 1998 in Yokohama,
Japan. Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar also became members of EANET in 2001,
2002, and 2005, respectively.
Despite considerable progress of monitoring activities through EANET which has
developed into a highly formal and concrete cooperative mechanism, this chapter argues
that EANET is largely a failure in terms of generating broader cooperation and producing
useful measurement data that could lead to the creation of a regional environmental
regime. This chapter finds that its existence appears to be driven by Japanese diffuse
interests in promoting soft power and applying foreign aid to cement more diffuse
political relations in the region; there are few broader effects or benefits. There are also
few opportunities for the learning mode of socialization because of the too frequent
turnover of bureaucrats and diplomats, and the very small numbers of scientists who are
trained under the program.
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Figure 3.1. Member countries of EANET as of 2013. Adapted from EANET
http://www.eanet.asia/eanet/org.html

As of December 2012, participating countries had established 54 monitoring sites
for wet deposition and 47 sites for dry deposition (Jiro, 2012) (Figure 3.2). The 13
participating countries conduct ecological surveys at 20 soil survey sites, 18
forest/vegetation survey sites, and 18 inland aquatic environment sites, such as lakes and
rivers.
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Figure 3.2. Locations of EANET monitoring sites by area type. Adapted from “Review of
Exisitng and Required Capacities for Addressing Adverse Environmental Impact of
Transboundary Air Pollution in North-East Asia,” by Sato Jiro, 2012, p. 15.
http://www.neaspec.org/documents/tap_jul_2012/Session1-Japan.pdf.

Table 3.1
Numbers of Monitoring Sites of Member Countries
Cambodia
China
Indonesia
Japan
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Myanmar
Mongolia
Philippines
Republic of Korea
Russia
Thailand

Wet Deposition
1
8
5
12
1
4
1
2
3
3
4
6

Dry Deposition
1
3
4
12
1
3
1
2
3
3
4
6
85

Total
2
11
9
24
2
7
2
4
6
6
8
12

Viet Nam
4
4
8
Total
54
47
101
Note: Adapted from “Review of Existing and Required Capacities for Addressing Adverse
Environmental Impact of Transboundary Air Pollution in North-East Asia,” by Sato Jiro, 2012, p.
15. http://www.neaspec.org/documents/tap_jul_2012/Session1-Japan.pdf.

EANET has developed into one of the most successful cooperative mechanisms in
terms of “formal” modes and “concrete” degrees of collective action in East Asia. 40 Its
high level of formalization can be seen in its clear organizational scheme and the
financial structures. Participating countries have succeeded in structuring clear
indications of the purpose and division of labor among their secretariat,
intergovernmental meetings, scientific advisory committee, and network center. The
EANET’s financial structure has been constructed through formal measures agreed to by
member countries. In addition to these formal characteristics, the EAENT has established
the most concrete forms of collective action by developing a common set of formats and
guiding principles for monitoring for EANET activities as well as common monitoring
guidelines and quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) measures to confirm the
comparable quality of the monitoring data among its 13 member countries. The
monitoring itself has been improved by implementing quality assurance and quality
control activities through their Inter-laboratory Comparison Projects. Capacity building in
participating countries has been significantly enhanced through various EANET activities,
such as individual training and the network center’s technical missions.
As discussed later in the chapter, a qualitative analysis of the data indicates that
EANET has developed into a highly formal cooperative mechanism in which high-level
governmental officials attend meetings and sign non-legally binding agreements on
40

For specific explanation about measurement of formal and concrete characteristics of regional
cooperative mechanisms, see Table 1.5 in chapter 1.
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proposals even though it is a science-focused cooperative effort that does not attempt to
reach any legal agreements, it. Of the three variables included in this study’s
hypotheses—political leadership, knowledge, and socialization—the only variable
positively associated with this highly formal and concrete form and degree of collective
action is political leadership. Strong structural leadership by the Japanese has enabled
participating countries in the region to structure their cooperation, particularly during the
early phase of EANET development. Japan’s biggest financial contribution to the
EANET budget has made EANET the most financially abundant regional cooperative
mechanism in East Asia and has created the most practical benefits and capacity building
through its monitoring activities. Japan’s leadership, particularly its structural leadership
based on its material capabilities, has succeeded in driving more highly formal and
concrete forms and degrees of collective action.
Yet Japan’s dominant contributions also have become an obstacle to moving
EANET to the UNEP’s first category of regional cooperation, which, as mentioned in
chapter 1, is legally binding cooperation. Regional efforts over the past 2 decades have
not led to the creation of any regulatory regional environmental regime to address acid
deposition in East Asia. EANET still falls into the UNEP’s second category of regional
environmental action, a regional entity with a permanent structure and science focus
without the solid legal infrastructure and a policy focus of the characteristics of the first
category.
The relatively small amount of scientific knowledge about acid deposition shared
among the participating countries of EANET and the adaptation rather than learning
process of socialization in which they engage do not seem sufficient to explain why
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EANET has achieved the most highly formal and concrete form and degree of collective
action among regional environmental cooperative mechanisms. Nonetheless, an
examination of those two variables of scientific knowledge and socialization reveals the
social mechanisms among political leadership, shared scientific knowledge, and
socialization and explains why EANET remains in the UNEP’s second category without
advancing to the highest category of legally binding cooperative mechanisms. First, the
examination of the hypothesized social mechanism—i.e., that the stronger the political
leadership and the greater the shared knowledge in the region, the more likely
participants in regional cooperation will be to engage the learning process of socialization
and thereby create the most formal and concrete collective action—shows that strong
political leadership alone did not lead participating countries to engage in the learning
process of socialization, and the lack of shared scientific knowledge can be attributed to
the adaptation rather than learning process of socialization by participants in the EANET
activities. Second, the lack of scientific knowledge and the adaptation process of
socialization among the participating countries of EANET can address why EANET has
been stuck in the UNEP’s second category over the course of 2 decades of cooperative
efforts regarding transboundary acidification issues despite producing the most formal
and concrete mode of collective action in the region.
The lack of shared knowledge among regional scientists about the compelling
impacts of acid deposition has not motivated the countries participating in EANET to
develop a more regulatory regional regime. Political calculations among countries in the
region about whether to participate in EANET activities and East Asian bureaucratic
rotation systems, which make public officers hold the same position for only a limited
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time to prevent corruption and increase creativity, have led countries in the region to
engage in the adaptation process of socialization, and thereby they have not been
motivated enough to pursue a regional environmental regime creation.
To better understand how EANET has achieved of the most successful collective
action of the three cases but failed to generate a legal infrastructure on acid deposition in
the region, this chapter investigates how the existing level of cooperation through
EANET has resulted from political leadership and scientific knowledge and whether the
adaptation or learning as socialization processes constrained or boosted its regional
collective action. As socialization is a process that is a consequence of the interplay
between sets of independent variables, this chapter calls for attention to the social
mechanism between the two variables of political leadership and scientific knowledge.
The following sections explain how the acid rain issue has become an environmental
concern in East Asia, and how the region has responded to its concern through
developing the EANET mechanism.

Acid Rain
Acid rain refers to rain below an acidity of pH 5.6. It affects most constituents of
the ecosystem, such as lakes, valleys, mountains, forests, plants, and animals. The
damage it produces is widespread and diverse. Sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides
(NOx) that are emitted from the combustion of fossil fuels are known to be major causes
of acid rain. Acid rain was first recognized as an environmental problem in 19th century
Europe. In his pioneer 1872 article, “Air and Rain: The Beginnings of a Chemical
Climatology,” English chemist Robert Angus Smith coined the term acid rain to describe
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the acidic precipitation in Manchester, England. About 90 years later, Svante Odén, a soil
scientist working at Sweden’s Agricultural College near Uppsala, synthesized diverse
strands of research to conclude that the acidity of precipitation and surface water was
increasing in many areas and causing detrimental impacts on fish, forests, and materials
(Odén, 1968). Following Odén’s hypotheses, various research and monitoring programs
were initiated after the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm, Sweden. According to Clark and colleagues, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development’s Cooperative Technical Program to Measure Long-Range
Transport of Air Pollutants, initiated in 1972,“provided international legitimation for
Odén’s ideas in 1977” (2000, p. 51). Indeed, the Canadian Network for Sampling
Precipitation (CANSAP) was established in 1976, the United States National
Atmospheric Deposition Program (NADP) in 1978 was organized by the State
Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES), and later funded by the National Acid
Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) to measure the effects of atmospheric
deposition on the environment.
These various programs and studies have found that widespread loss of fish
populations, especially in Scandinavia but also in the United States, Canada, and the
United Kingdom, has resulted from surface-water acidification. In addition, severe forest
dieback has been noticed in the vicinity of emission sources over the centuries,
particularly that caused by direct SO2 damage. Central Europe observed widespread
forest declines in the 1980s even though it was far from emission sources.
Table 3.2
Acidity and Its Effects
Acidity (pH)

Effects
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6.0 or lower
5.5

Freshwater shrimp cannot survive.
Bottom-dwelling bacterial decomposers begin to die, causing nondecomposed leaf litter and other organic debris to lie on the bottom and
depriving plankton of food supply.

All fish and most frogs and insects die. Acid rain also damages buildings
and historical monuments; leads to the release of harmful chemicals, such
4.5 or lower
as aluminum, from rocks and soils into drinking water sources; and
corrodes lead and copper piping.
Note: Adapted from “Acid Rain in China and Japan: A Game-theoretic Analysis,” by Y. Nagase
and E. C. D. Silva, 2007, Regional Science and Urban Economics 37, pp. 100-101.

Acid Rain in Northeast Asia
Acid rain has been a serious and growing problem in Northeast Asia. In China,
acid rain emerged as an important environmental problem in the late 1970s and grew
worse throughout many years of record economic growth due to increased energy
demand, greater coal combustion, and larger emissions of pollutants. As smokestack
heights are usually very high in China, its emissions contribute more to regional than to
local acid rain.
Acid rain in China is caused mostly by emissions of sulfur dioxide by power
plants, industrial boilers, ore smelters, and oil refineries. Power plant boilers are known
as the single largest contributor, followed by industrial boilers and residential stoves and
boilers. Moreover, power plants contribute to pollutant emissions that are transported
long distances and accordingly to regional acid precipitation, while industrial and
residential sources contribute mainly to local acid precipitation (Sinton, 1991).
Between 1980 and 2004, China’s aggregate energy consumption grew
enormously. Even though shares of other energy sources such as hydropower, nuclear
power, and natural gas have grown, coal remains the dominant source of energy in China.
In fact, the proportion of coal in China’s energy mix increased from 51% in 1980 to 62%
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in 1996, as its economy made a particularly quick expansion (Aden & Sinton, 2006). Due
to its pattern of energy consumption, the acid rain in China is still evident, and serious
acidification is most dominant in Southeastern China, where the economy is growing fast.
Figure 3.3 shows pH values in 2007 in China.

Figure 3.3. 2007 regional distribution of acid rain in China. Adapted from “Report of China’s
Environmental Conditions,” by Ministry of Environmental Protection of China, 2007,
http://jcs.mep.gov.cn/hjzl/zkgb/2007zkgb/200811/t20081117_131297.htm

Development of EANET
Along with this serious and growing problem regarding acid rain in East Asia due
to the rapid increase of China’s energy consumption, international discussions on acid
rain alarmed East Asia. Agenda 21, adopted at the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, declared that “the experiences of the
programs on transboundary air pollution in Europe and North America needed to be
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shared with other regions of the world” (EANET, 2010d, p. 15). In addition, the World
Bank estimated in 1995 that 1990 levels of sulfur dioxide emissions in East Asia would
nearly triple by 2020 if energy and environment policies remain unchanged (EANET,
2011a). These two findings led the region to recognize the potential problem of adverse
impacts of acid deposition in the region. Thus, Japan initiated regional discussions
regarding the acid deposition issue. Dr. Naoko Matusmoto at the Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies (IGES) in Japan stated that the fundamental basis for
establishing the EANET was the Rio Conference and the resulting Agenda 21 (IGES,
2010). The development of EANET was led by bureaucrats from Japan’s Environment
Agency because acid rain was “considered to be an issue which Japan had the capability
to take up and contribute to, and could have high visibility among East Asian countries”
(IGES, 2010, p. 4).
Japan’s initiative was set in motion in 1993 by holding the First Expert Meeting in
Toyama, Japan (EANET, 1993). At this meeting, participants shared the view that
atmospheric protection was a critical issue for sustainable development in East Asia and
recognized that acid precipitation due to the expanding economies was being observed in
East Asia. They shared a common fear that the adverse effects of acid precipitation would
become a problem in certain areas in the future despite a lack of evidence of acid
precipitation at the time. Accordingly, the participants acknowledged the necessity of a
comprehensive approach to assessing the impact of acid precipitation and providing
greater monitoring of acid precipitation. Thus, the participants agreed that regional
cooperation would be essential to this end and to collaborative monitoring to understand
the state of acid precipitation in East Asia through creating regional monitoring
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guidelines, as monitoring methods varied across countries. Finally, the participants
shared the view that an Acid Precipitation Monitoring Network in East Asia needed to be
established in the near future.
Since then, Japan’s initiative developed in three phases: the early years between
1993 and 1997, the preparatory phase between 1998 and 2000, and the regular phase
since 2001. Four Expert Meetings were held between 1993 and 1997 to discuss the state
of acid deposition in the region, ecological effects, and potential steps toward regional
cooperation regarding acidification. Through these meetings, participants agreed on the
necessity of creating a comprehensive approach for assessing impacts and establishing a
regional monitoring network with standardized monitoring methods and analytical
techniques. The participants are composed of delegates from ministries of environment
and national research centers. 41
During the preparatory phase from 1998 to 2000, participating countries agreed
on the Joint Announcement on the Implementation of EANET and the Tentative Design of
EANET, resulting in the organizational structure of EANET shown in Figure 3.4. The
Third Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting (IG3) in 2001 adopted the Rules of
Procedure for EANET. Since the IG3, the Intergovernmental Meetings and Scientific
Advisory Committee (SAC) meetings have been held annually. Four subsidiary bodies—
41

Specific institutes involved in EANET activities are Ministry of Environment for Cambodia;
The China National Environmental Monitoring Center & Ministry of Environmental Protection
for China; Ministry of the Environment for Indonesia; Ministry of the Environment for Japan;
Water Resources & Environment Administration for Lao P.D.R; Malaysian Meteorological
Department (MMD) for Malaysia; Ministry of Nature and Environment for Mongolia; Ministry of
Transport for Myanmar; Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for
Philippines; Environmental Management Bureau(EMB) for Philippines; Ministry of Environment
& The National Institute of Environmental Research (NIER) for ROK; Ministry of Natural
Resources of the Russian Federation & Russian Academy of Sciences for Russia; Pollution
Control Department(PCD) for Thailand; Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
(MONRE) for Viet Nam.
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the Task Force on Monitoring for Dry Deposition, Task Force on Soil and Vegetation
Monitoring, Task Force on monitoring instrumentation, and Task Force on Research
Coordination—were established under the Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC). It was
also decided that the senior technical managers (national QA/QC managers) from the
participating countries should meet to discuss important technical issues related to the
network and exchange information on their 2001 monitoring activities.

Figure 3.4. Organizational structure of EANET. Adapted from EANET, 2013b,
http://www.eanet.asia/eanet/org.html

The Intergovernmental Meeting is the decision-making body of EANET,
composed of the representatives of all the participating countries. Its tasks are as follow:
1) review and approval of the work program and budget of the Network; 2)
review of implementation of the work program; 3) review and approval of
periodic reports on the state of acid deposition in East Asia; 4) establishment of
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subsidiary bodies as necessary and appropriate; 5) review and approval of
scientific, technical, administrative and financial matters for the management of
the Network; 6) adoption of the rules of procedures for the Intergovernmental
Meeting and subsidiary bodies, including the Scientific Advisory Committee; 7)
provision of necessary instructions and guidance to the subsidiary bodies, the
Secretariat and the Network Center, on their activities; and 8) decision on other
matters related to the management of the Network and implementation of the
work program. (EANET, 2000b, p. 2)

The Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) is the advisory team that supports the
Intergovernmental Meeting on scientific and technical issues of the EANET. It is
composed of scientists and technical experts nominated by the participating countries,
and establishes task forces when necessary. In fact, the members of the SAC include
scientists at national research institutes and professors at universities (EANET, 2010e).
Its tasks are to advise and assist the Intergovernmental Meeting with the following
matters:
1) scientific and technical aspects of the monitoring strategies for the Network; 2)
development and revision of the monitoring guidelines and technical manuals; 3)
matters related to the selection of monitoring sites, QA/QC programs, data
reporting procedures and formats; 4) matters related to collection, evaluation,
assessment and analysis of monitoring data; 5) preparation of periodic reports on
the state of acid deposition in East Asia, based on the data reports by the Network
Center; 6) matters related to studies of other scientific issues; and 7) other
scientific matters as requested by the Intergovernmental Meeting. (EANET,
2000b, p. 3)
The secretariat is in charge of communication among the participating countries.
The United Nations Environment Program’s Regional Resource Center for Asia and the
Pacific (UNEP RRC.AP) in Bangkok, Thailand was designated as the secretariat
following the interim secretariat run by the Environment Agency of Japan in 2001. It
consists of three employees: one coordinator, one program officer, and one administrative
assistant. The employees tend to be Thais due to the location of the secretariat. It prepares
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for the meetings and conducts necessary administrative and financial management
activities. The secretariat is designated by the Intergovernmental Meeting and facilitates
cooperation among member countries in a transparent manner. Under the guidance of the
Intergovernmental Meeting, the secretariat carries out the following tasks:
1) necessary administrative arrangements for the meetings of the
Intergovernmental Meeting, the Scientific Advisory Committee, and other
subsidiary bodies; 2) necessary administrative and financial arrangements for
managing the Network; 3) communication and cooperation in administrative
aspects as the focal point of the Network; and 4) other necessary tasks as
requested by the Intergovernmental Meeting. (EANET, 2000b, p. 3)
The network center has conducted the most important activities for the EAENT
because of its main objective of monitoring. The Acid Deposition and Oxidant Research
Center (ADORC, renamed as Asia Center for Air Pollution Research [ACAP]) based in
Niigata, Japan was designated as the network center for EANET. It compiles and
evaluates the monitoring data and provides data upon request from the participating
countries. It has helped participating countries enhance their quality assurance and quality
control (QA/QC) activities, and has provided technical support and training for the
participating countries. It has also worked on the promotion of public awareness on acid
deposition issues. A list of its tasks includes:
1) central compilation, evaluation and storage of monitoring data and related
information; 2) preparation of data reports on acid deposition in East Asia; 3)
dissemination of monitoring data and other relevant information; 4) provision of
technical assistance to the participating countries in implementing the network
activities; 5) implementation and coordination of QA/QC activities; 6)
development and implementation of education/training programs for those
engaged in the network activities; 7) implementation of research activities on acid
deposition; 8) provision of scientific and technical support for the
Intergovernmental Meeting, Scientific Advisory Committee and other subsidiary
bodies; and 9) other tasks as requested by the Intergovernmental Meeting.
(EANET, 2000b, p. 4)
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Each of the participating countries organized its national focal points of the
EANET, national centers, and national QA/QC managers. The national focal points of
the 13 member countries are basically all governmental officials in ministries of
environment and are responsible for communicating with the EANET secretariat and the
network center regarding implementation of their network activities (EANET, 2010g).
The national centers of participating countries collect national monitoring data and
submit them to the larger network center. They deal with technical matters regarding the
network activities and with promoting national QA/QC activities. The national centers
consist mostly of national research institutes, such as the China National Environmental
Monitoring Centre (CNEMC) in China, the Asia Center for Air Pollution Research
(ACAP) in Japan, and the National Institute of Environmental Research (NIER) in the
ROK (EANET, 2010a). National QA/QC managers, mostly from the national centers of
the EANET, work to promote national QA/QC activities in cooperation and coordination
with the national centers (EANET, 2010c).

EANET’s Achievements and Limitations
Since 2001, 42 the EANET’s objectives are (a) to “create a common understanding
of the state of acid deposition problems in East Asia”; (b) to “provide useful inputs for
decision-making at local, national regional levels aimed at preventing or reducing adverse
42

To test the feasibility of creating EANET, the objectives of the preparatory phase of EANET
between 1998 and 2000 were more specific than those of the regular phase of EANET since
2011. They included (a) “to examine the feasibility of the designed Network activities and
relevant guidelines and technical manuals”; (b) “to provide time for participating countries to
further develop national monitoring systems for the Network; and (c) “to formulate policy
recommendations for the further development of the Network” (EANET, 2013a). During this
period, participating countries developed the technical manuals and guidelines for monitoring of
wet deposition, soil, and vegetation and inland aquatic environments, and finally adopted them at
the Second Interim Scientific Advisory Group Meeting of EANET in 2000.
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impacts on the environment caused by acid deposition”; and (c) to “contribute to
cooperation on the issues related to acid deposition among the participating countries”
(EANET, 2011a). The Tentative Design of EANET outlined the activities required to
achieve several objectives such as collection of the monitoring data and information, the
implementation of the QA/QC programs, and publication of periodic reports on the state
of acid deposition in the region. 43
EANET has accomplished several achievements. First of all, the number of
monitoring sites in the network has increased from 42 at the start of the regular EANET
monitoring activities in 2001 to 54 in 2010, which has improved the quantity of data. As
shown above in Table 3.1, Japan has established nearly a quarter of total monitoring sites
of EANET (24 out of total 101 sites) as of December 2012. Thailand has established the
second largest number of monitoring sites, 12. China has 11; Indonesia 9; Russia and
Vietnam 8 each; Malaysia 7; Philippines and ROK 6 each; Mongolia 4; and Cambodia,
Lao PDR, and Myanmar 2 each.
In addition to increasing the number of monitoring sites, EANET has enhanced
concrete procedures for monitoring through developing clear monitoring guidelines
(EANET, 2000e), technical manuals (EANET, 2000d), and QA/QC programs (EANET,
2000c). Particularly, QA/QC plays an important role in acid deposition monitoring by
ensuring the collection of meaningful data and enhancing the quality of datasets “at the
national levels and in the Inter-laboratory Comparison Project schemes” (EANET, 2011d,
p. 9). Thus, EANET has developed several documents on QA/QC programs intended to
support the provision of reliable data with comparability among participating
countries and with information from other monitoring networks outside the East
Asian region, such as EMEP (the Co-operative Programme for Monitoring and
43

For specific objectives, see EAENT, 2000a, pp. 1-2.
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Evaluation of the Long-range Transmissions of Air Pollutants in Europe) and
WMO (the World Meteorological Organization) (EANET, 2011d, p. 1).
EAENT’s QA/QC programs have supported work at the national level in participating
countries through providing appropriate documentation on QA/QC procedures and
regulation of individual monitoring entities. The QA/QC program aims to “obtain reliable
data that can be comparable among the countries of the East Asian region, as well as with
other networks by ensuring data accuracy, precision, representativeness and completeness
in acid deposition monitoring” (EANET, 2000e, p. 1).
In particular, the annual “Inter-laboratory Comparison Projects” implemented by
the network center of EANET, contributed to improving “reliability of analytical data
through assessment of suitable analytical methods and techniques” (EANET, 2013b, p.
1). The projects have been expanded to a wider range of fields including dry deposition,
soil, and inland aquatic environments.
For example, the EANET network center distributes artificial rainwater samples
for testing to participating laboratories in the13 member countries to compare the
analytical precision and accuracy of the measurement of wet deposition. 44 The
participating laboratories have to dilute the artificial samples 100 times with deionized
water and analyze the diluted samples for 10 parameters: pH, EC, SO4²-, NO3-, Cl-, Na+,
K+, Ca²+, Mg²+, and NH4+ (EANET, 2013b, p. 6). The laboratories are required to apply
the analytical methods and data-checking procedures specified in the Technical Manual
for Wet Deposition in East Asia and the QA/QC Program for Wet Deposition Monitoring
in East Asia and to submit their results to the EANET network center. The results of this
wet deposition comparison in Figure 3.5 indicate the percentage of data that satisfied the
44

For specific information on participating laboratories in member countries, see Table 1.1,
Participating Laboratories in EANET, 2013b, p. 3.
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data quality objectives (DQOs) and flags those that did not. The flags indicate the degree
of deviation from the DQOs: Flag E stands for deviations between 15% and 30% and
Flag X for deviations over 30%. Figure 3.5 shows that the quality of measurement data
has improved over time as the blue bars, which indicate the qualifying percentage of data,
appear to be increasing.

Figure 3.5. Results of the inter-laboratory comparison project on wet deposition for 1998-2009.
Adapted from The Second Periodic Report on the State of Acid Deposition in East Asia: Part III:
Executive Summary, by EANET, 2011e
http://www.eanet.asia/product/PRSAD/2_PRSAD/2_ex.pdf. p. 5

In addition to improvements in the quantity and quality of data, capacity building
in the participating countries of EANET has improved. According to EANET, the
“technical capabilities and skills of the participating countries in acid deposition
monitoring and assessment were significantly enhanced” through EANET’s training of
individuals and the network center technical missions taken to assist all the participating
countries in “monitoring performance, laboratory operations, data management, and other
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procedures” (EANET, 2011b, p. 10). Various activities such as scientific workshops and
individual training courses at EANET’s network center and Japanese agencies helped to
enhance the skills and knowledge of personnel in national monitoring centers. China,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam have consistently received individual
training. Russia participated in the individual training program three times for a total of
13 years. The ROK has never participated in any of training opportunities because of the
preexisting capabilities of its own personnel. The individual training program has been
held at ADORC, now ACAP, annually to teach monitoring and data management skills
(Table 3.3). It is striking to see the remarkably small numbers of people trained each year.
Table 3.3
Individual Training Programs at ADORC

1998
1999

Number of
Participants
2
10

2000

Year

2001

2002

2003

2004

Countries

Training Provided

Thailand, Russia
China (9), Indonesia

Filter-pack monitoring
Training on EANET activities

4

Philippines, Russia,
Thailand (2)

Training on EANET wet and dry
deposition monitoring, data
management

6

Indonesia (3),
Malaysia, Philippines,
Vietnam

Wet and dry deposition, soil and
vegetation, inland aquatic
environment monitoring, and data
management

6

China (2), Indonesia,
Mongolia, Philippines,
Thailand

Wet and dry deposition, soil and
vegetation, inland aquatic
environment monitoring, and data
management

6

Cambodia, China, Lao
PDR, Malaysia,
Philippines

Wet and dry deposition, soil and
vegetation, inland aquatic
environment monitoring and data
management

5

Cambodia, China, Lao
PDR, Malaysia,
Philippines

same as above
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2005

6

Cambodia, China,
Indonesia, Lao PDR,
Thailand, Vietnam

same as above

2006

2

Cambodia, Lao PDR

same as above

2007

5

Cambodia, China,
Indonesia, Lao PDR,
Malaysia

same as above

2008

5

Cambodia, China, Lao
PDR, Myanmar,
Vietnam

same as above

2009

6

Indonesia, Malaysia
(2), Mongolia, Russia,
Thailand

same as above

2010

3

China, Indonesia,
Vietnam

same as above

Note: Adapted from Proceedings: The Ninth Session of the Working Group on Future
Development of EANET, by EAENT, 2010g, p. 73.

According to EANET, not only its network center but also Japan’s International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) “has delivered the training program through conducting the
JICA Third Country Training Program in Thailand and the JICA Training Course on
EANET in Japan to provide training on acid deposition and air quality management”
(EANET, 2011b, p. 10). All of the member countries except Russia and the ROK have
sent at least one researcher to the JICA Third-Country Training Course every year (Table
3.4). Cambodia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam have sent the largest
number of researchers between 2004 and 2009.
Table 3.4
Participants in JICA Third-Country Training Course on Acid Deposition Monitoring and
Assessment in Thailand (NC collaboration with JICA and PCD, Thailand)

Cambodia
China
Indonesia
Lao PDR

2004
2
2
0
2

2005
3
2
1
2

2006
2
2
3
2

2007
2
1
3
0
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2008
3
1
0
3

2009
2
0
0
2

Total
14
8
7
11

Malaysia
Mongolia
Myanmar
Philippines
ROK
Russia
Thailand
Vietnam

0
2
0
0
0
0
6
4

2
2
2
1
0
0
4
3

1
3
2
1
0
0
6
2

1
1
3
0
0
0
6
2

0
2
2
2
0
0
6
3

2
2
3
2
0
0
8
0

6
12
12
6
0
0
36
14

Note: Adapted from Proceedings: The Ninth Session of the Working Group on Future
Development of EANET, by EANET, 2010c, p. 75.

These training programs have enhanced the monitoring skills of member countries
of EANET. One of the Chinese delegates has stated that the training implemented by the
network center has let Chinese trainees learn monitoring techniques that are believed to
have improved other monitoring sites in China as well. 45
The technical manuals and guidelines for monitoring of wet deposition, soil, and
vegetation and inland aquatic environment were developed during the preparatory phase
between 1998 and 2000. Each country provides the EANET network center with data and
related information obtained from the monitoring activities conducted at the EANET sites
in their respective countries following the technical manuals and guidelines for
monitoring by the end of June of each calendar year. Then, the network center prepares
and presents an annual draft data report containing the monitoring data submitted by the
participating countries at the meeting of the Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC). After
it is reviewed by the SAC, which is composed of experts from the participating countries,
the draft data report is finalized. Since 2000, data reports have been published annually
without interruption.

45

Interview with a Chinese delegate at the Twelfth Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting on
the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia 23-24 November 2010, Niigata, Japan.
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The Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting (IG5) held in 2003 decided to
establish a Working Group on Future Development of EANET (WGFD) to review the
performance of the secretariat and network center and develop guidelines for their
administrative and financial management. A high-level segment held with the Seventh
Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting (IG7) in 2005 launched the Report for Policy
Makers: Goals, Achievements and Way Forward. IG7 also adopted Decision 1/IG7
(Niigata Decision), which endorsed the necessity of an appropriate instrument and legal
status for a sound basis for financial contributions to EANET. The Eighth Session of the
Intergovernmental Meeting (IG8), held in 2006, adopted a 5-year medium-term plan
(MTP), renamed Strategy on EANET Development (2006-2010), which was then
followed by another for 2011-2015.
EANET characterized the most recent agreement on and the operation of the
Instrument for Strengthening the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia at the
12th Intergovernmental Meeting (IG12) in 2010 as “another important historical
milestone of the EANET cooperation” (EANET, 2012b, p. 1). Seven participating
countries – Cambodia, Japan, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, the ROK, and Thailand –
signed the instrument, waiting for responses from the other countries at the IG12 in 2010.
In 2011, Indonesia announced that it “is not able to sign the Instrument due to
consideration on legal aspects. The willingness was expressed to continue joining the
activities of EANET” (EANET, 2011c, p. 5). Lao PDR informed the IG that its Ministry
of Foreign Affairs approved the instrument and it would contact the secretariat soon, and
Malaysia informed the organization that it was “already at the final stage of internal
consultation to sign the Instrument. The clarification was requested to the Session if there
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will be any legal obligations as the effect on signing the Instrument after the operational
date” (ibid., 6). In Russia, the instrument has been undergoing internal processes among
ministries such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Finance to seek approval
for a financial contribution (EANET, 2011c). Christer Holtsberg, Senior Technical
Advisor at RRC.AP, Asian Institute of Technology, “encouraged the two remaining
countries to expedite the internal process for the signing of the Instrument as soon as
possible” in his opening remarks at the 11th Session of the Working Group on Future
Development of the EANET in 2012 (EANET, 2012b, p. 1).
The high-level segment meetings have enhanced the authority of the agreements.
The fact that very senior officials, including the Minister of the Environment of Japan,
the Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, the Vice-Minister of the
Ministry of Nature, Environment, and Tourism of Mongolia, and the Director General at
the Climate and Air Quality Policy Department of the Ministry of Environment of ROK,
attended IG12 in 2010 to sign the instrument has made it a strongly official and formal
statement. This official involvement has made EANET a formal form of collective action
regarding acid deposition in East Asia.
Based on these developments, it can be asserted that the monitoring activities
have been managed properly to the standards of providing clear monitoring guidelines,
technical manuals, and quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) programs. These forms
of EANET activity go much beyond simple discussion. The devotion of the network
center to the EANET monitoring activities is well represented by its various publications,
including strategy papers, technical manuals, and scientific and technical reports. In terms
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of organizational structure, the clear division of labor among the secretariat, the network
center, and SAC support the EANET’s strong presence in the region.
Despite this development of formal and concrete collective action, EANET has
not advanced to a legally binding agreement since countries in the region started
discussions in 1993 regarding acid deposition in East Asia. A comparison of the 2000
Tentative Design and the 2010 Instrument shows the slow development of EANET. The
Instrument is almost identical to the Joint Announcement on Implementation and the
Tentative Design of 2000, essentially just adding several phrases and labeling each
section in the text. Two perhaps significant differences between the two are more
clarification of financial contributions and an expansion of the scope of monitoring air
pollutants, as discussed next.
As to the first of these, the Tentative Design indicates financial arrangements of
EANET very briefly:
The administrative and operational costs of national monitoring within each
country will be borne by each country. The administrative and operational costs
of the Network will be financed by voluntary contributions by the participating
countries, while efforts should be made to mobilize existing funding sources and
seek new ones. (EANET, 2000e, p. 4)
However, Item 14 of the 2010 Instrument indicates more specific financial arrangements
than the Tentative Design. 46 But, this more specific indication of the financial structure in
the later document is not that different from the earlier one in that all financial
contributions are still on a voluntary basis.
The key change between the 2000 and 2010 documents might be the latter’s
indication of a potential expansion of EANET in the future. Along with the objectives of

46

For detailed arrangements, see EANET, 2010a, p. 22
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EANET, the new document adds a statement that the “scope of this Instrument may be
extended, as decided by the IG” (EANET, 2010d, p. 17). Other than this
acknowledgement of potential expansion of EANET’s research scope, the 2010
document is very similar to the texts agreed to 10 years earlier, and remains not legally
binding.
As noted, a few countries declined to sign the instrument due to internal processes
that might be required for their signature. It is notable, however, that Japan and the other
countries that signed the instrument in 2010 were not concerned about following national
processes to obtain approvals for their signature, not because their national delegates had
full authority to sign it, but because it is a non-legally binding agreement.
Regarding the EANET’s future direction, according to one of Japanese delegates
to the IG 12 of 2010, 47 the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Ministry of
Environment seemed to have agreed that Japan wanted a legally binding agreement. But
in 2008, the MOFA reviewed the document and concluded that Japan needed to keep
EANET not legally binding because making it legally binding might require a more equal
contribution among member countries rather than the then-current heavy reliance on the
Japanese financial contribution, which supplied more than 90% of the annual budgets of
both the secretariat and the network center. 48 The Japanese MOFA was concerned that
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Informal discussion with a Japanese delegate at the Twelfth Session of the Intergovernmental
Meeting on the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia, November 23-24, 2010, in
Niigata, Japan.
48
Japan made financial contributions of US$ 367,402 in 2008 and US$ 382,262 in 2009 for the
secretariat and US$ 422,967 to the network center core budget in 2009 (EANET, 2010b). Most of
the network center’s additional budget is also contributed by the Japanese government, including
its Ministry of Environment, National Institute for Agro-Environmental Studies of Japan, and
Niigata city and prefecture, and Japanese companies such as Nissan Science Foundation and
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. (EANET, 2010c).
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the existing system of EANET might not work if Japan reduced its contribution and few
of the other countries were willing to increase their financial contribution to EANET.
This internal decision by the Japanese government led to the proposed non-legally
binding instrument, which seven countries signed without much difficulty or reluctance.
As mentioned above, the instrument specifies no mandatory financial contribution or
regulations for the reduction of pollution because the objectives of the EANET are only
to set up a common monitoring system and to formulate policy recommendations for the
further development of the network based on their monitoring results without considering
specific emission standards.
Thus, Japan’s significant financial contributions have made the EANET’s
financing capability “the highest among other regional cooperative mechanisms” (Kim,
2013, 12). The other side of the coin, however, is that Japan’s enormous contribution has
prevented EANET from moving on the next step of creating a legally binding regional
agreement. The reasons for both these achievements and limits of EANET are discussed
in the following sections.

Political Leadership
This section tests Hypothesis 1, which predicts that the stronger the political
leadership—whether structural, instrumental, or directional—that a participating country
in the region exerts, the more formal and the more concrete the collective action in the
region will be. It examines whether stronger political leadership taken by any country in
the region increases the likelihood of developing more formal and concrete collective
action.
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Since EANET’s beginning, Japan has exerted firm structural leadership through
its dominant financial contributions, but only limited directional leadership despite its
advanced research and limited instrumental leadership. Before discussing Japan’s
structural leadership, we need to understand the limit of Chinese leadership. In terms of
environmental cooperation, as discussed in chapter 1, China, despite its growing political
and economic strength in the global order and its enormous emissions that contribute to
regional air pollution, has emphasized its status as a developing country without showing
any leadership in acid deposition issues.
Although China has taken various domestic measures to tackle air pollution and
acid rain in particular, it has shown little interest in regional environmental cooperation.
China’s environmental policy is essentially decided in accordance with its National
Economic and Social Development Plan on a 5-year basis. In the sixth 5-year-plan period
between 1979 and 1985 during the reformation of the country’s political and economic
systems, widespread acidic pollution was observed and the issue of acid rain emerged in
China based on nationwide surveys on precipitation chemistry (Lai, Kawashima, Shindo,
& Ohga, 2001).
In the seventh 5-year-plan period between 1986 and 1990 during a period of
economic stabilization, the acid rain issue was adopted as one of China’s national key
projects. Systemic studies suggested that the level of acidity was going to worsen and that
Southern China was the most seriously hit area. Accordingly, China adopted the Air
Pollution Control Act in September 1987, but the act excluded many sulfur emission
facilities, such as power stations, from those requiring control. During the eighth 5-year
plan period between 1991 and 1995, when China was experiencing a booming economy
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and its government advocated the concept of sustainable development, Chinese officials
strengthened the acid rain projects in the National Plan and began to release data relating
to acid rain to make information about pollution openly available in response to growing
public concerns. During the ninth 5-year-plan period between 1995 and 2000, the plan for
economic development included environmental protection:
The Air Pollution Control Act 1987 was amended, and articles dealing with sulfur
and acid rain pollution were revised in 1995. The new act prescribes provisions
relating to the acid deposition control zone and the sulfur dioxide control zone. It
has been a remarkable step in China’s policy toward acid rain control. In 1996,
sulfur dioxide was listed as one of the pollutants requiring control under the
System for Controlling the Total Amount of Major Pollutants. (Lai et al., 2001, p.
1846)

Despite China’s considerable concern about domestic air pollution, particularly
the acid rain issue, it has shown little interest in regional environmental cooperation.
China has cited its insufficient financial capacity and more pressing domestic issues, such
as wide economic gaps among regions and various problems in public health, 49 to explain
its low level of activity on environmental questions. However, it seems evident that the
Chinese disinterest in EANET is related to its strategic recognitions of what the network
might find because of its status of a source country. China’s position was similar to those
of the United Kingdom and Poland who refused to sign the 1985 Sulfur Protocol
(Protocol on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes) which
mandated uniform reductions of 30% in sulfur dioxide emissions from 1980 levels by
1993 because these two countries “burned large amounts of dirty coal, and were upwind
from the very sensitive ecosystems in Scandinavia” (Levy, 1993, p. 94). According to
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Interview with a Chinese professor at Peking University in April 2011.
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Komori, China, as a net contributor to regional air pollution, “had initially denied any
responsibility for its role in causing transboundary acid rain” (Komori, 2010, p. 17).
Since the China-Japan Environmental Cooperation Agreement was signed in
March 1994, bilateral environmental activities in the area of air pollution have been
heavily promoted by Japan. The environmental projects addressed by the two countries
have been supported by the Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs 50.
Japan has provided China with special lower-interest loans for environmental projects
since 1995, which it has assessed as “effective in helping to control China’s acid rain”
(Lai et al., 2001, p. 1848). Accordingly, bilateral cooperation between China and Japan
has been largely one-way, in which Japan has been a resource provider and China a
resource beneficiary. In fact, the bilateral projects have been “a reflection of Japan’s
concern with and enthusiasm for the acid rain issue” rather than a reflection of China’s
(Lai et al., 2001, p. 1848).
Structural Leadership in EANET
Structural leadership is measured by contributions to the financing of the regional
cooperative mechanisms, treating spending as evidence of structural leadership. The lack
of interest in leading regional environmental cooperation on the part of China means that
Japan has been the only country exerting leadership in the acid deposition issue. As noted
earlier, Japan has been the key resource provider for the EANET monitoring activities.
To support the monitoring activities of EANET, its network center has provided basic
measuring equipment for most member countries except the ROK, which was able to
make its own monitoring samples and other tools (Table 3.5). One of the Chinese
delegates to IG12 in 2010 stated that EANET’s capacity building was one of the most
50

The Japanese ODA programs for China began in 1979.
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important outputs of EANET. 51 In fact, the provision of this monitoring equipment to
member countries enhanced their monitoring capabilities in a practical manner.
Table 3.5
Equipment Provided to Participating Countries for Monitoring Activities
Year
1998
1999

2000

2001
2002

2003

Country
Assisted
Mongolia
Russia
China
Philippines
Vietnam
Indonesia
Malaysia
Vietnam
Cambodia
Lao PDR
Mongolia
Vietnam
Cambodia
Lao PDR
Mongolia
Philippines

2004
2005
2006

2007
2008
51

Russia
Philippines
Vietnam
Lao PDR
Vietnam
Cambodia
China
Lao PDR
Myanmar
Philippines
Cambodia
Lao PDR
Cambodia

Equipment Provided
IC, Wet-Only Sampler, Filter Pack Sampler Kit
Wet-Only Sampler
Wet-Only Sampler, Filter Pack Sampler Kit
Wet-Only Sampler, Refrigerator
Wet-Only Sampler, Filter Pack Sampler Kit
Wet-Only Sampler
Filter Pack Sampler Kit
Filter Pack Sampler Kit, Flow Meter
Wet-Only Sampler, Power Stabilizer
Wet-Only Sampler, Power Stabilizer
Pure Water Generator Boiler
Flow Meter
pH and EC Meter
pH and EC Meter
Digital Pipette, Flow Meter
Filter Pack Sampler Kit, Computer, Digital
Camera
AAS (used)
Filter Pack Sampler Kit, Refrigerator
Filter Pack pump
Refrigerator
Refrigerator
IC (purchased using Secretariat's savings)
Filter Pack Sampler Kit
IC (purchased using Secretariat's savings)
Wet-Only Sampler, pH and EC Meter
Rain Sensor
Filter Pack Sampler Kit
Filter Pack Sampler Kit
Refrigerator of Wet-Only Sampler

Interview with a Chinese delegate in November, 2010 in Niigata, Japan.
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2009

2010

Philippines
Myanmar
Lao PDR
Vietnam
China
Indonesia
Myanmar

Refrigerator of Wet-Only Sampler
IC (donated by JICA)
IC Suppressor
Filter Pack Pump
Filter Pack Kit
Filter Pack Kits (2)
Refrigerator for Wet-Only Sampler

Note: Adapted from Proceedings: The Ninth Session of the Working Group on Future
Development of EANET, by EANET, 2010c, p. 69.

As mentioned above, based on the Tentative Design, the EANET member
countries have borne the administrative and operation costs of national EANET
monitoring activities. The Report of the Second Session of the Working Group on Further
Financial Arrangements for EANET in 2003 reported the annual expenses for national
monitoring, as seen in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6
Annual Expenses for National Monitoring (US$)
Cambodia
N/A
Mongolia
11,000
China
135,000
Philippines
24,000
Indonesia
22,000
ROK
125,000
Japan
874,000
Russia
37,000
Lao PDR
N/A
Thailand
69,000
Malaysia
248,000
Vietnam
16,000
Note: Adapted from Report of the Session: The Second Session of the Working Group on Further
Financial Arrangement for EANET, by EANET, 2003,
http://www.eanet.asia/event/wgf/wgf02.pdf. p. 3

Unlike self-borne expenses for national monitoring, Japan has consistently
contributed the bulk of the financing of the secretariat and the network center. Because of
Japan’s considerable financial support, EANET has established the most financially
abundant regional cooperative mechanism in East Asia. At the same time, continuous
efforts have been made to diversify financial resources other than the contributions of
Japan. Decision on the Further Financial Arrangement for EANET was adopted in 2003
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at the Fifth Intergovernmental Meeting (IG5) to urge member countries to contribute to
the financing of the secretariat and network center. EANET considers the latest UN
guidelines for burden sharing based on assessment scales as the first step in this direction.
(The UN assessment scales are set by the UN General Assembly for all UN member
states based on GNP, population, and geographic criteria.) At the annual
Intergovernmental Meetings, the secretariat and the network center announced the
expected contributions of each of the member countries using something like the UN
assessment formula to calculate the money share. For example, Japan took part in
16.624% UN scale of assessment in 2007-2009, and reflecting its sharing on the global
scale, 71.314% scale of EANET burden sharing on the regional scale. Based on this
calculation, it was estimated that Japan might make an EANET contribution of
US$337,571 in 2010 (Table 3.7) (EANET, 2009a, p. 236).
Table 3.7
Estimated Participating Countries’ 2010 Contributions to Secretariat Budget, Based on
Latest UN Assessment Scale

Cambodia
China
Indonesia
Japan
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Mongolia
Myanmar
Philippines
ROK
Russia
Thailand

UN scale of
assessment, 20072009 (%)

Scale of EANET
burden sharing
(%)

Estimated
contribution (US$)
in 2010

0.001
2.667
0.161
16.624
0.001
0.19
0.001
0.005
0.078
2.173
1.2
0.186

0.004
11.441
0.691
71.314
0.004
0.815
0.004
0.021
0.335
9.322
5.148
0.798

19
54,157
3,271
337,571
19
3,858
19
99
1,586
44,127
24.368
3,777
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Viet Nam

0.024

0.103

488

Total

23.311

100

473,359

Note: Adapted from Proceedings of the Eleventh Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting on
Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia by EANET, 2009a, p. 236.

EANET financial reports have shown that few countries have met these estimated
contributions, however, which may be because they are made on a voluntary basis
without any specific enforcement measures. Revised Procedures and Guidelines for
Voluntary Financial Contribution to EANET was adopted at the Ninth Intergovernmental
Meeting (IG9) in 2007 to determine the minimum amount of US$50 for the voluntary
financial contributions by participating countries, and Cambodia, Mongolia, and Lao
PDR have paid US$50 annually in recent years. China and the ROK have annually
contributed around US$15,000 and US$18,000, respectively, for the financing of the
secretariat since 2002 and 2006. However, compared to the total actual annual expenses
(between US$330,000 and US$500,000) of the secretariat (Table 3.8), these contributions
seem minor, and as a result, the shortfall in the budget has been covered by Japanese
contributions.
Table 3.8
Summary of Income and Expenses of the Secretariat in US$ 2004-2009
Details
Savings from 2002 and 2003 budget
Income for 2004 budget
Total expenses for 2004 budget
Income for 2005 budget
Total expenses for 2005 budget
Income for2006 budget
Total expenses for 2006 budget
Income for 2007 budget
Total expenses for 2007 budget

Income

Expenses
(Regular + Savings)

469,931
290,284
329,814
346,831
337,720
254,302
413,101
343,988
367,407
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Income for 2008 budget
Total expenses for 2008 budget
Income for 2009 budget
Total expenses for 2009 budget
Total

408,503 52
497,920
423,083

53

2,532,382

423,033
2,350,995

Note: Adapted from “The Review of Performance of the Secretariat (2008-2009),” by EANET,
2010f.

Based on the latest UN assessment scale, contribution estimates (in U.S. dollars)
were China, $73,942; Japan, $290,526; ROK, $52,403; Russia, $37,146; and the other
countries, less than $6,000 (EANET, 2010f). Yet the actual contributions of member
countries for the financing of the secretariat have fallen far short of that except Japan’s.
In 2009, Cambodia contributed $50; China $15,000; Japan $382,262; Lao PDR $50;
Malaysia $3,835; Mongolia $50; the ROK $18,029; and Thailand $3,777. In 2008,
Cambodia contributed $50; China $15,000; Japan $367,402; Malaysia $3,836; Mongolia
$50; ROK $18,388; and Thailand $3,777. Japan’s contributions for the financing of the
secretariat ($382,262) comprised more than 90% of the total expenditures of the
secretariat in 2009.
Japan’s dominant contributions to the EANET budget are even more significant
for the financing of the core budget of the network center, accounting for more than 99%
of the total contributions of participating countries toward this budget in 2009.
Furthermore, the network center has been supported by the Japanese government, which
has provided extrabudgetary contributions for technical support and training and
contracts for research through its Ministry of Environment. The 99% contribution of
Japan resulted partly from the lack of participation of other member countries,
52

In USD, Cambodia contributed 50; China 15,000; Japan 367,402; Malaysia 3,836; Mongolia
50; Korea 18,388; and Thailand 3,777.
53
In USD, Cambodia contributed 50; China 15,000; Japan 382,262; Lao PDR 50; Malaysia
3,835; Mongolia 50; Korea 18,029; and Thailand 3,777.
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particularly China and the ROK, in the financing of the network center. For example,
Korean delegates to EANET have expressed their reservations about contributing to this
financing because of some transparency issues, and therefore the ROK has not made any
contribution to the core budget of the network center, whereas it has made around
$18,000 in annual contributions to the secretariat in recent years.
One of key arguments of the Korean delegates regarding the controversial
transparency of EANET is that the annual budget for the network is too high considering
the size of the EANET, with just 13 participating countries. The annual core budget of
the network center, US$400,000-500,000, is almost same as the budget of the Chemical
Coordinating Centre (CCC) of the Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and
Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP), which
is in charge of measurements, including data monitoring, data storage, and quality control
and assurance, for more than 40 member countries (UNESC, 2012, p. 13). Moreover, the
additional budget for the EANET network center (US$803,000 in 2009) is considerably
higher than the Norwegian Institute for Air Research (NILU)’s voluntary extrabudgetary
contributions for the CCC of EMEP (US$326,438 in 2008). In the view of Korean
delegates, EANET’s relatively high budget might have resulted from its more expensive
personnel costs in comparison to those of the secretariat. As stated during discussions at
the IG8 on problems with hiring a coordinator in the secretariat in 2006, staff members in
the secretariat have earned a “low salary for this position compared to similar positions in
the UN system” (EANET, 2006b, p. 2). 54
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Interviews with Ken Yamashita, a Japanese researcher at Asia Center for Air Pollution
Research (ACAP) on February 8, 2011, and with Korean participants in various EANET
meetings.
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This cost issue has been raised since the early years of development (see, for
instance, EANET, 2002, p. 5), and is still controversial in 2013. Against the Korean
assertions about the higher personnel costs in the network center, a Japanese participant
argues that there actually is not much difference in the personnel costs between the
network center and the secretariat. According to the organization’s financial reports, the
EANET secretariat spent $135,518 for three employees, including the coordinator, the
program officer, and an administrative staff member, while the network center spent
$577,794 for 12 employees. On this account, the Korean delegates argue that the staff of
the network center is not responsible solely for EANET monitoring activities but also
conduct domestic measurements and other research activities, costs which should not be
borne by other participating countries. A Japanese participant explained that the network
center had tracked the amount of labor allotted to EANET activities by employees for a
year and has included only a percentage of the salary of staff members in the annual
EANET budget and expenditures. However, the Korean delegates have not been
persuaded by the Japanese argument about the division of labor within the Network
Center because of the potential difficulties of distinguishing between the labor for
national research and for international research.
Therefore, even though Japan’s dominant role in the financial support of EANET
has given it the highest financial capability among various regional cooperative
mechanisms, it has also become an obstacle to other nations’ justifying the use of their
national resources to financially contribute to EANET’s operations. The key point of
Korean delegates on the transparency issue has been that the EANET’s network center is
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not an international organization but a Japan-led program for which the Japanese
government discretionally sets and executes the annual budget.
As mentioned above, this problematic Japanese dominance was recognized by the
Japanese government when it decided to maintain EANET as a voluntary, not binding,
mechanism. EANET recently discussed whether to convert its current voluntary
mechanism to a legally binding one, but ironically Japan opposed the idea in favor of
maintaining the current EANET system. One Japanese scholar attributes this to
bureaucratic inertia, 55 saying that the Japanese government wishes to keep EANET’s
existing system even though it recognizes that doing so might not work for further
development of EANET. Under the current voluntary circumstances, it is doubtful the
dominance of Japanese financial contributions is likely to change in the near future.
Directional Leadership in EANET
Directional leadership refers to developing substantive solutions based on
knowledge and changing perceptions of risks. Japan also seems to have expected to exert
directional leadership and instrumental leadership from the beginning of EANET
activities. Neither of these two modes of leadership, however, has been successfully
practiced by Japan because of other member states’ objections to Japanese leadership.
Regarding directional leadership, Japan anticipated leading the technical arrangements of
EANET in the early years (1993-1997) based on its high technology. As described below,
the development of the Guidelines for Monitoring Acid Deposition in the East Asia
Region demonstrates how Japanese directional leadership has been both asserted and
denied throughout the development of EANET.

55

Interview with Professor Atsushi Ishii at Tohoku University, Japan on October 17, 2010.
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At the early years of EANET, Japan exerted its directional leadership without
objections from other countries. At the First Expert Meeting in 1993, the participating
countries welcomed the leadership exerted by the Environment Agency of Japan, as they
believed that Japan “could play a coordinating role toward the establishment of a
monitoring network and host this kind of expert meeting for the next two years” (EANET,
1993). This meeting recognized that a regional acid precipitation monitoring network was
needed, as “adverse effects of acid precipitation would become a critical problem in
certain areas in the future although evidence of the effects of acid precipitation on
ecosystems has yet to be determined” given the significant expansion of the economies in
the region (ibid.). Thus, draft guidelines had been prepared by the Environment Agency
of Japan and adopted at the Second Expert Meeting in March 1995 in Tokyo, Japan
without many difficulties.
“Data Reporting Procedures and Formats for Acid Deposition Monitoring in East
Asia” 56 was agreed to in the Second Interim Scientific Advisory Group Meeting in 2000
without difficulties. It included concrete formats for reporting monitoring results and
guidelines for monitoring, such as monitoring sites and intervals, monitoring parameters
indicating first and second priorities, and meteorological measurement. 57 This creation of
a concrete monitoring format for compatible data can be considered a strong
advancement in environmental cooperation in the region.
Since April 1998, when EANET’s activities were accelerated by the First
Intergovernmental Meeting in March 1998, the participating countries grew more
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Available at http://www.eanet.cc/product/datarep_form.pdf
EANET has collected monitoring data on SO2, NO2, O3, CO, PM10 for ambient air quality;
pH, EC, Cation including NH4+, NA+, Ca2+, Mg2+ and Anion for wet deposition; and PM2.5
mass and composition in PM2.5 for dry deposition (EANET, 2010f).
57

121

concerned about the guidelines and technical leadership provided by Japan. While the
adoption of “Data Reporting Procedures and Formats for Acid Deposition Monitoring in
East Asia” was not controversial, adoption of other technical documents, including
QA/QC and technical manuals, raised significant concerns among other participating
countries. If EANET were to be established as an international program, only monitoring
devices that were appropriate to the technical documents should be used in EANET
activities. 58 Several Japanese monitoring device companies had dispatched employees to
the network center anticipating the adoption of their devices for EANET monitoring
activities because the network center purchased equipment from Japanese companies and
provided them for the member countries for free in the earlier stage of EANET.
However, there were two problems that the official adoption of the Japanese
devices because they were very different from the international standards or the oftenused global techniques that the United States and Europe had invented. First, the East
Asian countries, particularly the ROK, which had already equipped itself with monitoring
devices (mostly made in the United States), would have to change their existing devices
to the Japanese devices. Second, the monitoring data could not be compared and accepted
globally because of the different standards. Accordingly, the Interim Scientific Group
made considerable modifications to the guidelines that were proposed by the
Environment Agency of Japan and submitted by the network center. In fact, the meeting
report of the Interim Scientific Advisory Group in Jakarta in March 2000 stated that
“[a]fter intensive review and discussions, ISAG [Interim Scientific Advisory Group]
adopted the monitoring guidelines, technical manuals and other technical documents
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Email discussions with a Korean delegate on March 17 and 19, 2012.
122

(EANET/ISAG 2/4/1-8) with the modifications presented in Annex II” (EANET, 2000c,
p. 4).
Under these circumstances, the Japanese device companies could not dominate
the sale of monitoring equipments and lost their desire to play a role as stakeholders in
EANET. There is an interesting parallelism here to the Med Plan except the subjects of
opposition to the leadership of a particular country, Japan in the case of EANET and
France in the case of the Med Plan (Haas, 1990). In the Med Plan, France tried to
exercise directional leadership, which is similar to that of Japan – providing money, soft
power, and seeing an opportunity for selling French technology, yet it failed because
UNEP interceded and created a network of scientists that were able to socialize other
governments and thus the efforts that France initially helped support evolved in ways far
different from what France anticipated and wanted. In the case of EANET, participating
countries rather than an international organization opposed to the directional leadership
that Japan tried to exert, through opposing to the idea of adopting Japanese technology.
Thus, directional leadership by the Japanese has been reduced since 1998, but
without leading to an increase in directional leadership by other participating countries.
During the regular phase since 2001, no other countries have demonstrated a strong
interest in exerting leadership in developing EANET. In fact, few participating countries
actually contribute to writing the manuals due to their own limited labor resources, which
has let Japan maintain its practical leadership in preparing technical guidance and QA/QC.
Nonetheless, Japanese directional leadership has been subtle and unstable to some extent,
due to technical reasons such as those mentioned above.
Instrumental Leadership in EANET
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Instrumental leadership is demonstrated by negotiating skills to frame issues and
to put together deals through institutional bargaining. Like its directional leadership, the
instrumental or entrepreneurial leadership played by Japan also has not been impressive,
but no alternative country has shown an interest in taking firm instrumental leadership
over EANET, either. Instrumental leadership can be defined as exercising the
“negotiating skills to frame issues in ways that foster integrative bargaining and to put
together deals that would otherwise elude participants endeavoring to form international
regimes through institutional bargaining” (Young, 1991, p. 293). In the case of EANET,
which has not created any regulatory mechanisms, countries which provide instrumental
leadership could function mainly as agenda setters and popularizers, drawing more
attention to the issues, rather than as inventors or brokers of policy options.
Japan’s limited instrumental leadership is well represented by the issue of
extending EANET’s scope in terms of substances and activities. At the Second Expert
Meeting in 1995, the participating countries agreed to use the term “acid deposition,”
rather than “acid precipitation,” to accommodate all aspects of acid rain issues in the
future development of the network. Thus, in the early years of the EANET, countries
understood that acid rain might be too narrow a concept for regional cooperation in the
future and adopted the more inclusive term, acid deposition. During the preparatory phase,
the potential extension of EANET therefore had been anticipated. At the Second Interim
Scientific Advisory Group in March 2000, in Jakarta, Indonesia, scientists endorsed a
statement regarding the eventual necessity of modeling, mentioning that “[c]ontribution
by anthropogenic and natural emission sources cannot be distinguished through the
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network monitoring activities. It will be done at the next step through modeling”
(EANET, 2000c, p. 2).
China has stressed the step-by-step process since the beginning of the regular
phase. The ideal steps in such a progression would be to move from monitoring to
inventory work to modeling and then to the mitigation of impact damage. This
incremental approach advocated by China has consistently blocked Japan’s ambition to
expand the scope of EANET and thereby exert its instrumental leadership. Comments of
a key Japanese delegate who has participated in the EANET meetings since March 1998
reflect the Japanese view which is different from China’s. He mentioned that EANET is
not focusing on acid deposition only and that participating countries need to think big and
integrate air pollutants and climate issues. 59 He asserted that the hemispheric transport of
air pollution (HTAP) could serve as a good precedent study regarding intercontinental
transport of ozone, aerosols, mercury, and persistent organic pollutants.
In fact, the Report of the Long-Term National Acid Deposition Monitoring in
Japan (JFY 2003-2007) produced by Japan’s Ministry of Environment in 2009 clearly
points out the necessity of extending the scope of EANET’s actions to include more
diverse air pollutants and modeling:
Aiming to extend the action scope of EANET from the conventional acid
deposition monitoring to the management of the atmosphere environment in East
Asia, it is necessary to establish the international cooperative relationship and
promote regional collaboration to prevent air pollution. . . . It is needed that the
transboundary air pollution monitoring including not only acid deposition but also
ozone and aerosol should be conducted. (MOEJ, 2009, pp. 6-7)
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However, Japan’s ambitions toward instrumental leadership have not been exerted
due to Chinese objections to the expansion of the scope of air pollution substances and of
EANET activities to modeling. The Chinese objection was not the only reason for
Japan’s failure to exert instrumental leadership. As the regular phase evolved, Japanese
delegates started to realize the necessity of enhancing the ownership of other countries in
the organization through various meetings. In fact, Japanese delegates have consciously
tried to let delegates from other countries talk more rather than guiding the meetings to
increase other countries’ sense of ownership in EANET. 60
In short, as EANET has evolved from its early years through its preparatory and
regular phases, various forms of Japanese leadership have been exerted and also
challenged. Above all, the structural leadership of the Japanese brought the acid
deposition issue to the attention of the region. The establishment of the cooperative
mechanism during the earlier phases is attributable to Japanese structural leadership.
Despite criticisms by other member countries regarding Japan’s dominant contributions
and seeming lack of transparence about the expenditures of the network center, Japan
seems to be the only country which has been willing to exercise structural leadership up
to now. Japan’s strong willingness will need to continue to be a driving force if EANET
is to remain the most formal and concrete collective action among various regional
cooperative mechanisms. In addition to Japanese structural leadership, Japanese
directional leadership succeeded in igniting the regional discussions on acid deposition in
the first phase, it was reduced at the second preparatory phase due to potential problems
regarding Japanese-led technical guidance. During the final regular phase, Japan has
60

Informal discussions with a Japanese delegate to the Twelfth Intergovernmental Meeting in
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relaxed its instrumental leadership through its own initiative in order to better share
ownership with other member countries. Some member countries, particularly China,
have objected to the Japanese instrumental leadership regarding the issue of extension of
EANET. Such challenges to Japanese directional and instrumental leadership have made
Japan more cautious in exerting its political leadership. However, no other member
country has stepped up to the plate with meaningful financial support for this issue. This
has created a considerable gap in the leadership of EANET, which is one of obstacles that
EANET must overcome if it is to proceed to the next stage of regime creation so as to
produce visible outcomes in both institutional and environmental terms.

Knowledge
This section tests Hypothesis 2, which asserts that a region will develop more
formal and more concrete forms of collective action if participating countries in its
environmental cooperation efforts develop greater commonly shared knowledge. As
mentioned in chapter 1, this research emphasizes the development of scientific
knowledge rather than the development of epistemic communities because of the
characteristics of regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia,
principally its focus on science without the development of policy options by scientists.
Japan had developed research on acid deposition between 1868 and 1920 that was
conducted by foreign professors in Japan, but no syntheses of the environmental
phenomena were made due to “sporadic, uncoordinated, and minimal” ideas from the
West (Wilkening, 2004, p. 86). In the 1930s and 1940s, limnological research focusing
on the chemical analysis of lake water with comprehensive field research was conducted
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in Japan, but none of researchers at that time succeeded in making “a link between acidic
inputs from the atmosphere and changes in lake chemistry” (Wilkening, 2004, p. 101).
The field of air pollution research began in the late 1950s in Japan. The Air
Pollution Society of Japan was established in 1959, and the number of articles on air
pollution significantly increased in the mid-1960s. The journals of the Air Pollution
Research group and the National Air Pollution Monitoring Network (NAPMN) were
founded in 1965 and spurred further research. Scientists found tree decline in the Kanto
Plane surrounding Tokyo in the 1970s, and the Environment Agency of Japan started a
survey on wet air pollution in the Kanto region in 1975. Wilkening argues that before the
1970s, however, “Japan lay completely outside the mainstream of this international
activity on acid rain” (Wilkening, 2004, p. 144). 61
One of the reasons for the late development of research regarding acid deposition
in Japan is that Japanese scientists could not get funding without the establishment of law
about environmental problems. 62 Wilkening argues that the environmental “law was the
first in Japan to establish general principals and objectives for overall environmental
policy and to provide a legal mechanism for their implementation” (Wilkening, 2004, p.
127). As a key Japanese scientist, Dr. Hajime Akimoto, stated, “In Japan, without law, no
research fund is provided. It is contrasting that no law is created without research in the
U.S. In Japan, science has little power. Laws are made ahead of science. This is quite
state-centric.” 63 As these statements indicate, it is hard for Japanese scientists to get

61

The international literature regarding acid rain in China appeared in the 1980s, which was
much later in than Japan (Larssen et al., 2006).
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Interview with Director General of the Network Center of EANET on February 8, 2011.
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Interview with Dr. Akimoto, Director General of Asia Center for Air Pollution Research
(ACAP), on Feb. 8, 2011.
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money from even a general research fund or from their government, including the
Ministry of Environment, because research funds in Japan are available only when legal
measures are developed.
Even though research capacity has spread to local research institutes, it is an
undeniable fact that the “national-level researchers remained the scientific leaders”
(Wilkening, 2004, p. 148). The national-level researchers are more reliant on
governmental funding to research a phenomenon, and the Japanese government is
reluctant to provide funding before certain laws are established. Thus, the development of
measures to control sulphur dioxide emissions in Japan, as outlined in Table 3.9, can be a
key to understanding why Japanese researchers started to recognize acid deposition only
in the early 1970s.
Table 3.9
Measures to Control Sulphur Dioxide Emissions in Japan
YEAR Description
1962
1968
1969
1970
1973

Establishment of the Law Concerning the Regulation of Smoke and Soot
Emissions and Other Measures
Establishment of the Air Pollution Control Law
Establishment of the Environmental Quality Standards concerning SOx
Partial revision of the Air Pollution Control Law (introduction of the K-value
regulation for each designated area)
Revision of the Environmental Quality Standards on sulfur dioxide

1974

Partial revision of the Air Pollution Control Law (introduction of Total Mass
Emission Control)

1976

Partial revision of the Air Pollution Control Law (revision of the emission
standards)

Note: The information presented in this table was provided by a Japanese delegate to EANET in
an interview on February 8, 2011.

As Table 3.9 shows, the first Japanese law passed to control air pollution was
enacted in the 1960s. With the legal infrastructure in place, Japan started to pay attention
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to the possible causes of acid rain in the mid-1980s (Wilkening, 2004, p. 140). In 1983,
Japan started its National Acid Deposition Survey with 14 national monitoring stations
through the Acid Deposition Prevention Committee, established by the Environment
Agency of Japan. The committee consisted of experts in air pollution, soil/vegetation, and
inland water, and it has extended the number of monitoring sites and conducted research
on acid deposition to clarify the actual condition and influence of acid deposition in Japan.
The monitoring results between 1983 and 2002 were summed up in the “General Report
about Acid Deposition Research” in 2004, which noted that acid depositions in Japan
were not observed to be as high as those in Europe and the United States (Ministry of
Environment of Japan, 2009).
The results of Japan’s domestic research were identical to the reports of the
Expert Meetings of EANET in the organization’s early years. At the First Expert Meeting
of EANET in 1993, participants agreed that acid deposition would cause adverse effects
and become a critical problem in some areas in the future, considering the expanding
economies in the region, even though evidence of its effects had not yet been determined
(EANET, 1993). Monitoring results over the following 2 decades have also shown only
low impact of acid deposition in East Asia.
The key outcomes of EANET research activities have also been published in two
periodic reports on the state of acid deposition in East Asia, in 2006 and 2011. EANET
concludes that acid deposition is still common in East Asia, but has not yet had a
significant impact on ecological systems in the region. The first Periodic Report on the
State of Acid Deposition EANET in 2006, based on its monitoring activities between 2000
and 2004, stated that no clear adverse ecological impacts had been found. For impacts on
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soil, the report points out that little evidence of acid deposition causing changes in soils
had been observed because it had been only a few years since EANET began soil
monitoring. For impacts on vegetation, the report asserted that there had been no report of
data that clearly blamed acid deposition for the deterioration of tree conditions, even
though trees in Russia showed some symptoms of decline. 64 Although it had been alleged
that high ozone concentrations may be harmful to plants, the report acknowledged that
this issue could not be verified through EANET activities because they had not conducted
specific observations on ozone effects. Regarding lakes and rivers, the report mentioned
that no clear trend in acidic values was observed in the aquatic environments in the
region. Finally, the report concluded its findings on the impacts of acid deposition as
follows:
Some EANET data revealed high values of sulfate and nitrate loadings from the
atmosphere, as well as low pH precipitation. The effects on vegetation and aquatic
life are still inconclusive, however, so more coordinated studies are needed. Based
on previous studies conducted in different areas, the ecological impacts of acid
deposition, especially on forest tree species and aquatic organisms, could not be
determined or were not observed with the short observation period. (EANET,
2006a, p. 25)
In 2011, the most recent periodic report of the EANET also stated that:
EANET’s monitoring work has demonstrated that acid rain remains prevalent
across East Asia. The annual average pH of rainwater is lower than 5.0 (the
threshold for acid rain) at 60% of monitoring sites, and values of less than 4.6
have been recorded in several locations. Sulphuric acid (H2SO4) remains the
primary contributor to acid rain across the region . . . [and] contribution of nitric
acid (HNO3) to acid rain is almost equal to that of sulphuric acid. Despite
continued acidification in the region, the impact of acid deposition on eco-system
functions still appears limited. No decline in tree growth or in the number of
64

Despite forest decline in some areas of China due to the direct effects of SO2, effects on forests
are much less certain in China because “few reports are made about widespread damage in more
remote areas,” and “scientists have stated that soil acidification is likely to have negative effects
on forest growth in China” in the future (Larssen, 2006, p. 422).
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species in understory vegetation has been observed during monitoring, and overall
forest functions and structures apparently remain sound. (EANET, 2011d, p. ii)
Whereas some sites in Malaysia, China (Chongqing), Indonesia, the ROK, and Japan had
recorded 5-year (2005-2009) average rainwater pH values lower than 4.6, other sites in
China (Xi’an) and Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar) had recorded average rainwater pH values
higher than 6.0 due to “increased contribution of alkaline species such as ammonia (NH3)
from agriculture and calcium carbonate in soil dust, respectively” (EANET, 2011d, iv).
Despite no evidence of significant damage from acid deposition at that time, the
report pointed out that “the influence of acid deposition could become obvious in the
future if we continue to have acid depositions as it is, because the influence of acid
depositions to soil/vegetation and land water is considered to appear after long term
period” (Ministry of Environment Japan, 2009, p. 9). Along this line of thought, EANET
acknowledged acid deposition as one of several future problems, and it regarded
monitoring as a way of preparing for those problems. As it noted, “Considering the
significance of possible future problems regarding acid deposition, it becomes
increasingly important to obtain accurate and precise data on acid deposition” (EANET,
2000a, p. 1).
Probably due to this inconclusive state of acid deposition in East Asia, EANET
has not provided precise analysis of acid deposition in this region and only vindicated the
need for “further amplification.” According to the Second Periodic Report,
Although the EANET has accumulated ten-year record at most, the length of
period does not suffice for temporal trend analysis because the wet deposition has
a number of factors most of which are quite variable with time, the existing time
trend could be concealed unlike gas and aerosol species. This would stress the
significance of a long-term high-quality monitoring is indispensable to detect
some symptoms at all for elimination and mitigation of potential impacts. . . The
data trend generated over the years of monitoring in the ecological stations across
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the EANET participating countries suggests possible acidification or nitrogen
saturation in several sites. There is, however, a need to isolate other existing
environmental conditions that may have contributed to such an observation. . .
The pH of water in five inland aquatic systems significantly decreased from 2000
to 2009. The accumulated data for the last years suggested the possible
acidification or nitrogen saturation of the inland ecosystems in several EANET
sites. But just like in the cases of the forest soil and vegetation, some other factors
that can bring about nitrogen saturation in inland waters need further
amplification. (EANET, 2011a, pp. 2-3)
Given that one of the objectives of EANET is to “create a common understanding of the
status of acid deposition problems in East Asia” (EANET, 2010b), it is uncertain whether
this weak scientific conclusion can help EANET achieve that objective in the near future.
As Dimitrov argues, a key factor in international policymaking is knowledge about
transboundary consequences of an environmental problem rather than just the extent and
causes of the problem. Considering that the position of the Federal Republic of Germany
“dramatically changed after the release of its first comprehensive forest survey in 1982”
(Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994, p. 98), it seems that East Asia will need greater evidence
of the environmental impact and consequences of acid deposition in East Asia to justify
regional environmental cooperation.
East Asian countries seem little motivated to exert their political leadership given
this “lack of an urgent ecological imperative” (Komori, 2010, p. 18). When the Japanese
government, particularly the Environment Agency of Japan, decided to pay more
attention to the regional implications of European experiences after Agenda 21 of the
1992 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, it
asked Japanese scientists to identify the most appropriate issue on which Japan could
initiate regional environmental cooperation. The accumulation of scientific knowledge in
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Japan in the 1970s and 1980s had given Japan the confidence to proceed to regional
environmental regime creation.
It is argued by a Japanese scientist that the Japanese government was informed by
its scientists that acidification was not a serious threat to this region due to the
naturalization and diversity of its forests, which are quite different from Europe’s. The
former are more diverse than the latter, as Europe’s forests are dominated by very similar
kinds of trees that are very sensitive to acidity. 65 Ironically, the Japanese government
pushed the issue of acid deposition to be the regional agenda precisely because of these
characteristics of acid deposition in East Asia, thinking it would be easier for East Asia to
begin regional environmental cooperation by addressing a less sensitive and non-urgent
issue. Indeed, Korean participants in the Intergovernmental Meetings asserted that if the
acidification issue had generated intensive concerns regarding responsibility and
regulations, other countries might have not agreed on Japan’s initiative to create EANET
in the first place. 66
Therefore, since EANET was established, Japan’s scientific knowledge has been
neither challenged nor strengthened by EANET research activities. The state of
knowledge has remained elusive, requiring further research. For around 2 decades,
regional scholars have not discovered any commonly shared significant adverse
consequences of acid deposition in East Asia, and Komori argues that “governments’
commitment to the acid rain problem is primarily limited to the enhancement of scientific
cooperation” due to “the lack of an urgent ecological imperative” (2010, p. 18).
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Interview with Dr. Akimoto, Director General of Asia Center for Air Pollution Research (ACA)
on February 8, 2011.
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This statement was frequently made by Korean interviewees.
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Socialization
This section tests Hypothesis 3, which is that participating countries in regional
environmental cooperation efforts are more likely to create formal and concrete collective
action through regional cooperation if they adopt learning rather than adaptation as a
process of socialization. Through the adaptation process of socialization, international
actors can change their behaviors in response to new events, but they do so without
fundamental changes in their beliefs about underlying values and causal mechanisms. In
comparison, the learning process of socialization can produce more significant behavioral
changes, as international actors can raise questions on fundamental and implicit theories
and have a chance to examine their original values.
As mentioned in chapter 1, to determine which of these two processes of
socialization the participating countries have engaged in, this chapter assesses the
participation patterns of member countries in international meetings of EANET in terms
of the two criteria. First, this section investigates whether the participation of countries in
the region has been prompted by not intrinsic but indirect concerns about particular
transboundary air pollution issues. It is considered that countries have engaged in the
adaptation process of socialization if indirect political concerns have led them to
participate in regional environmental cooperation on the acid rain issue; it is considered
that countries have engaged in the learning process of socialization if they have found
intrinsic motivations for their regional cooperation.
Second, this section also analyzes the participation patterns of delegates to
international meetings as a proxy for socialization. Given that the learning process of
socialization typically requires extended exposure to the expected norms, values, and
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practices, it is considered that delegates are more likely to have engaged in the adaptation
process of socialization if they have had the opportunity to attend international meetings
for only a short period or in a sporadic manner, and to have engaged in the learning
process of socialization if they have been able to attend international meetings for an
extended period in a consistent manner.
For the first criteria of the participation patterns, the following sections examine
the external and internal contexts of East Asia to illustrate processes of socialization.
Thus, it is helpful to examine the external environment of international negotiations in the
early 1990s, such as Europeans’ responses to transboundary pollution issues, in order to
understand the socialization processes of Northeast Asian countries.
Japan, the initiator of EANET but a novice in regional environmental cooperation,
took the adaptation process rather than learning process in the early years of EANET
because of both its external and internal political environment rather than because of its
intrinsic concerns over acid rain issues. Japan recognized regional environmental
cooperation could be a means to improve its international status through leading regional
cooperation. Other countries, particularly China and the ROK, also took the adaptation
process, as they recognized joining the EANET as their chance to achieve other
objectives than solely focusing on acid deposition issues in East Asia.
Principle 21 of the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment had awakened global concerns on transboundary pollution. 67 It
stated that although each nation has “the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
67

In terms of international law, the 1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration between the United States and
Canada is known as the starting point in the evolution of transnational environmental dispute
resolution. For the historical development of international environmental law from classical
dispute resolution based on the principle of territorial sovereignty to multi-state regulation based
on conservation and prevention ethics, see Sand, 2007.
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pursuant to their own environmental policies,” it also has “the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” 68 As shown above,
even though various domestic measures were taken to respond to air pollution problems,
it was not until the 1990s that Japan, the initiator of EANET, began regional initiatives.
The Agenda 21 of the 1992 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development explicitly stated that successful European experiences on
tackling acid rain should be shared with other regions of the world.
Japan had confidence in the issue of acid deposition as a subject of regional
environmental cooperation due to its scientific accumulation over several decades, as
discussed in the knowledge section above. At the same time, the success of the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) in 1979 provided
Japan with more confidence about the successful development of regional environmental
cooperation on transboundary air pollution issues. These incidents show that Japan tried
to adapt to the international surroundings that emphasized environmental concerns and
regional cooperation to deal with transboundary environmental problems.
Yet given the historical context of East Asia, Japan’s will and confidence seems
to have yielded suspicion among other countries in the region as to Japan’s political
motivations for creating a regional network. These suspicious neighboring countries did
not seem to initially welcome Japan’s initiative for regional environmental cooperation,
although both China and the ROK adapted themselves to the international surroundings
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for boosting regional cooperation and viewed joining the EANET as a means to achieve
other ends of their own.
As mentioned above, even though China did not accept any responsibility for its
contribution to causing transboundary acid rain in the region, it “acknowledged in1992
that its pollution might have contributed to the transboundary problem” (Komori, 2010, p.
17). It is argued by Korean delegates that China had changed its position because of
Japan’s investment in building the Sino-Japan Friendship Center for Environmental
Protection in China, which was established in 1992. 69 Also, when China decided to
participate in the network not as an observer party but as a full member of EANET in
1998, it seemed like a diplomatic gift at the 1998 summit meeting between China and
Japan.
Korean participants claimed that the ROK also agreed to participate in EANET in
exchange for Japan’s agreement on the ROK’s initiative for NEASPEC (North-East Asia
Sub-regional Program for Environmental Cooperation). NEASPEC was the first
comprehensive regional environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia among six member
countries and which, unlike EANET is an issue-specific regional cooperative initiative, as
discussed in chapter 2. The NEASPEC was created by the Korean government in 1992 to
create a role for the ROK as an international and regional actor through initiating the
regional environmental cooperation.
Thus, it can be argued that all three countries of Japan, China, and the ROK have
taken the adaptation process of socialization because the creation of EANET was based
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This might be regarded as a structural leadership of Japan through providing China with the
economic incentives. However, unlike the hegemonic powers, Japan was not coercive because of
both historical responsibilities for regional air pollution and its colonialization in East Asia. This
is why Japanese leadership cannot be regarded as a structural leadership.
138

not primarily on an environmental concern of these countries, but rather by their
particular political and practical concerns. Participation in EANET activities was a means
for each to achieve other objectives than an end to the acid deposition issue itself. Japan’s
motive for initiating this regional environmental initiative was mostly the request of the
international community to spread the successful European experience and the Japanese
willingness to become a responsible international actor as befitting its economic
superpower status. It is difficult to assert that other member countries, particularly China
and the ROK, have changed their fundamental causal understanding of acid deposition.
Rather, both China and the ROK have found their own political reasons to participate in
EANET. No learning process of socialization has been observed in the participation of
these three member countries.
Along with these external international negotiation circumstances in Europe and
Northeast Asia, the participation patterns of delegates to the international meetings of
EANET also show the adaptation processes of socialization. Bureaucratic rotation
systems in East Asia have led countries to take the adaptation process rather than learning
process. Bureaucratic systems in East Asia allow public officers to hold the same position
for only a limited time in order to prevent corruption and increase creativity. The ROK
usually rotates the positions of its public officials every year or at most every 1.5 years,
and Japan uses a similar rotation with a little more flexibility in the duration of positions,
but still at most every 2 years. China seems to allow public officials to stay a little longer
than do the ROK and Japan.
Appendix II, which contains the list of delegates to the Intergovernmental
Meetings of EANET between 2001 and 2010, shows these patterns of participation by
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delegates. Most member countries have changed their delegates to the Intergovernmental
Meetings very frequently. One Japanese delegate to the EANET meetings pointed out
one of the difficulties that EANET has been facing, noting that “a biggest problem for
Japanese dialogue with Korea is that Korean bureaucracy is changing too frequently.
Thus very frequently, counterparts have to suspend the on-going discussions and start
from explanation on previous history/discussions to Korean newcomers.” 70
There are two groups of delegates to these meetings: (a) governmental officials,
mostly from ministries of the environment and (b) scientists, mostly from national
research centers and universities. The bureaucratic rotation system has been directly
applied to governmental officials, and the officials of most member countries have
changed at least every 2 or 3 years.
The ROK tends to send one or two governmental officials from the Ministry of
Environment to the Intergovernmental Meetings, who change almost every year. JaeMoon Yang, Deputy Director of the Air Quality Policy Division in the Ministry of
Environment, attended three consecutive IG meetings between 2003 and 2005, the only
Korean governmental official who remained in the group of Korea delegates for more
than 2 years. Jae-Hyun Lee, Director of the Air Quality Policy Division in the Ministry of
Environment, attended the IG6 in 2004 and came back to the IG12. As mentioned in the
previous discussion of EANET’s achievements, the high-level meetings have enhanced
the formal form of collective action of EANET member countries. Director General
Lee’s participation also showed how seriously and formally the Korean government
treated the EANET and the 2010 Instrument. However, the high-level officials
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Interview with Professor Katsunori Suzuki on April 23, 2010. He was one of founding
members of EANET while working at the Japanese Environmental Agency.
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participated in the IG12 Intergovernmental Meeting just for a short period of time to read
their scripts to represent their governments regarding the Instrument. It is hard to imagine
that his second visit to the Intergovernmental Meetings might have led him to the
learning process of socialization. Of course, during his rotation within the Ministry of
Environment, he must have become familiar with various environmental concerns of the
Korean government. At the same time, the 6-year gap and the difference in his role as an
EANET delegate between his two visits undoubtedly affected his learning process
regarding the changing EANET issues and objectives.
Many Japanese governmental officials from the Ministry of Environment and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs have changed every year. Japan has sent three to five
delegates in total to each Intergovernmental Meeting. Only a few officials attended more
than two Intergovernmental meetings over 10 years. Reiko Sodeno, Deputy Director of
the Global Environmental Issues Division of the Ministry of the Environment, attended
three consecutive meetings between 2006 and 2008, and Toshihisa Kato, an official of
the Global Environment Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attended four
consecutive meetings between 2007 and 2010. One may wonder whether the 1-year
difference in Japan’s pattern of rotation would make a difference in the amount of
learning that took place.
China shows a pattern similar to Japan’s. China has tended to send two to five
delegates in total to the Intergovernmental Meetings annually. Among them,
governmental officials from the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the former State
Environmental Protection Administration of China, have changed every year or two.
Only one governmental official attended more than two Intergovernmental Meetings.
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Fang Li, the Deputy Director of the Division of General Affairs in the Department of
International Cooperation at the State Environmental Protection Administration of China,
attended three consecutive IG meetings between 2003 and 2005. Other officials have
attended at most two IG meetings.
Lao PDR, Russia, and Thailand are exceptions to this pattern of participation. Lao
PDR has sent two governmental officials from the Science Technology and Environment
Agency (STEA) between 2003 and 2006, and from the Water Resources and
Environment Administration since 2007. One delegate, Sisouphanh Luangrath, has
participated in a consistent manner, attending six of eight meetings. Russia has also
tended to send the same delegates to the IG meetings. The Russian Federal Service for
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring in the Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environment has sent two officials to the IG meetings, and one delegate, Veronika
Ginzburg, has participated in eight IG meetings over 10 years. Thailand has sent three or
four governmental officials from the Pollution Control Department in Ministry of Natural
Resources and Environment, and one delegate, Supat Wangwongwatana, participated in
all the IG meetings between 2001 and 2010. This consistency is not common among the
other 10 member countries.
In order to overcome difficulties that have originated from the bureaucratic
rotation system, countries have adopted various organizational measures. For example,
one of the Korean governmental officials stated that the transfer of duties has been
systemized within the Ministry of Environment to create some consistency despite the
annual change of positions. 71 All predecessors are required to hand over their job
71

Interview with Gyu Il Kim, Deputy Director of the Climate and Air Quality Policy Division at
the Ministry of Environment in the ROK on December 23, 2010.
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description for the position, including the development and challenges that they have
experienced. Yet this transfer process might also lead governmental officials to stick to
their predecessors’ learning and understanding of the cooperative mechanisms and not
give successors much time to think critically on their own regarding the participation of
their countries in the international meetings or to play different and more constructive
roles for the international cooperative mechanisms. The job descriptions prepared by the
predecessors for succeeding officials might become a set of instructions or directions for
participation of new officials in the international meetings.
In general, it can be assumed that 1- or 2-year terms would be too short for the
governmental officials to take the learning process of socialization through a critical
assessment of their countries’ participation in and contribution to the EANET activities.
This can make the legacy of previous meetings, such as controversial points or
competitiveness among member countries, continue rather than being solved due to the
“instructions” passed by the predecessors. Participants might be so busy with adapting to
the international settings and the national participation trends. As a result, few behavioral
changes can be driven through the adaptation process of socialization.
The other group of delegates to the Intergovernmental Meetings has consisted of
scientists. Unlike the frequent changes in national delegates from ministries of
environment, scientist delegates have engaged in the Intergovernmental Meetings as well
as SAC meetings in a more consistent manner. China has sent at least one scientist
delegate to the Intergovernmental Meetings from national research centers such as the
China National Environmental Monitoring Center (CNEMC) and Chinese Research
Academy of Environmental Sciences (CRAES) since 2004. Wang Ruibin, Director of the
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Department of Air Quality Monitoring in the CNEMC, attended four Intergovernmental
Meetings over 10 years. Moreover, China has sent him to the SAC meetings eight times
over 10 years along with relatively new researchers from CNEMC.
The ROK has sent one or two scientist delegates to Intergovernmental Meetings
from universities and national research centers. A Korean scientist delegate, Seog-Yeon
Cho, a professor at the Environmental and Civil Engineering Division of Inha University,
has attended seven Intergovernmental Meetings over 10 years and ten consecutive SAC
meetings. The other SAC participant from the ROK, Jin-Seok Han, Director of the
Atmospheric Chemistry Division of the National Institute of Environmental Research
(NIER), was also present at six SAC meetings between 2001 and 2010.
Japan has not sent any scientist delegates to the Intergovernmental Meetings, but
has sent same three scientists to the SAC meetings for 10 years. Unlike other member
countries that send governmental officials mostly from ministries of the environment,
Japan has sent at least one official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs every year rather
than having scientists represent Japan at the IG meetings. In addition, Japan began to
send specialists in international environmental negotiations. Norichika Kanie, Associate
Professor at the Department of Decision Science and Technology of the Tokyo Institute
of Technology, and Yukari Takamura, Professor of Law at Ryukoku University, have
joined the group of Japanese delegates to the IG meetings since 2007. The greater
participation of the MOFA in Japan and the professionals in international negotiations
indicate that Japan has paid considerable attention to structuring EANET as an
international institution rather than merely focusing on joint monitoring like other
participating countries.
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Japan has sent at least three scientists to the SAC meetings every year, and the
three key scientists have participated in SAC meetings very consistently. Dr. Hajime
Akimoto attended 8 SAC meetings, Tomoyuki Hakamata 7 SAC meetings, and Hiroshi
Hara 10 consecutive SAC meetings. The changes in their affiliations have not affected
their attendance, which shows that the Japanese government has a preference for relying
on particular scientists rather than certain research institutes for the advisory mission for
EANET.
The more consistent participation patterns of scientist delegates to the IG
meetings and SAC meetings show that participating scientists have had enough time to
engage in the learning processes of socialization than have governmental officials. Even
though the governing body is the Intergovernmental Meeting and the national focal
points 72 of EANET are officials from ministries of environment, these scientist delegates
have played the role of key resource persons to consult with the governmental officials
who newly join the EANET delegates. They thus have provided new delegates with their
understanding of other countries’ intentions on specific occasions as well as changes in
and struggles of EANET activities. For example, the ROK started to change its attitude
toward the EANET from being passive to being more active in 2009. According to one of
the Korean delegates to the IG 12,
It is a transition period for all three countries [China, Japan and the ROK]. China
and the ROK have been opposing to the development of EANET. However, in
2009, the Korean attitude changed to be more prospective for EANET, and thus
China started to take a wait-and-see attitude rather than opposition. In fact, the
interests in transboundary pollution have been increased due to the limitations of
domestic measures in improving environmental quality. Therefore, countries in
the region seem to recognize that they need to develop more active international
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cooperation rather than simply sharing technology and discussing compensation
for the environmental degradation. 73

However, it is unclear whether the communication among governmental official
delegates and scientist delegates of member countries has been substantial. To some
extent, it is true that both scientist delegates and political delegates from the same country
within East Asia communicate with each other because the political delegates might
acknowledge the professional expertise of scientist delegates based on their longer terms
of service and the scientific focus of the cooperative mechanisms. However, the
adaptation processes of the governmental official delegates, given their short terms of
service in their relevant positions because of bureaucratic rotation systems, have been
affected by the limited interaction with scientist delegates from other countries as well as
with their national scientist delegates.
In addition to the limited communication between delegates from the same
member countries, the communication and interaction with delegates from other
countries might have been too limited to influence or be influenced by other delegates,
particularly political delegates, from other countries. This lack of channels of
communication between the two groups of international delegates has led to little
learning process of socialization.

Conclusions
This chapter examined how political leadership, scientific knowledge, and
socialization have affected extent of collective action regarding acid deposition. EANET
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Interview with Lim-Seok Chang on August 17, 2009 at the National Institute of Environmental
Research in ROK.
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has developed into the most formal and concrete collective action among the various
regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in which Northeast Asian countries have
participated. It concludes that political leadership is the only variable positively
associated with this highly formal and concrete collective action. Japan’s much greater
financial contributions to the EANET budget have enabled EANET to enhance capacity
building and the quality of monitoring data in a practical sense. Paradoxically, however,
the dominant structural leadership of the Japanese government also has become an
obstacle to EANET’s movement toward legally binding agreements.
The lack of shared and new scientific knowledge regarding acid deposition among
the participating countries of EANET and the adaptation process of socialization that they
have taken fail to show that EANET’s highly formal and concrete form and degree of
collective action are attributable to shared scientific knowledge and the learning process
of socialization. This chapter does not support the second hypothesis that the greater the
commonly shared knowledge among participating countries in regional environmental
cooperation efforts, the more formal and the more concrete will be the collective action
found in the region. The adaptation process of socialization also does not seem to support
the third hypothesis that participating countries in regional environmental cooperation
efforts are more likely to create formal and concrete collective action through regional
cooperation if they adopt learning rather than adaptation as a process of socialization.
However, the examination of these last two variables has not been in vain because
it reveals the social mechanisms between these variables to some extent and helps explain
why EANET has not advanced to become a legally binding cooperative mechanism. As
socialization is a process that is a consequence of the interplay between sets of
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independent variables, this study intended to examine the hypothesized social mechanism
between the other variables of political leadership and knowledge, which is that the
stronger the political leadership and the greater the shared knowledge in the region, the
more likely participants in regional cooperation are to engage in the learning process of
socialization and thereby create the most formal and concrete modes of collective action.
First, the hypothesized social mechanism between political leadership and shared
scientific knowledge is half-proven. Strong political leadership alone did not lead
participating countries to engage in the learning process of socialization, and the lack of
shared scientific knowledge can contribute to the adaptation process of socialization
among participants in EANET activities.
Second, the lack of shared and new scientific knowledge can explain the other
side of the coin that EANET has not proceeded to develop a legally binding regime
despite its considerable efforts for 2 decades. During the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese
scholars had accumulated enough knowledge concerning the extent and causes of acid
deposition to lead the Environment Agency of Japan to choose acid deposition as the
most appropriate issue in which Japan could initiate regional environmental cooperation.
However, scholars have not discovered the significant adverse consequences of acid
deposition that might motivate member countries to take firm policy initiatives. The lack
of proven negative impacts of acid deposition has made member countries reluctant to
push for institutional development into a more regulatory regime.
Regarding socialization, external pressures for developing regional environmental
cooperation in East Asia and internal organizational characteristics have led the
participating countries in EANET to take the adaptation process of socialization.
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Responding to those external pressures, all three of the countries of China, Japan, and the
ROK have found their own political reasons to create and participate in EANET activities
rather than finding a clear need for solving adverse environmental impacts of acid
deposition. Japan developed its willingness to initiate a regional cooperative mechanism
in order to become a responsible international actor. China seemed to have achieved what
might be considered side payments for participation in the EANET monitoring activities,
and the ROK seemed to have gained Japanese participation in a ROK-initiated
cooperative mechanism, NEASPEC, through pledging to participate in EANET.
Along with these political calculations, the East Asian countries also have been
led to take the adaptation process of socialization by their bureaucratic rotation systems,
which allow governmental officials to serve in a particular position within their
organizations for only a limited number of years. As a result, governmental officials are
too busy adapting themselves to the national participation patterns through understanding
“instructions” passed by the predecessors to do much independent thinking or learning on
their own. This adaptation process has been strengthened by a lack of communication
between political delegates and science delegates from the same country and between
delegates from other countries.
Yet the lack of new scientific knowledge and the adaptation rather than learning
process of socialization among participating countries cannot explain why EANET has
developed into the most formal and concrete collective action among regional
environmental cooperative mechanisms. However, they can help explain why EANET
has been stuck in the UNEP’s second category over the course of 2 decades of
cooperation efforts regarding transboundary acidification issues.
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CHAPTER 4
TRIPARTITE DIRECTOR GENERAL MEETING (TDGM) ON DUST AND
SANDSTORMS (DSS)

Picture 4.1. Koreans wear dust masks in Seoul on March 19, 2011 after the announcement of the
national yellow dust advisory. Adapted from Yonhap News Agency.
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/03/20/52/0301000000AEN20110320000400315F.
HTML.

Introduction
Seasonal Dust and Sandstorms (DSS) carry fine particulate matter, aerosols,
ozone, and heavy metals through southeasterly wind and cause significantly negative
consequences on human health (In & Park, 2003). To deal with DSS, China, Japan, and
the ROK initiated joint research under the Tripartite Director General Meeting (TDGM)
on Dust and Sandstorms at the Tripartite Environmental Ministers Meeting (TEMM) in
2007. Mongolia has participated in working group meetings since the 2009 ad hoc
working group meeting in Shenyang, China.
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The Korean government, as the initiator, points out three important reasons for the
creation of this Joint Research on DSS (MOEK, 2007c). First, even though the joint
research program is a research-oriented cooperative body, it is the first governmentallevel, multilateral cooperative mechanism in Northeast Asia agreed upon at the
ministerial (TEMM) and directors-general level (TDGM). Thus, this body can garner
higher-level political commitments from each government. Second, the Joint Research
program can be an important channel for policy dialog among governments and experts.
Third, the Joint Research program is expected to play the role of an incubator that helps
the region boost its multilateral cooperative mechanisms for DSS monitoring and
construct a network for early warning and forecasting.
Despite the Korean government’s positive contributions to creating formal
regional cooperation on DSS through TDGM, a qualitative analysis of the data indicates
that TDGM has been working as a formal cooperative mechanism through the
involvement of ministries of environment of the three countries and agreement on the
Terms of Reference (TOR) of the Steering Committee and the Working Groups for Joint
Research on DSS, but it has neither developed concrete obligations that participating
countries are required to fulfill nor reached any legally binding agreements. Thus, it is
argued that TDGM has largely been a failure in terms of generating broader cooperation
and useful measurement data for the region as TDGM has produced few research
outcomes that would lead participating countries of the region to fashion any practical
policies to deal with environmental degradation caused by DSS.
Of the three variables discussed in the hypotheses—political leadership, scientific
knowledge, and socialization—the only variable positively associated with the highly
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formal collective action is political leadership. The moderate but dominant structural
leadership by the Korean government has enabled participating countries in the region to
structure their cooperation. The ROK’s role as the only financial contributor to the
TDGM has led China to participate in joint research through TDGM.
Yet, the lack of shared scientific knowledge about DSS among the participating
countries of TDGM and the adaptation rather than learning process of socialization in
which they engage explain why TDGM remains in the UNEP’s second category of
focusing on science without advancing to the highest category of legally binding
cooperative mechanisms. Even though the Korean government expects the role of these
regional efforts through TDGM to be an incubator for constructing a network for early
warning and forecasting, as mentioned above, the organization’s joint research for half a
decade in Northeast Asia has produced few broader effects or benefits, such as bringing
about specific policy outcomes.
In order to understand how TDGM has achieved the current extent of cooperation,
this chapter investigates the roles played by political leadership, shared scientific
knowledge, and the socialization processes. In the following sections, the background and
development of regional cooperative mechanisms on DSS are examined. This is followed
by a discussion of how the region has responded to its concerns about DSS through
participation in TDGM activities.

Dust and Sandstorms (DSS)

152

DSS 74 occur when large quantities of dust and fine sand particles are blown away
from the ground by strong winds. Dry, loose surfaces and strong, persistent winds are
prerequisites for DSS. DSS arise when meteorological conditions and soil surface
properties interact. Four types of climatic conditions are associated with DSS: cold waves,
cyclone weather, atmospheric thermo-instability, and sharp changes in weather elements.
The surface properties that are the most critical determinants of DSS are surface
roughness length (highly related to land use and cover), soil texture, and moisture content
(ADB, 2005, p. 64). According to ADB, “6.5 meters/second (m/s) is regarded as the
threshold wind velocity to initiate a dust outbreak provided that the soil surface is dry”
(ADB, 2005, p. 9). Dust storm strength is measured in terms of ground particle matter
concentrations such as PM10 and dust height distributions from various remote sensors
(Wang et al., 2011).
DSS are transboundary environmental problems that have been globally observed.
The Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer sensor on the Nimbus 7 satellite has identified
the major dust source in the Northern Hemisphere as a broad “dust belt” extending from
the west coast of North Africa through the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and into
China (Wang et al., 2011, p. 6369). It is known that North Africa is a source of dust
deposition in Southern Europe and that Saharan dust is transported westward over the
Atlantic Ocean and becomes the main source of dust in the world (UN, 2001). India,
Pakistan, Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula also contribute to global dust, as they bring
about Arabian Sea dust deposition (UN, 2001).

74

Other terminology sometimes used to refer to DSS includes “Sand and Dust storms (SDS)”
(Wang, Steinb, Draxlerc, Rosad, & Zhanga, 2011) and “yellow sand” (Jho & Lee, 2009).
153

DSS in Northeast Asia are “a phenomenon of wind-borne soil and mineral
particles raised thousands of meters into the air in the arid and semi-arid regions inland
China, such as the Takla Makan and Gobi deserts and the Loess Plateau” (MOEJ, 2008, p.
2), which are in the “mid-latitude Desert Zone (N 40-45°E 90-120°)” (ADB, 2005, p. 9).

Figure 4.1. DSS originating source areas. Adapted from “Dust and Sandstorms,” by MOEJ, 2008,
p. 2. http://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/dss/pamph/pdf/full.pdf

Picture 4.2. Dust storms attacking a village near the Gobi Desert. Adapted from “Governing
Trans-boundary Pollution in Northeast Asia,” by Yoon, 2013, p. 13.

The ADB specifies that
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the geographic area covered includes part of continental Asia (PRC, the Korean
peninsula, and Mongolia) and the neighboring islands of Japan…. However, the wind and
weather patterns of the DSS force may originate in the Russian Federation to the north
and west and from Kazakhstan to the west of the PRC and Mongolia. The DSS impact
may be felt in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and in North America.
(2005, p. 60)

Moreover, satellite imagery and model calculations have shown that the North
Pacific Ocean and the North American continent are influenced by DSS that originate in
Northeast Asia and are carried by prevailing westerlies (Wang et al., 2011, p. 6368). A
recent study concluded that “32% of total emitted dust…is suspended in the atmosphere
or subject to long-range transport” (Li, Han, & Jhang, 2011, p. 3954). 75 It shows that
“while dry deposition dominates total deposition of dust near source regions” such as
North and Central China and the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River, “wet
deposition plays a more important role in the intermediate pathway of dust transport and
the far downwind areas,” including “northeast China, the Korean Peninsula, the west
Pacific and Japan” (Li et al., 2011, p. 3962).
The number of dust storms in China (Table 4.1) and Mongolia (Figure 4.2), two
source countries in Northeast Asia, illustrate the increasing frequency of DSS.
Table 4.1
Record of Strong Dust Storms in China, 1950-2001
Average occurrence of
Year(s)
DSS a year
1950s
5
1960s
8
1970s
13
1980s
14
1990s
23
2000
12
75

This study utilized a Regional Air Quality Model System (RAQMS) to “investigate the spatial
and temporal distributions of PM10 concentration and soil dust aerosol over East Asia in March
2010” (Li et al., 2011, p. 3954).
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2001

32

Note: Adapted from “Dragon Dust: Atmospheric Science and Cooperation on Desertification in
the Asia and Pacific Region,” Journal of East Asian Studies, 6: 433-461, by Wilkening, 2006, p.
438.

Figure 4.2. Number of dusty days in Mongolia. Adapted from “Analysis of Dust Storms
Observed in Mongolia During 1937-1999,” Atmospheric Environment 37: 1401–1411, by
Natsagdorja, Jugdera, & Chung, 2003, p. 1409.

The increasing frequency of DSS with their transboundary characteristics has
resulted in severe damage in Northeast Asia, including a few intense events that affected
Northeast Asia considerably. The following provides a vivid illustration of the damage of
some of these events:
The DSS on 5 May 1993 directly affected 1.1 million square kilometers in the
PRC, which resulted in human casualties (i.e., 85 deaths and 246 injuries) and
destruction of 4,412 houses, 120,000 livestock, and 373,000 hectares of crop land.
The direct economic cost of this DSS within the PRC alone was more than
CNY550 million (about US$66 million at 2002 exchange rate). The two most
severe DSS events in decades took place in March and April 2002. They swept
across Mongolia and hit 18 provinces in the PRC, the Korean peninsula, and a
large area of Japan. . . . The DSS in early April 2002 was so severe that Mongolia
had to close its international airport in Ulaanbaatar for three days. Also, the
Republic of Korea had to close their primary schools and cancel more than 40
flights departing from Gimpo Airport in Seoul. Satellite images of DSS events . . .
. have revealed that impacts of strong DSS are not limited to the region, but
reached as far as North America across the Pacific Ocean. (ADB, 2005, p. 61)
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The increasing frequency of DSS has also been observed in the ROK (Figure 4.3).
Regarding effects of DSS, one study states that between US$ 3-5 billion of financial
damage is incurred each year due to “respiratory & mucous membrane diseases, retarded
growth of crops, difficulties in outdoor activities” caused by DSS in Korea (Kim, 2007).
In addition, some Korean food processing industries and industries that use precision
machines and electronics, both of which require clean conditions, have reported damages
due to DSS contamination (Kim, 2007). 76
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Figure 4.3. Number of dusty days in ROK. Adapted from Korea Meteorological Administration,
2013. http://www.kma.go.kr/weather/asiandust/observday.jsp.

The increasing frequency of DSS has been observed in Japan as well (Figure 4.4).
The total number of days of DSS observation at 108 Japanese meteorological observation
points “had rarely exceeded 300 days annually before the late 1980s in Japan,” but it has
often exceeded 300 days per year since 1988 and reached “an especially high number of
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In contrast, some studies argue that little evidence exists to prove that DSS causes damage to
precision machinery and electronics.
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recorded observations of approximately 700 to 1,200 days in three years from 2000 to
2002” (MOEJ, 2006, pp. 1-2). High concentrations of atmospheric aerosols have been
reported from various sites, although, compared to the ROK and China, Japan has
observed low dust levels.

Figure 4.4. Number of dusty days in Japan. Numbers represent the days when any station in Japan
observed DSS between 1967 and 2009, targeting the 67 stations that had been active for the
whole period. Adapted from Japan Meteorological Administration, 2013.
http://www.data.kishou.go.jp/obs-env/cdrom/report/html/4_2_1.html

Development of TDGM
The Korean government took the initiative for this joint research program under
TDGM based on its continuous bilateral efforts to deal with DSS concerns since the early
1990s. At the summit meeting between China and the ROK in June 1994 in China, both
governments first started to discuss DSS as one of the major topics on its agenda (MOEK,
2007a, p. 5). Following this meeting, ministers of science and technology agreed in
November 1996 to carry out the joint study on DSS, and the actual joint study was
launched in 1997. Since then, various bilateral cooperative programs have been
developed between China and the ROK to establish joint measurements of DSS and a
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data sharing system. 77 China and Japan have also developed a variety of bilateral
cooperative programs to deal with DSS. Japan has implemented various Official
Development Assistance (ODA) projects to combat desertification. ODA projects include
support for water resource conservation, reforestation and forest conservation,
agricultural development, capacity building and education, and research on
desertification (MOEJ, 2000).
Along with these bilateral efforts to combat DSS, international concerns about
desertification started to lead the states in Northeast Asia to realize a need for creating
regional cooperative mechanisms beyond bilateral cooperation in order to tackle DSS
issues more efficiently. Since the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 78
(UNCCD) was enacted in 1994, Northeast Asian countries have diversified their bilateral
cooperative efforts, but at the same time they have strengthened their multilateral
cooperation, as discussed below.
Even though UNCCD was established in 1994 to stop the anthropogenic
deforestation and desertification caused by excessive development through providing
developing countries with financial and technical assistance, the international level
discussions progressed from the early 1970s through the early 1990s. For example, under
the auspices of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the first All-African
Seminar on the Human Environment was convened in 1971 and “made specific
recommendations for steps to be taken to combat the spread of deserts in Africa”
(UNCOD, 1978). Furthermore, the United Nations Conference on Desertification

77

For more information on bilateral cooperative programs between the ROK and China, and
between the ROK and Mongolia, see Table 4.2.
78
Desertification is defined as “the diminution or destruction of the biological potential of the
land, and can lead ultimately to desert-like conditions” (UNCOD, 1978).
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(UNCOD) adopted a Plan of Action to Combat Desertification (PACD) in 1977 for all
regions of the world, not only Africa. The PACD presented “a set of recommendations
for initiating and sustaining a co-operative effort on the scale required to combat
desertification” (UNCOD, 1978).
Even so, in 1991 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) concluded
that the problem of land degradation had intensified despite several local examples of
success. Thus, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, named desertification as one of the greatest
challenges to sustainable development. As a result, the UNCCD was established in 1994
at one of the Rio Conventions, along with the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).
It seems that these international discussions have educated the Northeast Asian
countries about the existence and extent of the problem. Since UNCED, Northeast Asian
countries have developed numerous bilateral cooperative mechanisms to tackle
transboundary DSS issues. This bilateral cooperation has mainly focused on forestation
on desert areas in China and Mongolia, both of which have been identified as source
countries. In fact, the ROK has supported several plantation projects to plant trees for
erosion control in China. Moreover, the ROK and China have conducted various joint
research projects. For example, they conducted joint research on methods for combating
desertification in Ulbanbuhe and Kubuchi between 1996 and 2002. This research studied
sand dune fixation based on sand-carrying volume, aerial seeding based on coverage and
growth rate, and selection of drought resistant trees based on survival and growth rates.
Another joint research project in Dengkou conducted between 2002 and 2005 examined
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tree selection and desertification control, focusing on soil amelioration and the selection
of drought-resistant grass species. Joint research between the ROK and Mongolia has
also studied sand dune fixation with straw and stone, vegetation establishment tests, and
tree nurseries (J. Kim, 2007). Despite these impressive examples of the development of
bilateral cooperation, bilateral initiatives have tended to be limited to some specific field
and national boundary areas, even though DSS poses a transboundary environmental
problem on a regional scale (ADB, 2005). In addition to bilateral cooperative programs,
inspired by the international discussions on desertification at UNCCD, Northeast Asian
countries have also created various multilateral research programs, including the joint
project on Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia (RETA
6068) between 2003 and 2005, and Joint Research conducted under the Tripartite
Director General Meeting (TDGM) on Dust and Sandstorms at the Tripartite
Environmental Ministers Meeting (TEMM) in 2007. Before discussing the development
of TDGM, the following section considers international contributions made by
international organizations to developing understanding DSS issues in the region between
2003 and 2005.
The RETA 6068 Project was collaboration between various international agencies
and Northeast Asian countries that was designed to serve as a cornerstone for regional
cooperation. The governments of China and Mongolia requested international assistance
to tackle DSS in the early 2000s. In 2002, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved
“the regional technical assistance for Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in
Northeast Asia (RETA 6068, the Project) to support the establishment of a regional
cooperation mechanism and framework to guide and coordinate the interventions to
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combat DSS concerns” (ADB, 2006, p. 1). Since ADB was coordinated, the UNCCD
Secretariat, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific
(UNESCAP), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have partnered
to process and implement this cooperative project.
These three UN agencies drafted a project proposal seeking financial support
from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as a response to ADB’s request for regional
technical assistance that originated as a concept paper in May 2002. As a result, RETA
was financed by the ADB between 2003 and 2005 79 on a grant basis, with US$500,000
funded by the Japanese government’s Japan Special Fund and US$500,000 by the GEF.
To implement this project, the four participating governments—China, Japan, the ROK,
and Mongolia—made in-kind contributions in the form of human resources, such as
counterpart staff, professional services, and national experts, and of office facilities (ADB,
2005; NEASPEC, 2009; MOEJ, 2008).
The RETA 6068 Project was conceptualized as an entity that would produce a
master plan that could guide regional collaborative activities for both the prevention and
control of DSS in Northeast Asia. This regional master plan consisted of two components.
The first component was intended to establish “a regional network for monitoring, early
warning, and forecasting of DSS” through “strengthening the monitoring capacity in the
two DSS source countries” (ADB, 2005, p. 6). The second component was designed to
implement three activities: “(i) the selection of sites for nine demonstration projects . . . ,
(ii) the identification of best practices for the demonstration projects for DSS prevention

79

The Project was slated for completion by June 30, 2004; however, this date was extended to
February 28, 2006 because of “(i) the postponement in project commencement due to the
outbreak of SARS in 2003, and (ii) the requests for translation and publication of the Master Plan
in the national language of all the four participating countries” (ADB, 2006, p. 4)
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and control, and (iii) the development of an investment strategy including
recommendations on sustainable financing mechanisms for the promotion and
dissemination of best practices in addressing the causes of DSS” (ADB, 2005, p. 7).
In 2005, ADB published the findings of RETA in three volumes: Regional
Master Plan for the Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia;
Establishment of a Regional Monitoring and Early Warning Network for Dust and
Sandstorms in Northeast Asia; and An Investment Strategy for the Prevention and
Control of Dust and Sandstorms through Demonstration Projects. The Master Plan has
been “endorsed by the governments of participating countries through various official
statements including the Communiqué of the Tripartite Environment Minister Meeting”
(ADB, 2006, p. 2). According to Jho and Lee, this project has been “meaningful in that it
provided the basic framework for building the first regional cooperation scheme with the
aim of countering yellow sand in Northeast Asia” (2009, p. 51).
In addition to the RETA project, several international meetings proved to be
catalysts for the creation of TDGM, as shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2
Timeline of TDGM Creation
Year

Meetings

Locations

December 2006

8th TEMM

China

January 2007

7th China-Japan-ROK
Summit Meeting

Philippines

March 2007

1st TDGM

ROK

September
2007

2nd TDGM

Japan

December 2007
December 2008

9th TEMM
1st SC Meeting

Japan
Japan
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Theme
Agreeing to create TDGM and
Joint Research on DSS
Recognizing DSS as a common
issue in the region
Agreeing to create
organizational structure for the
Joint Research
Agreeing on the Terms of
Reference of the Steering
Committee (SC)
Finalizing members of the SC
Agreeing on the Terms of

Reference of the Working
Groups and Joint Research Plan
for 2008-2010

As shown in Table 4.2, China, Japan, and the ROK acknowledged the urgency of
addressing the threat DSS posed to the region and agreed to strengthen countermeasures
under TEMM at the Eighth Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM) held in
Beijing, China in December 2006, and the Seventh Summit Meeting between China,
Japan, and the ROK, held in the Philippines in January 2007 (MOEK, 2009a).
The Ministers recognized that dust and sandstorm in Northeast Asia was posing
common concerns for countries in this region and agreed to work together to reduce the
damage caused to possible human health and the environment in this region. They
recognized the necessity of capacity building and monitoring data sharing in order to
promote a monitoring network in Northeast Asia region. In this regard, they welcomed
the efforts to develop the outputs of the ADB-GEF DSS regional technical assistance
(RETA) project. Also, they concurred in holding a director general meeting before the
next TEMM to discuss concrete measures including the establishment of a joint research
group (TEMM, 2006). Based on these international discussions, the three governments
agreed to create the first regional cooperative mechanism dealing with DSS, the Tripartite
Director General Meeting (TDGM) on Dust and Sandstorms, at the Eighth TEMM in
2006. The objectives of TDGM were identified in a 2007 meeting report:
Participants shared the view that DSS is one of the most critical environmental
issues in Northeast Asia and that they must take urgent actions against DSS in a
cooperative manner. They reconfirmed the importance of the regional monitoring
and early warning network in Northeast Asia in order to mitigate environmental,
economic and social impacts of DSS in the region, and that they would continue
to cooperate in establishing the network by sharing information with each other.
(TEMM, 2009e, p. 1)
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TDGM’s Achievements and Limitations
TDGM presents mixed characteristics of the formal mode of collective action due
to its firm organizational structure but lack of financial arrangements, and it has
demonstrated little concrete collective action related to the joint research on DSS. First of
all, the TDGM established three organizational entities: Steering Committee, Working
Group I, and Working Group II. Each entity has met annually (see Table 4.3). The
Steering Committee was composed of governmental officials and experts from each
country, while Working Groups I and II were composed of officials and experts from
national research institutes, such as the Meteorological Administration and the Forest
Service.
Table 4.3
Meetings of TDGM and Entities Associated with Joint Research
Year

TDGM

Steering Committee

Working Groups

2007

1st / ROK
2nd / Japan

-

-

2008

3rd / ROK

1st / Japan (January)
2nd / ROK (July)

1st / ROK

2009

4th / China

3rd

Ad hoc meeting / China (June)
2nd / Japan (September)

2010

5th / NA

4th

3rd / ROK

2011

6th / NA

5th

4th / China

2012

7th / China

6th

5th / Japan

2013

8th / Japan

7th / Japan (Feb)

6th / ROK

Note: Adapted from “Joint Communiqué of TEMM,” by TEMM, 2010, p. 31; TEMM, 2013e, p.
3.

The objectives of each body of TDGM have been clarified in the Joint
Announcement that was formally adopted by Directors General of China, Japan, and the
ROK. Along with the Joint Announcement, the Terms of References of the Steering
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Committee and the two Working Groups have clearly defined the division of labor
among these three organizations within the TDGM Joint Research project.
The Joint Announcement adopted at the first TDGM meeting in March 2007 held
in the ROK indicates that the three participating countries agreed on the organizational
structure of the TDGM, as well as on the establishment of a Steering Committee and two
Working Groups (Working Group I & Working Group II) that would perform joint
research on DSS in Northeast Asia. According to the Joint Announcement, the “the
Steering Committee will include determination of the two working group activities,
coordination of relevant departments and agencies at national and regional levels,
exchange of information, and exploring financial resources” (TEMM, 2009a, p. 2). The
Steering Committee’s responsibilities are clearly stated in its Terms of Reference, and
include providing “general guidance for establishing and implementing the project plan
of the Joint Research Group,” determining “the direction of each working group's
research plan and activities, and support them,” and reporting “the result of joint research
to the TDGM on DSS” among others (TEMM, 2009b, p. 1). The 2007 Joint
Announcement contained the proposal that Working Group I (WG1) focus on DSS
monitoring and early warning systems, while Working Group II (WG2) investigate
methods for preventing and controlling DSS (MOEJ, 2007b).
Although this solid organization structure has made TDGM a formal mode of
collective action regarding DSS, its unclear financial arrangements have not. Instead, the
Joint Announcement emphasized the need for external financial assistance from
international organizations rather than from participating countries. It stated that the
Directors General of China, Japan, and the ROK recognized the importance of the

166

immediate implementation of the proposed second phase of the ADB-GEF Project,
including securing project funds, and asked “GEF to provide necessary financing for the
regional monitoring and early warning network on DSS” (TEMM, 2009a, p. 2).
The Terms of References (TORs) also failed to specify the financial contributions
required from each member country. The TOR of the Steering Committee meetings
merely stated that all expenses for holding meetings “shall be covered by the Chair
Country (TEMM Host Country) and the traveling expenses, including accommodations,
shall be born by each country” (TEMM, 2009b, p. 2). The TOR of the Working Groups
stated that expenses for holding meetings “shall be covered by the host country, and the
traveling expenses shall be borne by each country” (TEMM, 2009c, p. 2). Nothing was
mentioned regarding specific financial contributions from member countries.
Since the TORs were drafted, no country has taken the initiative to raise the issue
of financial arrangements for joint research that would provide a core fund similar to
EANET’s. In particular, China has not shown a willingness to contribute to financing the
joint research. On the contrary, it has requested financial support from the other
participating countries from the beginning. For example, at the first meeting of the
Steering Committee, China requested “positive consideration for financial support by
Japan and Korea” for the “effective implementation of the joint research activities” when
the participating countries agreed that “exchange of DSS related policy and existing
research findings for the implementation of the Joint research would be started regardless
of the status of financial arrangement, while exploring financial mobilization such as
from international organization is also important” (TEMM, 2009d, pp. 1-2). Few efforts
have been made to establish solid financial structures.
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In addition to having the limited extent of formal mode of collective action,
TDGM has demonstrated little concrete collective action related to the joint research on
DSS. Even though participating countries have determined what information to share
while conducting joint research projects, they have not developed specific guidelines for
data collection. For joint research projects, action plans and timelines are roughly
designed by the participating countries at the working group meetings without further
discussion of the shared and specific research methods that will be used.
At the meetings of the two working groups, the participating countries have
proposed joint research projects and introduced their pre-existing DSS-related research to
one another at the annual meetings. For example, at the 2008 meetings of the WG1 and
the WG2, participating countries agreed to launch joint research projects. The action plan
of the WG1’s project included four items: (a) determining the type of data that would be
shared; (b) holding a joint conference; (c) conducting a joint field campaign; and (d)
writing an annual report (MOEK, 2008). Regarding data sharing, the participating
countries of WG1 agreed to share “meteorological conditions for DSS occurrence, PM
physical properties & compositions, [s]atellite data, [m]odel results, and [l]idar data”
(ibid., p. 22-23). Although they agreed to share “any necessary information,” they failed
to adopt common measurement methods (ibid., p. 23).
The participating countries have also discussed QA/QC activities for the joint
research. Indeed, the Third Meeting of WG1 for the Joint Research on Dust and Sand
Storms, “China and Korea reported on the joint QA/QC activities recently conducted by
CMA and KMA” separately (TEMM, 2011, p. 2). In addition, the Japanese participants
of the Fourth Meeting of the WG1 presented “the QA/QC activities for SPM monitoring
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and pointed out the technical problems in SPM monitoring” (TEMM, 2012). 80 Although
the three participating countries attempted to establish commonly shared methods and
indicators for DSS monitoring through these discussions at working group meetings, they
have not been able to formalize common QA/QC criteria like those of EANET.
The participants of the working groups have acknowledged the importance of the
lack of common monitoring methods that would enable countries to compare data, but
they have not solved this problem. At the fifth meeting of WG1 for Joint Research in
November 2012, a Japanese participant Hitoshi Yoshizaki pointed out that “information
sharing based on a similar template would contribute to forming common understanding
among participants” (TEMM, 2013d, p. 1).
Therefore, it can be argued that TDGM has developed a certain degree of formal
collective action through agreement at the ministerial level, but a lesser degree of formal
financial arrangements when compared with those of EANET. Additionally, TDGM has
not established concrete forms of collective action, such as monitoring with common
indicators and methods, as EANET has. The following sections explain why Northeast
Asian countries have developed this limited degree of DSS-related regional cooperation
through TDGM.
To summarize, TDGM presents mixed characteristics of the formal mode of
collective action. It is notable that the objectives of each body of TDGM have been
clarified in the Joint Announcement that was formally adopted by Directors General of
China, Japan, and the ROK, and the division of labor among those organizational entities
has been clearly defined in the Terms of References of the Steering Committee. However,
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SPM (Suspended Particulate Matter) are “finely divided solids or liquids that may be dispersed
through the air from combustion processes, industrial activities or natural sources” (OECD, 1997).
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the lack of financial arrangements for the TDGM activities has reduced the formal
characteristic of collective action. In addition to the limited extent of formal collective
action, TDGM has demonstrated little concrete collective action related to the joint
research on DSS as shown in little development of specific guidelines for data collection
of the joint research.

Political Leadership
This section tests Hypothesis 1, which predicts that the stronger the political
leadership exercised by individual participating countries in regional environmental
cooperation efforts, the more formalized and the more concrete the collective action in
the region will be. This study aims to investigate whether stronger political leadership
taken by any country in the region, regardless of its materialistic power, increases the
likelihood of developing more formal and concrete collective action.
Structural Leadership in TDGM
As described in chapter 1, unlike most leadership literature that maintains that
structural leadership comes from a state’s ability to wield economic and political power
commensurate with its material resources, this study assumes that any state can seek to
exercise leadership if it is willing. The typologies of structural leadership previously
mentioned assume that structural leadership is not grasped by willing countries but
determined by the international community or powerful countries that shoulder most of
the considerable costs of cooperation. However, this study argues that the states of the
region can exert structural leadership based on their issue-specific national goals that are
changeable through international interaction rather predetermined. Structural leadership
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thus may be exercised not only by powerful countries, but by any willing country,
including those with few material resources. To investigate which countries exert
structural leadership, this dissertation analyzes the material contributions that
participating countries make to regional environmental cooperation as a proxy variable
and regards spending as evidence of structural leadership given that states wanting to
exercise or already exercising structural leadership would expend more financial
resources than other countries to ensure successful regional cooperation.
As described above, no specific financial arrangements have been made since the
establishment of joint research programs within TDGM. From its inception, participating
countries have requested that international organizations continue financing various
projects related to DSS. The most critical issue for the TDGM in 2007 seemed to be
implementing the project for Establishing a Regional Monitoring and Early Warning
Network for Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia. In fact, in June 2007, the Directors
General submitted a letter signed by the three ministers to GEF and ADB requesting
immediate approval of the second phase of the ADB-GEF Project (MOEJ, 2007a). In
addition, the 2007 Joint Announcement of TDGM stated that “three countries request
GEF to provide necessary financing for the regional monitoring and early warning
network on DSS” (MOEJ, 2007b, p. 2). The initial focus of TDGM seems to have been
acquiring support for assistance from various international organizations and maintaining
funding for previously begun international research projects.
Under these circumstances, the ROK has exerted moderate structural leadership
through making more financial contributions than other participating countries since
TDGM originated. Neither China nor Japan has exhibited any firm leadership on DSS
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issues. However, the ROK’s moderate contribution has led the program to have
insufficient funding because no country has been willing to step forward and pay the
necessary money.
Thus, the TDGM has focused on securing financial support and research funds
from international organizations. In TDGM’s working group meetings for joint research,
the participants have tended to present their plans for requesting international funding for
research in the upcoming years (for example, see TEMM, 2013b). Regarding this
financial dependency on external sources, a Korean delegate to the Seventh Steering
Committee Meeting in 2013, professor Suh-Yong Chung, pointed out “the importance of
self-sustainability of activities toward solving the issues” (TEMM, 2013b, p. 4). After
Chung’s presentation, participants discussed a potential problem: the previous
“GEF/ADB project had not been continued with a follow up project, and therefore the
matter should be discussed more carefully as a follow-up option after the completion of
the current tripartite joint action plan” (ibid.).
As previously noted, the TOR of Steering Committee for Joint Research on DSS
states that for expenditures and finances of joint research, the chair country (i.e., TEMM
host country) must cover the costs of holding the Steering Committee Meeting and that
each country bears the financial responsibility of covering its traveling expenses to
international meetings. In a joint research project, “Analysis of Selected DSS Cases and
Capability Building for Dust and Sandstorms Monitoring,” WG1 stated that each country
was responsible for its own research and development expenses for joint research projects
between 2008 and 2010.
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WG2 presented more specific information regarding budget sharing and the
division of labor among three countries for its joint research projects conducted between
2008 and 2010 in its “Identifying Successful Factors and Developing an Advanced Model
for Ecological Restoration of Area.” WG2 agreed on a total budget in the first year of
around US$75,000 (MOEK, 2008, p. 32). The ROK proposed contributing around
US$55,000 toward the total budget, and China around US$20,000, although the ROK
planned to provide China’s share of US$20,000 and to cover its travel expenses to
support China’s participation in the joint research. In situations in which other countries
have lacked the funding necessary for participation in the Joint Research of DSS, the
ROK has been the only resource provider and has thus exercised structural leadership. It
is arguable that the financial configuration established by WG2 shows Korea’s structural
leadership to the extent that the scale of its financial contributions far outweighs those of
other countries.
Although Japan has born its own travel expenses unlike China contributed its
share, exactly how much Japan expended to participate in this joint research remains
unknown. It is likely that Japan would have utilized resources from its own existing
research projects, including researchers from various research institutions that had
conducted research on similar topics. Japan might not have allocated additional funds
solely for this project. 81
Japan has expressed a relative lack of interest in regional cooperation efforts
partly because DSS has not been a significant environmental issue within its borders.
There are several reasons for Japan’s passive participation in the TDGM Joint Research,
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This opinion has been made based on interviews with researchers who are involved in the LTP
initiated by the ROK, as discussed in the next chapter.
173

contrary to its dominant contributions to EANET as described in the previous chapter.
Since 1994, when the Basic Environment Plan was enacted, Japan has maintained its
leadership role as a key resource provider for regional environmental cooperation. In
general, however, Japanese “leadership raises suspicions in the region, due to its history
of military invasions of neighboring countries; and Japan itself seems reluctant to step out
in front” (Yoon, 2006, p. 84). Moreover, Japan is “cautious and passive when it comes to
government-level multilateral cooperation” in Northeast Asia because it regards the
multilateral framework as a “form of development aid” that is redundant with its already
being “active in utilizing unofficial channels of cooperation through the Green Aid Plan”
(Jho & Lee, 2009, p. 66).
Japan’s political caution and sponsorship of its Green Aid Plan have encouraged
reliance upon direct bilateral cooperation with countries in the region. In fact, the JapanChina Friendship Center, established by Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA)
program, has undertaken cooperative programs since 1996 together with Japan’s National
Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES) (MOEK, 2007c). For example, the JapanChina Friendship Center and Japan’s NIES conducted research into the evolution and
transportation of DSS between 1996 and 2000, into the transport mechanisms of DSS that
originated in Northern China, and into the environmental impact of dust aerosol between
2001 and 2003. In addition, funded by Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science, and Technology, Japan’s Meteorological Agency, and the Chinese Academy of
Science, Japan launched the Aeolian Dust Experiment on Climate Impact project in 2000
and studied the climatic impact of aerosol radiative forcing.
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In addition, compared to the ROK and China, Japan has hardly felt the impact of
DSS. In fact, the Kyushu area (Nagasaki), which is close to China, has observed only
low-level dust aerosol phenomena, whereas the Tokyo area (Tsukuba) observed only
trace levels of dust aerosols in April 2002 (Table 4.4). In contrast, it was reported that
dust concentration at the ground surface level in Beijing exceeded 1mg/m³ and that dust
aerosol blown to Beijing was observed several hours later in ROK. The Kyushu area in
Japan, however, recorded only 0.1-0.2mg/m³ during this time. 82
Table 4.4
Occurrence of Low Level Dust in Nagasaki and Tokyo
Nagasaki
Year

No. of days
DSS observed

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

15
20
1
11
11
6
11
6
5
11
7

Tokyo

Max
concentration of
SPM (mg/m³)
0.306
0.705
0.099
0.152
0.178
0.296
0.582
0.446
0.152
0.898
0.316

No. of days DSS
observed
0
0
0
0
0
1
4
0
3
4
2

Max
concentration of
SPM (mg/m³)
0.13
0.167
0.131
0.898
0.156

Note: Adapted from “Past Records of DSS in Japan,” by Ministry of Environment of Japan, 2011.
http://www.env.go.jp/air/dss/past/index.html. (In Japanese)

Likewise, China has expressed little interest in regional environmental
cooperation, even though it is a source country and thus directly and seriously affected by
DSS. This seeming apathy may be due to the fact that DSS has existed for thousands of
82

For an overview of DSS observations in Japan, see
http://www.env.go.jp/press/file_view.php?serial=5960&hou_id=5225
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years and is thus not a new issue for China. China seems to regard DSS as a natural
phenomenon rather than an environmental crisis, as is discussed below in the knowledge
section. In addition, China has also pursued bilateral cooperation with Japan and the
ROK because bilateral cooperation “might enable it to have more leverage in negotiations”
(Yoon, 2006, p. 85). Japan’s preference for bilateral cooperation with neighboring
countries, particularly China, over multilateral cooperation has coincided with China’s
preference of bilateral cooperation over multilateral cooperation. 83
Instrumental Leadership in TDGM
In addition to providing structural leadership, the ROK has exerted instrumental
leadership around DSS-related issues. As explained in chapter 1, actors who exercise
instrumental leadership function as agenda setters, who shape the forms that issues take;
popularizers, who draw attention to the issues; policy inventors, who bring innovation to
the table; and brokers, who make deals and line up support options through negotiations.
As in the case of EANET, participants in the joint research program exercise instrumental
leadership through becoming agenda setters and popularizers rather than policy brokers
because EANET and TDGM have not established any regulatory policy measures. The
Korean participation in various TDGM joint research meetings illustrates the ROK’s
instrumental leadership that is in some ways similar to Japan’s display of instrumental
leadership within EANET.
The Research Plan 2008-2010 highlights the ROK’s role as an instrumental leader.
Agreed to by WG2 in 2008, the plan indicated what information each participating
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Unlike China and Japan, the ROK has promoted environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia
with a “strong incentive to pursue binding environmental cooperation that would impose some
constraints on its two powerful neighbors’ unilateral interpretation of international agreement”
(Yoon, 2006, p. 84).
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country was required to provide for joint research during its first year of TDGM
membership. China was expected to (a) “provide relevant information on ecosystem
restoration projects,” (b) “review restoration projects,” (c) “select the demonstration
region (sites), and the field survey of the status,” and (d) “review vegetative restoration
technology in practices” (MOEK, 2008, p. 31), and Japan was expected to (a) “provide
the concerned project reports,” (b) “take part the joint field survey (provisional),” (c)
“provide useful information and lesson learnt at the field through the activities of ongoing Japanese projects,” and (d) “suggest the ideas on entire research process and data
analysis” (ibid.). Whereas China and Japan were tasked with reviewing the existing
research, the ROK played the role of program coordinator and focused on the
development of common tools for future research. The ROK was required to (a) “make a
check up list for field survey,” (b) “select study sites and perform joint field survey,” and
(c) “develop a monitoring and assessment method for ecosystem restoration projects”
(ibid).
The ROK’s instrumental leadership was further displayed through its involvement
in choosing a joint research project. At the First WG1 Meeting in 2008, the participating
countries agreed to adopt the suggestions put forth in “Identifying Successful Factors and
Developing an Advanced Model for Ecological Restoration of Area” after
accommodating all the concerns of other countries, particularly China. The ROK
delegates to WG1 proposed that the three participating countries jointly monitor DSS in
Baekdu Mountain, known in China as Changbai Mountain, situated on the border
between the DPRK and China. China declined this proposal, maintaining that Baekdu
Mountain was an inappropriate location for DSS monitoring because foreign research
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institutes were not allowed to bring monitoring equipment into China (MOEK, 2008).
Japan also submitted plans for two research projects, but China and the ROK objected to
both. For both projects, Japan proposed sharing only the monitoring data acquired
through its own existing monitoring projects and equipment: the Aeolian Dust
Experiment on Climate Impact project collaborated on by Japan’s Meteorological
Agency and the Chinese Academy of Science, and the NIES’s LIDAR (Light Detection
And Ranging). 84 China and the ROK rejected both of Japan’s proposals because their
own participation in the projects would have been difficult in using Japan’s devices for
monitoring. It is interesting to note that Japan demonstrated similar desire to adopt
Japanese-made devises for the collection of monitoring data both in EANET and TDGM
joint research projects.
Despite Korean efforts to structure research activities, the Joint Research of the
TDGM remains under development without producing specific outputs. As mentioned
above, the Working Groups of the Joint Research program started to discuss developing
common methods of monitoring in 2010. Japan proposed to “discuss the QA/QC
practices of each country regarding PM10 measurements” and, at the Third Meeting of
Working Group I for Joint Research in 2010, participants approved Japan’s proposal and
“exchanged views on QA/QC practices regarding LIDAR and visibility measurements as
a study item following PM10” (TEMM, 2011). As explained in the previous chapter
about EANET, QA/QC activities are critical for gathering data from various countries
that each use different methods and tools. This Japan’s initiative for QA/QC activities
might be an indicator of Japan’s initial attempts to exert instrumental leadership based on
84

LIDAR is “a remote sensing technology that can distinguish DSS particles which cannot be
seen with the naked eye from other atmospheric pollutant particles” (MOEJ, 2013).
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its extensive experiences within EANET. Its attempt to exert such leadership on the issue
of DSS is quite recent.
In short, the ROK has played an important role in developing regional
cooperation through exerting structural leadership involving financial contributions and
instrumental leadership involving activities proposed for future development. However,
the ROK’s limited structural and instrumental leadership and Japan’s newly-born
instrumental leadership still have a long way to go if more specific rule-based
cooperation is to develop.
Directional Leadership in TDGM
Directional leadership can be described as the ability to drive “intellectual capital
or generative systems of thought that shape the perspectives of those who participate in
institutional bargaining” (Young, 1991, p. 298) through the power of ideas, norms, and
knowledge (Selin, 2012). Thus, social persuasion would play an important role in
influencing and shaping the perceptions of other participants in demonstrations of
successful domestic policy. All three countries have taken various domestic measures to
build infrastructure in order to prevent, or at least lessen, damage from DSS. The ROK’s
establishing several legal frameworks for DSS early warning and forecast seems to best
demonstrate such taking of domestic countermeasures.
The ROK introduced a legal framework in its “Comprehensive Measures for
Prevention of DSS Damage” and “Framework Plan for National Safety Management”
plans for dealing with DSS “at the level of disaster management.” These measures aim to
strengthen standards for DSS early warnings (Table 4.5) and improve DSS forecasting
(Table 4.6).
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Table 4.5
ROK’s Standard Forecast Regarding the Intensity of DSS
Category

Predicted Density

Weak DSS

When the 1-hour average PM-10 density due to DSS is predicted to be less
than 400 ㎍/㎥
Strong DSS
When the 1-hour average PM-10 density due to DSS is predicted to be about
400~800 ㎍/㎥
Exceptionally When the 1-hour average PM-10 density due to DSS is predicted to be greater
Strong DSS
than 800 ㎍/㎥
Note: Adapted from “Current Status,” by Ministry of Environment of Japan, 2012b.
http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode=pol_cha_air_pol_dus_status.

Table 4.6
DSS Special Announcement Issuing Process and Behavior Guideline in ROK
Category

Issue Standard

Behavioral Guideline
•

DSS
Information

1 hour average PM10 density of
over300 ㎍/㎥,
Predicted
continuation of
over 2 hours

•

•

•

DSS Warning

1 hour average PM10 density of
over400 ㎍/㎥,
Predicted
continuation of
over 2 hours

•

•

•

DSS Alert

1 hour average PM10 density of
over800 ㎍/㎥,
Predicted
continuation of
over 2 hours

•

•

Children, the elderly, and persons with
respiratory disorders recommended to limit
outdoor activity
Kindergarten and elementary school students
recommended to limit outdoor activity (physical
education classes, field trips, etc.)
General public (junior and high school students
included) recommended to limit strenuous
outdoor activity
Children, the elderly, and persons with
respiratory disorders recommended to cease
outdoor activity
Kindergarten and elementary school students
recommended to cease outdoor activity (PE,
field trip, etc.)
General public (junior and high school students
included) recommended to cease strenuous
outdoor activity and limit other outdoor activity
Children, the elderly, and persons with
respiratory disorders recommended to remain
indoors
Kindergarten and elementary schools suspend
outdoor activity (PE, field trip, etc.), and student
protection measures, such as early dismissal and
school closure are recommended
General public (junior and high school students
included) recommended to avoid outdoor
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activity and to remain indoors
• Outdoor sports games recommended to be
stopped and postponed
Note: Adapted from “Current Status,” by Ministry of Environment of Japan, 2012b.
http://eng.me.go.kr/content.do?method=moveContent&menuCode=pol_cha_air_pol_dus_status.

The ROK has also attempted to expand its number of monitoring stations and
share observation information with source countries regarding early-warning
development to strengthen DSS monitoring and research (J. Kim, 2007), possibly
implying that DSS has affected Korea to such an extent that the Korean government has
come to position DSS as a high-profile environmental concern. According to Masataka
Nishikawa at the Laboratory of Intellectual Fundamentals for Environmental Studies,
Environmental Analytical Chemistry Section, National Institute for Environmental
Studies (NIES) in Japan, the ROK “is known as the only country to have set up standards
on concentration of DSS for forecasting advisory and warning levels.” 85
The ROK’s active stance reflects its instrumental leadership on DSS. In addition
to demonstrating directional leadership through introducing policy measures for setting
standards on DSS concentrations for forecasting advisories and warning levels, the ROK
seems to have exercised directional leadership through its role in building organizational
structures and creating research plans within the joint research program. For example,
Korean experts 86 and governmental officials (MOEJ, 2007a) drafted and proposed the
Terms of the Reference (TOR) of the Steering Committee and Working Groups for Joint
Research on DSS.

85

Interview with Dr. Masataka Nishikawa on March 8, 2011.
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Among others, Suh-Yong Chung, an associate professor of Law and International Relations in
the Division of International Studies at Korea University, helped draft the TOR.
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Knowledge
This section tests Hypothesis 2, which asserts that a region will develop more
formal and more concrete collective action if participating countries in its environmental
cooperation efforts develop greater commonly shared knowledge. This section argues
that scientists in the region continue to have significant uncertainties regarding the causes
and consequences of DSS because different countries embrace different monitoring
standards. Furthermore, China, which has registered the largest number of experts on the
UNCCD’s Roster of Experts, has shared little of its monitoring information due to the
bureaucratic rivalry among various institutes involved in DSS monitoring. Before
discussing variances in the monitoring methods of the three participating countries, the
following section examines the development of scientific knowledge about DSS in
Northeast Asia, focusing on international research projects operating through UNCCD
and ADB/GEF.
The accumulation of knowledge through the UNCCD activities has rarely led
Northeast Asian countries to build commonly shared scientific knowledge in the region
because the UNCCD has not provided enough scientific information about the causes and
consequences of desertification. L.L. Stringer criticized for “its absence of scientific and
institutional benchmarks and indicators for monitoring the international impact of the
convention on the overall condition and extent of the world’s drylands” (Stringer, 2008, p.
2067). For example, the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification 87 had not met
expectations by the early 1990s, according to Bauer and Stringer, in that desertification
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Its Plan of Action to Combat Desertification (PACD) resulted from “political discussions
following direct scientific input,” and “provided the UNEP with a general mandate to organize
and coordinate action with a view to eventually controlling desertification worldwide by the year
2000, as well as 28 specific recommendations on what needed to be done” (Bauer & Stringer,
2009, p. 250).
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“had not been insufficiently prioritized within national development plans and legislation”
(2009, p. 250).
Because the UNCCD’s “negotiators deliberately referred to ‘knowledge’ as a
broader concept, not to privilege science but to allow space to be created to incorporate a
wider range of cognitive resources” and “drew so heavily on chapter 12 of Agenda 21-‘Managing Fragile Ecosystems: Combating Desertification and Drought’--there was little
room for maneuver over issues such as defining desertification” (Bauer & Stringer, 2009,
p. 252). According to Bauer and Stringer, media and policy circles sidelined the scientific
community throughout the negotiation process because they blamed it for the “world’s
failure to solve the desertification problem after the earlier, more scientifically informed
UNCOD” (2009, p. 253). 88 The role of scientific knowledge in the organization remains
insignificant even today.
To date, the UNCCD process has lacked an efficient operational mechanism to
process and channel practical and scientific expertise for political decision
makers. Ultimately, this results in minimal ideational interplay and inhibits crossinstitutional learning. This is because the COP has failed to tap the information
potentially available from the scientific community, which in turn has been unable
to draw the attention of the Parties to the scientific aspects of the issues on their
agenda. Accordingly, there have been calls for the provision of independent
scientific policy advisory services from outside the immediate UNCCD process,
referring to the role of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
vis-à-vis the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) as a promising model. (Bauer & Stringer, 2009, p. 254)
Science had little influence on the development of shared knowledge about the
causes of DSS in Northeast Asia. The project on the Regional Master Plan for the
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Bauer and Stringer argue that there are several reasons for this scapegoating: the lack of ability
of science to “provide quick-fix solutions to urgent problems” or “simple solutions that can be
easily transferred between biophysical and institutional contexts, thus presenting a problem of
scale”; the tendency of scientific research to be “rarely definitive and final”; and the selective use
or interpretation of scientific research for political purposes (2009, p. 253).
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Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia (2003-2005) also
highlighted the lack of common understanding of DSS among countries. Even today,
there is no agreed-upon definition, terminology, or perception of DSS phenomena and no
common monitoring method or similar capacity for monitoring. The upstream countries
in the source areas consider DSS a natural phenomenon that has existed for thousands of
years, whereas the downstream countries see it as a problem of air quality.
Furthermore, the definition of DSS varies, depending on both monitoring method
and threshold value. Moreover, needs and expectations are different not only among
countries but also among agencies within individual countries (ADB, 2005). The ADB
project urges Northeast Asian countries to build optimization and flexibility with step-bystep approaches to formulate a feasible program for a proper regional monitoring and
early-warning network. Yet the master plan did not contribute to shared scientific
knowledge about DSS.
This absence of shared scientific knowledge in Northeast Asia has resulted not
only from the few contributions of these two international cooperative mechanisms, but
also from bureaucratic rivalry in the monitoring of DSS, particularly in China. Common
methods of monitoring DSS do not exist among countries in the region even though
monitoring is the first step that each country must take toward an understanding of
environmental issues. Once monitoring indicators are determined, 89 surface- and satellitebased observations will produce results that will be used for DSS source identification
and impact assessment, including health and economic loss, for short-term forecasting
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Two kinds of indicators are used for DSS monitoring. The first is atmosphere indicators, which
include meteorological parameters, wind, visibility, etc., and ambient atmosphere (TSP/PM10,
vertical profile by LIDAR). The second is ground surface, which includes land use/cover change
and soil attributes (ADB, 2005).
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through data sharing in real time and forecasting models, and for long-term forecasting
through tracing annual trends in DSS outbreaks. Early warnings on DSS, then, can be
achieved based on the results of monitoring. Thus, it is ironic that although monitoring
produces the information necessary for making early warnings possible, it is the activity
that countries disagree about most.
The DSS monitoring situation in China is complicated. Even though many
Chinese governmental agencies and institutions maintain monitoring stations that collect
data for DSS forecasting and early warnings, there is little cooperation among these
institutions, and access to the data required by modelers and forecasters is not always
available. To varying extents, at least four institutions at the central government level
have been directly involved in DSS monitoring, forecasting, and early warnings: the
China Meteorological Administration (CMA), the Ministry of Environmental Protection
(MEP, formerly SEPA), the State Forestry Administration (SFA), and the Chinese
Academy of Sciences (CAS). Each has developed its own individual network, as “each
institution strives to be self-sufficient in data gathering” (ADB, 2005, p. 69), which
highlights a general lack of cooperation among these institutions.
Each of these Chinese institutions uses different databases for monitoring and
allows different scopes of data availability. The CMA collaborated with the National
Satellite Meteorological Center to use databases of GMS images, and with the US
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to use images for the DSS
density map and visibility. MEP uses data from its own 43 monitoring sites for PM10,
TSP, and Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR). 90 The Ministry of Land and Resources
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LIDAR is radar that use laser light instead of radio waves. A remote sensor can measure a DSS
passing above from the ground. “The laser light emitted from the ground is scattered by fine
185

uses databases based on Landsat TM integrated with ground surveys, land use maps,
ecological environment maps, land degradation maps, vegetation maps, soil maps, and
other data in its focus on land degradation and salinization. The data the Ministry of Land
and Resources obtain are for internal use only. The State Forestry Administration
acquires data based mainly on ground surveys, using Landsat TM images that focus on
desertification. This organization’s primary data and database are also designated for
internal use only. 91 CAS uses a database based on Landsat TM images to monitor
desertification evolution and trends in Northern China and provides multiple levels of
data availability. The 1:200,000 and 1:500,000 scale maps are for internal use only,
whereas the 1:4,000,000 scale maps are published and available for public use (ADB,
2005, p. 70).
Some institutions have collaborated with other Chinese institutes. For example,
the “SFA and CMA have set up a consultative mechanism for prediction and forecasting
of DSS events and early warning by combining land surface field observation
information (land use, vegetation and land degradation dynamics, soil structure and
moisture) provided by positioning monitoring stations and information on weather
condition” (ADB, 2005, p. 74). This consultative mechanism has been considered a great
success in improving the accuracy of DSS prediction and forecasting. Despite this
development, data sharing among Chinese institutions remains limited. Such bureaucratic

particles in the air. By measuring the scattered laser light, the vertical distribution of DSS
particulate concentration, and the change with time, can be determined. By using polarized laser
light, an estimation of the non-spherical character of airborne fine particles can be determined.
The shapes of DSS particles are not spherical comparing with atmospheric pollutant particles,
therefore with this method it is possible to distinguish DSS from atmospheric pollutants” (MOEJ,
2008, p. 7).
91
The State Forestry Administration’s statistical data are open for public use.
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rivalry may have prevented Chinese scientists from building domestic epistemic
communities.
Japan has also faced a lack of coordination that has hindered the growth of its
knowledge base regarding DSS. In Japan, the major obstacle seems to be the involvement
of so many types of organizations that play a part in monitoring DSS. Multiple
governmental institutions play a role in DSS monitoring: the Japan Meteorological
Agency (JMA), Ministry of the Environment of Japan (MOEJ), and the National Institute
for Environmental Studies (NIES). JMA, an external agency of the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport of Japan, maintains an extensive network of meteorological
stations throughout the country and monitors DSS based on visibility at 113
meteorological sites. In January 2004, JMA began releasing forecasts on DSS aerosol
dust and has provided information about DSS aerosol distribution that could affect
people’s transportation and daily activities. The Ministry of the Environment of Japan
also maintains a network of air monitoring stations. The Atmospheric Environment
Regional Observation system (AEROS), also referred to as Soramamekun, has 1,541
stations in the network that collect PM10, TSP, and other data from LIDAR monitoring
(ADB, 2005, p. 75).
Whereas governmental agencies have dominated DSS monitoring in China,
governmental research institutions and universities have played a substantial role in
studying the meteorological and climatic phenomena of DSS in Japan. Governmental
agencies provide research institutions and universities with financial support and work to
raise public awareness about DSS in Japan. To address the participation of various types
of organizations in DSS, “the ministries and agencies involved in DSS issues established
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a coordination meeting in February 2005” for “liaison and coordination among
government agencies in Japan” (MOEJ, 2006).
In the ROK, the Ministry of Environment (MOEK), Korea Meteorological
Administration (KMA), and National Institute of Environment Research (NIER) are
involved in DSS monitoring throughout the country. Like China and Japan, the ROK is
equipped with high-tech LIDARs. Located along the ROK’s west coast, LIDARs are
operated by KMA and NIER to measure periodic DSS (ADB, 2005, p. 77).
Despite these efforts from all three countries, Northeast Asia has not created a
common monitoring system. As Masataka Nishikawa points out,
On their own online systems, Japan uploads PM7, and Korea and China have
uploaded PM10 data. They can share information, but they cannot compare. All
three countries have their own LIDARs, but it is hard to establish same
mechanism. 92
Nishikawa raises the topic of a more recent challenge to information sharing:
The Chinese 2007 Meteorology 13 prohibited researcher from giving any
information to other countries. The only exception for this law is the agreement
between Ministers of Environment, for example, TEMM. Under the TEMM,
Meteorological Agencies and Ministries of Environment in Korea and Japan work
together. However, for China, only the Ministry of Environmental Protection is
participating under TEMM, no participation from the Meteorological Agency.
This brings about high demand from Japan and Korea for more information from
China. 93
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Interview with Dr. Masataka Nishikawa, Section leader of the Laboratory of Intellectual
Fundamentals for Environmental Studies, Environmental Analytical Chemistry Section at
National Institute for Environmental Studies in Japan, on March 8, 2011.
93

Ibid. The Meteorology 13 seems to be under the Administrative Regulations on Meteorological
Data Sharing” which China Meteorological Administration (CMA) issued. The Meteorology Law
of China came into effect on January 1st, 2000 “to regulate the meteorological activities on a legal
basis” and to hold “meteorological departments responsible for discharging administrative
management functions” (CMA, 2012).
188

Each country has amassed its own understanding of DSS over time because the
DSS phenomena has existed for thousands of years even though it has increased
significantly in recent years. Furthermore, no common understanding of the causes and
consequences of DSS exists among participating countries due to their diverse methods
of monitoring its different aspects. As a result of the lack of substantial knowledge about
desertification that persists within UNCCD, countries have relied upon their own
understandings and experiences on this issue, which has resulted in a great deal of
controversy and disagreement over various aspects of DSS.
Although, as explained earlier in this chapter, “the scientific consensus is that the
main sources of dust are the Taklamakan and Gobi desert regions” (Wilkening, 2006, p.
444), a great deal of uncertainty remains about the specific areas from which dust
originates and the possible causes of the increased frequency of dust sandstorms, such as
climate change or human-induced desertification. Another area of controversy is sourcereceptor relationships of DSS (Wilkening, 2006). 94 First, the extent to which Mongolia
contributes to overall dust emissions is an important issue and area of controversy. If
Mongolia is a significant source of the dust that spreads over China, then China would
have more incentive to engage in cooperation with Mongolia to tackle desertification
problems. Second, the atmospheric pathways of dust transport are uncertain. There seem
to be two main paths of long-range transport of dust: “(1) an eastward route from the
94

For desertification, China identifies human factors rather than natural factors as the major
causes of desertification in its National Action Program of the UNCCD. The program states that
along with climatic variation, human activities, such as “population growth, the pressure from
economic development, poor awareness of the importance of the protection of ecosystem, overgrazing, over-cutting of fuelwood, deforestation and destruction of vegetation caused by
reclamation on steppe, desert steppe and pasture land, inappropriate farming system on slope and
the degradation of vegetative,” have accelerated desertification in China (China National
Committee for the Implementation of the UNCCD, 1996, p. 3).
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Mongolian Plateau region over Manchuria, the Korean Peninsula, Japan, and the Pacific
Ocean, and (2) a north-then-eastward route over the Tianshan Mountains and Lake
Balkhash to about 50°N before turning eastward toward the Pacific Ocean” (Wilkening,
2006, p. 444).
In addition to uncertainty over the causes of increasing DSS, there has been little
common understanding of its consequences. China, Japan, and the ROK have each
developed its own knowledge regarding different aspects of DSS’s effects. Nishikawa, a
participant in the Joint Research of TDGM, states that “Japan has the most advanced
knowledge on health effect of DSS. Korea is very good at financial estimation of DSS
effects. China has developed the most knowledge on the protection of agriculture and
forest.” 95 Regarding each country’s different areas of focus, he claims that Japan
privileges “pure science” to the point that it lacks the broader understanding of DSS
possessed by the ROK and China:
Regarding DSS, among three countries, Korea is the most active state, particularly
dealing with impact assessment. In fact, Korea is the only country to have set up
standards on concentration of DSS for forecasting advisory and warning levels. It
is because Korea suffers from damage for health, industry, and traffic. In fact,
Korea is the only country to have measured financial effects of DSS. Scientists
study in order to prevent health damage to the public. Policy makers study how to
achieve more with little investment. Thus, countries should calculate financial
aspects. Korea has the strongest perception on DSS. Japanese scientists tend to
admire pure science without calculating how much economic damage would be
caused by pollution. Korea and China are good at calculating in terms of money
regarding environmental adverse impact. 96

The Special Committee on dust and sandstorms in Japan has also recognized Japan’s lack
of understanding regarding the impact assessment of DSS:
95
96

Interview with Dr. Masataka Nishikawa on March 8, 2011.
Ibid.
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The interrelationships between DSS events and socioeconomic activities will
become more complex as productivity in Northeast Asian region grows
significantly. In future, forecasting in the field of economic and production
activities will be an important component of the evaluation of the effects of DSS
events. This field of study has already been launched by a Korean research group,
and Japan should closely follow the progress of this research initiative. (MOEJ,
2006)

The TDGM meetings have also paid little attention to the costs of tackling DSS.
At the First WG2 Meeting for Joint Research on DSS in 2008, the three countries
presented their existing research to share their research results (TEMM, 2008). Based on
the summary of the existing DSS research of these three countries, it seems that no
country had specified the economic costs of implementing measures to abate DSS. The
ROK presented its current research on planting trees and establishing pasture lands to
combat desertification, which explained how tree species were selected and how the
growth of plants in desertificated areas was measured. China introduced its past as well
as current research projects, including research on the integrated control model, technical
approaches of Eco-Asset Assessment, biodiversity conservation, and vegetation. Japan
shared its research on “Desertification control and restoration of ecosystem services in
grassland regions” and “Community-Based approaches for countermeasures in DSS” in
DSS source areas. Both of these studies focused on developing support for people living
in desertificated areas.
Unlike the individual countries themselves, the ADB tried to figure out the total
cost for DSS mitigation measures, based on budgets of various Chinese projects. China’s
10th and 11th Five-Year Plans between 2001 and 2010 presented its strategies for DSS
prevention and mitigation projects in specific counties, such as the Inner Mongolia
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Autonomous Region (ADB, 2005, p. 170). For example, the “Law on Desertification
Prevention and Treatment,” issued in January 2002, stated that “government at all levels
are responsible for the control of desertification and the central government should
increase investment and create more favorable policies” (ADB, 2005, p. 172). In
attempting to determine the cost aspect of DSS, ADB has emphasized the importance of
measures that are available at reasonable costs over large source areas. According to its
2005 research, the total capital cost of the projects in the Hulunbir, Xilingol, Ordos, and
Alashan areas of China were US$81,446,670, based on budgets allocated for these
projects. Other than these project-based cost estimates, the report notes that “cost
effectiveness, replicability, sustainability and technical ease of implementing the
interventions and control measures has yet to be demonstrated on a scale that is
commensurate with the area of land that needs to be treated in the DSS source areas”
(ADB, 2005, p. 165). Yet without developing a common understanding of the causes and
consequences of DSS, it will be difficult for the region to launch proactive research on
costs of measures necessary for abating DSS.

Socialization
This section tests Hypothesis 3, which is that participating countries in regional
environmental cooperation efforts are more likely to create formal and concrete collective
action through regional cooperation if they adopt learning rather than adaptation as a
process of socialization. As mentioned in chapter 1, through both the adaptation and
learning processes of socialization, international actors can change their behaviors in
response to new events. Through the adaptation process, international actors do so
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without making fundamental changes in their beliefs about underlying values and causal
mechanisms, whereas through the learning process, they do so by raising questions about
fundamental and implicit theories. Thus, more significant behavioral changes can be
made by international actors who have a chance to examine their original values through
the learning process of socialization.
The following sub-sections investigate which of the two processes of socialization,
adaptation and learning, the participating countries have engaged in. To determine the
socialization processes, this study qualitatively assesses the participation patterns of
member countries in two ways: (1) whether the participation of countries in the region
has been prompted by not intrinsic but indirect concerns about particular transboundary
air pollution issues; (2) whether the delegates to international meetings have been
allowed to have enough time to take the learning process of socialization. As mentioned
in chapter 1 and 3, regarding the first way, it is considered that countries have engaged in
the adaptation process of socialization if indirect political concerns have led them to
participate in regional environmental cooperation on the acid rain issue; it is considered
that countries have engaged in the learning process of socialization if they have found
intrinsic motivations for their regional cooperation. Regarding the second way, it is
considered that delegates are more likely to have engaged in the adaptation process of
socialization if they have had the opportunity to attend international meetings for only a
short period or in a sporadic manner, and to have engaged in the learning process of
socialization if they have been able to attend international meetings for an extended
period in a consistent manner.
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For the first criteria of the participation patterns, this subsection investigates the
international context that Northeast Asian countries faced before and while initiating their
regional environmental cooperation regarding transboundary pollution. The
implementation of the UNCCD signals a shared recognition that desertification and land
degradation are global issues. Deserts in Asia are expanding in various countries, such as
China, India, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Syria, Nepal, and the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic. The UNCCD has successfully reminded the international community of the
condition of Asia, which in terms of the number of people affected is the continent most
severely impacted by desertification and drought.
Even though two source countries in Northeast Asia, China and Mongolia, have
established their own National Action Plans as required by the UNCCD because they are
in the process of desertification, 97 their participation in the international discussions
partly seemed to have been driven by two political concerns: getting technical and
financial assistance from developed countries and changing international reputation on
their air quality. First, both China and Mongolia had particular national interests in the
technical and financial assistance that they would receive through the participation in the
UNCCD activities. According to ADB, “political commitment and increase in budgetary
allocations to desertification control on the part of the central government in each country
and technical and financial assistance from a number of donor agencies” have enabled
China and Mongolia to generate good practices and mitigation approaches (2005a, p. 4-
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Even though Japan and the ROK have not established National Action Plans because they are
not in the process of desertification, both countries submitted national reports to the UNCCD
because Article 26 of the UNCCD stipulates that each party must submit a report on the domestic
measures taken to implement the Convention. (For the national report of Japan, see MOEJ, 2000;
for the national report of the ROK, see UNCCD, 2006a.)
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2). 98 They have pursued “financial, technological, and capacity-building assistance” and
relied on “help from outside organizations such as UN organizations, foreign aid agencies,
and foreign foundations to beef up its scientific capability” (Wilkening, 2006, pp. 443444). In particular, according to Wilkening, Mongolia’s stagnant economy has brought
“limited technological capacity in areas such as silviculture; a shortage of trained
personnel; underdeveloped policy and legal structure relative to land use management;
and a weak scientific capacity to forecast and give early warning of dust storms” (ibid., p.
443).
Second, China needed to change its poor reputation on its air quality through
cleaning Beijing’s air of dust in order to hold the 2008 Beijing Olympics. According to
Wilkening, the “Olympics are a coming-of-age event for China similar to the 1964 Tokyo
Olympics for Japan and the 1988 Seoul Olympics for South Korea. However, dust and
dust storms could dirty the event” (2006, p. 443). In fact, Beijing failed to win the
Olympics in its first bid partly due to its air pollution.
Japan also had political motivations in participating in the international
discussions on desertification through the UNCCD. As mentioned in Table 4.4 above,
Japan has been subject to few dust concentrations due to its geographical location,
“downwind of the typical dust trajectories” and “its greater distance from the source
regions” than the ROK (ibid., p. 448). Despite its little environmental impacts of
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Mongolia, in particular, has pursued “financial, technological, and capacity-building assistance”
and relied on “help from outside organizations such as UN organizations, foreign aid agencies,
and foreign foundations to beef up its scientific capability” (Wilkening, 2006, pp. 443-444).
According to Wilkening, Mongolia’s stagnant economy has brought “limited technological
capacity in areas such as silviculture; a shortage of trained personnel; underdeveloped policy and
legal structure relative to land use management; and a weak scientific capacity to forecast and
give early warning of dust storms” (ibid., p. 443).
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desertification and DSS, Japan has been the “the second largest donor country to the
UNCCD” since it became a party of the Convention in 1998 (UNCCD, 2006b, p. 3).
Japan explicitly stated its preference to ODA for environmental cooperation to practice
its “partnership” for developing countries, based on the philosophy of “human security”
as follows:
At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), Japan
announced the policy for environmental cooperation mainly through its Official
Development Assistance (ODA), entitled the "Environmental Conservation
Initiative for Sustainable Development (EcoISD), as a revision of former
Initiative, the "Initiatives for Sustainable Development toward the 21st Century
(ISD) ". The philosophy of EcoISD consists of “Human Security”, “Ownership &
Partnership”, and “Pursuit of Environmental Conservation & Development”.
Environmental problems threaten the survival of human beings, so it is important
to tackle them from the viewpoint of “Human Security”. It is vitally important
that developing countries assume primary responsibility and role for tackling such
problems through their own “Ownership” and that the various stakeholders in the
international community work together in a spirit of “Partnership”. (UNCCD,
2006b, p. 3)

As Wilkening argues, “this seemingly incongruous support” of Japan has partly resulted
from “the desire to curry favor among developing nations and the desire to export its
expertise in forestry” (2006, p. 448).
The ROK seems to have genuine concerns for the international efforts on dealing
with desertification because it has been subject to large dust concentrations due to its
geographical location as “the closest downwind region along the typical atmospheric
trajectories from the China-Mongolia dust source regions” without its own desert areas
(Wilkening, 2006, p. 446).
Thus, it can be argued that China and Japan among the three countries have taken
the adaptation process of socialization because the creation of a regional cooperative
mechanisms, TDGM, was based not primarily on an environmental concern of these
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countries, but rather by their particular political and practical concerns. Participation in
TDGM activities was a means for each country to achieve other objectives than an end to
DSS issue itself. Little learning process of socialization has been observed in the
participation of these three member countries.
In addition to these external international negotiation circumstances in Northeast
Asia, this subsection examines the internal process of socialization through the
participation patterns of delegates to international meetings, showing the way in which
delegates to international meetings and negotiations have engaged in social interactions.
This sub-section investigates the interconnectedness of participants of TDGM and ones
of the UNCCD activities. This section argues that it is doubtful that the UNCCD
activities enhanced the learning aspect of the socialization process among Chinese,
Japanese and Korean Chinese experts in TDGM activities due to little interconnectedness
of TDGM and UNCCD.
As stated in the above discussion of TDGM’s development, the UNCCD seems to
have awakened Northeast Asia to the necessity of regional cooperation regarding DSS
through urging countries to conduct several research projects related desertification, but it
did not create direct contributions to consolidating regional understanding of DSS issues
due to the lack of participation of scientists, involved in UNCCD research activities, in
the TDGM activities. Even though the UNCCD was created in response to concerns
about African drought, Asian countries started to develop their own tools through
participating in the UNCCD. As of May 2012, 194 countries and the European Union had
become parties to the UNCCD. As shown in Table 4.7, all Northeast Asian countries
signed and ratified the convention in the mid-late 1990s: China (1994/1997), Japan
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(1994/1998), Mongolia (1994/1996), and the ROK (1994/1999). Given that China and
Mongolia were the only two countries that had experienced significant desertification
problems, they were the first countries in the region to adopt the UNCCD.
Table 4.7
Ratification of the UNCCD as of 2012
Country
Ratification Dates
Mongolia
September 03, 1996
China
February 18, 1997
Japan
September 11, 1998
ROK
August 17, 1999
Russian Federation
May 29, 2003
DPRK
December, 29, 2003

Out of 195 Parties
42nd
64th
139th
159th
187th
191st

Note: Adapted from “Update on Ratification of the UNCCD,” by UNCCD.
http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/convention/ratification-eng.pdf )

In addition to China’s having adopted UNCCD soon after its formation and
participated in the submission of the National Action Plans to UNCCD, the large number
of Chinese experts listed on the roster of experts for DSS illustrates China’s active
participation in UNCCD as well as its concern about desertification. As of September
2011, China boasted the largest number of experts on UNCCD’s Roster of Experts, 234
out of 1,995 from 93 parties, almost 12% of the total number of experts, compared to
Japan, 48; Mongolia, 3; and the ROK, 21 (UNCCD, 2011b). Article 24, paragraph 2, of
the UNCCD 99 states that the “Conference of the Parties shall establish and maintain a
roster of independent experts with expertise and experience in the relevant fields” based
on “nominations received in writing from the Parties, taking into account the need for a
multidisciplinary approach and broad geographical presentation.”
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Visit http://www.unccd.int/en/about-the-convention/Pages/Text-Part-IV.aspx#art24.
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To implement its National Action Plans, China guaranteed that it would put into
place, at various levels, measures designed to mitigate desertification. 100 The Chinese
government set up the China National Committee, composed of 16 ministries and
commissions in the State Council of China for its implementation of these plans. 101 The
participation of 16 Chinese ministries of State Council in the China National Committee
for implementing the UNCCD (CCICCD) may have diversified domestic measures,
The Chinese National Focal Points for DSS are affiliated with the State Forestry
Administration, helmed by Tuo Liu, Director General of the National Bureau to Combat
100

According to the China National Action Plan to Combat Desertification, China has set up three
phases to combat desertification: the first between 1996 and 2000, the second between 2001 and
2010, and the third between 2011 and 2050. These phases coincide with the schedule of the China
National Economic and Social Developmental Plan. Each phase has different strategic objectives
in terms of the magnitude of the area covered for rehabilitating lands affected by wind erosion,
controlling lands affected by water erosion, revegetating degraded steppe and rangelands, treating
salinized land, and establishing artificial plantation. To fulfill these objectives, China planned to
launch several research centers such as National Desertification Monitoring Center and Early
Warning System, National Training Center on Desertification, and National Research and
Development Center on Desertification. It also planned to conduct numerous projects throughout
the three phases, including 18 key projects to combat desertification caused by wind erosion;
various projects to combat desertification caused by water erosion; 9 projects to achieve soil and
water conservation at the middle reaches of the Yellow River and comprehensive watershed
management of the upper reaches of Guanting, Miyun and Panjiakou Water Reservoirs; and
various projects for controlling vegetative degradation and soil salinization.
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At the central governmental level, China developed desertification combating projects that
were consistent with the National Industry Policy Outlines within the National Economic and
Social Developmental Plan. The government also prepared the annual budget and encouraged
low-interest-rate loans for projects involving ending desertification. It also included these
research projects in its National Science and Technology Development Plan. China has
promulgated several policies, laws, and regulations for the National Action Plan. These laws
include a Forestry Law, Soil and Water Conservation Law, Water Law, Mineral Resources
Management Law, Grassland Law, Land Management Law, Environment Protection Law, and
Wild Life Protection Law. The government also established food security measures and social
guarantee measures. The former guarantees food in areas affected by desertification disasters, and
the latter guarantees dissemination of information to combat desertification at the root level,
provision of alternative livelihoods for farmers affected by desertification, and support for the
resettlement of farmers living in areas with fragile ecosystems. Local governments have also
taken measures to implement the Local Action Programmes to Combat Desertification under the
guidance of the National Action Plan to Combat Desertification at the local level through
encouraging scientific research, high-level education, and technological extension and
dissemination.
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Desertification, and Jia Xiaoxia, Director of CCICCD. As Appendix III shows, none of
the participants in TDGM meetings, including meetings of the Steering Committee or
WG1&2, have been affiliated with the State Forestry Administration. Furthermore, none
of the 234 Chinese experts listed on the UNCCD’s Roster of Experts in 2011 has
participated in TDGM meetings. None of the names of the 20 different delegates to
various meetings of TDGM, including Steering Committee meetings in 2008 and 2013,
WG1 meetings in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013, and a WG2 meeting in 2008, are
included in the roster of Chinese experts for UNCCD. 102 As such, little learning process
of socialization has been allowed to Chinese scientists.
Compared with China, the participants in UNCCD from Japan and the ROK enjoy
somewhat better but not enough relationships with and the participants in TDGM. As
shown in Appendix III, two of the 20 different Japanese delegates to TDGM meetings
held in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013 are included in the list of the roster of experts
for UNCCD: Ken Yoshikawa, Professor at Okayama University, and Masao Mikami
from Meteorological Research Institute of the Japan Meteorological Agency. Yoshikawa
attended the WG2 meeting in 2008 and the WG1 meeting in 2013. Mikami attended only
one meeting, WG1 in 2008. As a result, the Japanese delegates have had little chance to
engage in the learning mode of socialization due to their sporadic attendance at these
international meetings.
The ROK’s attendance paints a picture similar to Japan’s. Only one out of 26
different Korean delegates to TDGM meetings in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013 is
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The lists of participants are available in these years only through TEMM websites and MOEK
data sharing websites. TEMM has not updated meeting reports regularly. For more information,
see
http://www.temm.org/sub08/view.jsp?code=tm_jwg1&page=1&search=&searchstring=&id=36.
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included in the roster of Korean experts for UNCCD: Yowhan Son of Korea University,
who attended in 2013. No Korean delegates to the TDGM meetings have had an
opportunity to work with the Korean experts at UNCCD, which has resulted in a lack of
access to the learning method for Korean participants.
Similarly to the interconnectedness between national experts for UNCCD and
delegates to the TDGM meetings, the participation patterns of delegates to the TDGM
also exhibits the adaptation processes of socialization. As shown in the case of EANET,
bureaucratic rotation systems in East Asia have led participating countries to engage in
the adaptation rather than learning process of socialization. As in the case of EANET,
there are two groups of delegates to the TDGM meetings: (a) governmental officials,
usually selected from ministries of the environment for Steering Committee meetings,
and (b) scientists or researchers, most often selected from universities and national
research centers, such as meteorological agencies. Because, as stated above, information
about attendees of Steering Committee meetings is not kept up to date, these figures may
not be completely accurate regarding the frequency with which governmental official
delegates change.
Even so, the lists of participants in the Steering Committee meetings in 2008 and
2013, also available in Appendix III, show that none of the Chinese, Japanese, or Korean
delegates to the two Steering Committee Meetings attended the meetings in both years.
Six Chinese delegates to the TDGM meetings (five for the Steering Committee meetings
and one to a WG1 meeting) were from the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Other
delegates to TDGM meetings were from the China National Environmental Monitoring
Center (CNEMC), Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences (CRAES),
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China Meteorological Administration (CMA), Liaoning Environment Monitoring Centre,
and China-ASEAN Environmental Cooperation Center.
Japan is the only participating country that has sent the same delegates from the
Ministry of Environment to the WG1 meetings for 2 consecutive years. Shintaro Fujii
attended WG1 meetings in both 2009 and 2010, and Hitoshi Yoshizaki attended WG1
meetings in 2011 and 2013. Thus, it can be argued that few opportunities have been
available for participants to take the learning rather than adaptation because the turnover
rate of bureaucrats and diplomats is so high.
Unlike the frequent changes in national delegates to the Steering Committee
meetings, the other group of delegates to the meetings of the working groups of TDGM,
the scientists, has shown more consistent participation patterns. A few Chinese scientist
delegates have attended WG1 and WG2 in consecutive years and have had opportunities
to engage in the learning process. Xiaochun Zhang from the China Meteorological
Administration attended the WG1 meetings for 3 consecutive years between 2009 and
2011. Additionally, three Chinese delegates attended WG1 meetings for 2 consecutive
years.
Japanese scientist delegates have tended to exhibit even more consistent
participation patterns than China. Three Japanese delegates attended WG1 meetings for 4
consecutive years: Masataka Nishikawa from Japan’s National Institute for
Environmental Studies (NIES), Nobuo Sugimoto from NIES, and Takashi Maki from
Meteorological Research Institute of the Japan Meteorological Agency. Korean scientist
delegates have shown participation patterns consistent with those of the Japanese.
Youngsin Chun has attended WG1 meetings in the years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013, as
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well as one Steering Committee meeting in 2013. Sumin Kim from KMA also attended
WG1 meetings held in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2013, and Eun-Hee Lee from KMA has
attended three WG1 meetings in 3 consecutive years.
As such, all three countries have allowed several scientist delegates to
consistently attend the TDGM meetings and to have enough time to engage in the
learning processes of socialization, whereas the governmental official delegates have not
had the same opportunities. The political delegates may have consulted those scientist
delegates who have built professional expertise through the scientific focus of the Joint
Research of TDGM and longer terms of service. However, as the case of EANET
illustrates, it is unclear whether the consistent patterns maintained by scientist delegates
have helped governmental officials participate in the learning processes of socialization.
The governmental official delegates, who have had only short terms of service due to
bureaucratic rotation systems, are limited in the amount of interaction they can have with
scientist delegates and thereby have taken the adaptation rather than learning processes of
socialization.

Conclusions
This chapter has examined how political leadership, scientific knowledge, and
socialization have affected the collective action of the countries in the region most
affected by DSS. This chapter argues that TDGM has largely proven a failure in terms of
generating broader cooperation and useful measurement data for the region. The TDGM
has produced few research outcomes that might induce participating countries of the
region to draft any practical policies to deal with environmental degradation caused by
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DSS. Furthermore, a consideration of the various levels and degrees of collective action
in the three cases examined by this dissertation reveals that the Joint Research under
TDGM has developed a lesser degree of collective action than EANET due to its failure
to establish solid financial arrangements and concrete collective action associated with
joint research, even though it has realized formal collective action at the governmental
level. The involvement of the ministries of environment of the three countries and their
agreement on the Terms of Reference of the Steering Committee and the Working
Groups for Joint Research on DSS have led TDGM to become a formal cooperative
mechanism, yet TDGM has neither developed concrete obligations that participating
countries are required to fulfill for the joint research program nor reached any legally
binding agreements.
This study concludes that political leadership is the only variable positively
associated with highly formal collective action. The ROK’s political leadership, based on
moderate but dominant financial contributions to the Joint Research of TDGM, has
enabled participating countries in the region to structure their cooperation. Specifically,
the financial assistance the ROK extended to China for the Joint Research on Prevention
and Control of DSS has allowed China to participate in the joint research of TDGM.
However, it is evident that the political leadership exerted by the ROK within the TDGM
is much weaker than that by Japan within EANET in terms of the magnitude of its
financial contributions in a year (in U.S. dollars, Japan’s roughly $400,000 contributions
for the secretariat and another $400,000 for the network center dwarf the ROK’s
$75,000). The ROK’s limited exercise of leadership in TDGM seems to explain the
organization’s lesser degree of formal and concrete collective action.

204

This chapter’s findings do not support the second hypothesis, which predicts that
countries in the region will achieve more formal and concrete collective action if they
build greater commonly shared knowledge. The lack of shared scientific knowledge
about DSS among the participating countries of TDGM cannot explain why TDGM has
succeeded in establishing the formal mode of collective action through creating the first
governmental-level, multilateral cooperative mechanism that focuses exclusively on DSS
issues in Northeast Asia in a relatively short period of time, from 2007 to the present.
The third hypothesis, which predicts that it is more likely that participating
countries in regional environmental cooperation efforts will create formal and concrete
collective action through regional cooperation if they take the learning rather than the
adaptation process of socialization, cannot also explain the formal mode of collective
action of TDGM.
Yet the examination of these two variables—shared scientific knowledge and
socialization processes—reveals the social mechanisms between these variables and
contributes to an explanation for why TDGM has not developed into a legalized
cooperative mechanism and instead continues to focus on science. As became evident in
the EANET case, political leadership alone has not led participating countries to engage
in the learning process of socialization. The lack of shared scientific knowledge among
regional scientists, especially about the causes of DSS and the consequences directly
related to economic loss driven by DSS, has not motivated the countries participating in
TDGM to develop a more regulatory regional regime. Along with the lack of knowledge,
the lack of overlap or interconnectedness between national experts for UNCCD and
delegates to the TDGM meetings, and the too-frequent turnover among governmental
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officials and diplomats because of bureaucratic rotation systems has led countries in the
region to engage in the adaptation rather than learning process of socialization.
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CHAPTER 5
JOINT RESEARCH ON LONG-RANGE TRANSBOUNDARY AIR
POLLUTANTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA (LTP)

Introduction
This chapter deals with regional efforts focusing on identifying the diffusion of
emissions of specific transboundary air pollutants such as SO2 and NOx through the Joint
Research on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP). A joint
research project among China, Japan, and the ROK, the LTP was initiated by the
National Institute of Environment Research (NIER) of the ROK. It aims to “understand
the state of air quality in Northeast Asia, laying a foundation for research on long-range
transports, to develop the scientific basis for environmental decision-making, and
ultimately to improve air quality in Northeast Asia” (TEMM, 2010, p. 37). Experts in
monitoring and modeling, and governmental officials from these three countries, have
held annual meetings for the LTP project since 1995. The 2010 Tripartite Environment
Ministers Meeting among the ROK, China, and Japan (TEMM) agreed that these
meetings have helped the participants reach “a common understanding on a worsening of
air quality in the region” through “conducting joint research on LTP monitoring and
modeling as well as emission inventory” (2010, p. 37).
The participating countries agreed to carry out ground monitoring and aircraft
observation and to review the gridded emission data for SO2, NOx, and Volatile Organic
Compounds (VOC) at their First Sub-Working Group Meeting in 1999 (Secretariat of
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Working Group for LTP Project, 2010a, p. 4). As shown in Figure 5.1, China chose
Dalian and Xiamen, Japan chose Rishiri and Oki, and the ROK chose Gangwha, Taean,
and Gosan 103 as their monitoring sites based on the Terms of Reference of LTP adopted
at the First Sub-Working Group Meeting in 1999.

Figure 5.1. Locations of monitoring sites for LTP. Adapted from Annual Report: The 10th Year’s
Joint Research on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia, by Secretariat of
Working Group for LTP Project, 2010a, p. 13.

Despite two decades of continuous effort, however, LTP, like EANET and
TDGM projects, has been largely a failure in terms of generating broader cooperation and
producing useful measurement data that could lead to the creation of a regional
environmental regime. Unlike EANET and TDGM, however, LTP has established neither
formal nor concrete forms of collective action in the region. The LTP participants have
103

The ROK changed its monitoring sites from these three locations to Gosan and Dukjeok at the
Eighth Expert Meeting in 2005.
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reached no agreement about the program’s organizational structure, whereas the
participants of EANET and TDGM created joint announcements specifying their
structures in their early years, 2000 and 2007, respectively. Due to the lack of formal
characteristics of cooperation, the participating governments have been reluctant to
endorse the annual reports presented by the Secretariat of the Working Group for LTP,
and therefore no research results have been officially published. Another reason the
research findings have not been endorsed is that the Chinese and Japanese governments
appear to regard LTP as simply one of the many scientific research projects in which they
are engaged.
In addition to this lack of formal mode of collective action, LTP has established
few concrete forms of collective action. It has developed neither common methods for
monitoring essential items nor shared modeling programs for its modeling research
activities. The failure to move from joint research to more substantive forms of
environmental policy cooperation can be explained by the absence of all three of the
previously identified factors that contribute to meaningful regional cooperation: the
absence of political leadership, the inability to mobilize scientific research results for
creating shared knowledge, and the absence of learning as a socialization process.
The following sections examine the limited extent of LTP’s political leadership,
shared knowledge, and socialization activities, especially in comparison to the greater
success of EANET and TDGM. This chapter thus considers possible reasons for the LTP
program’s having developed the least extent of collective action. This relative failure is
puzzling given that the ministries of environment of all the three countries have affirmed
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their commitment to LTP program as well as EATNET in their joint communiqué of the
TEMM:
Regarding air pollution, the Ministers noted that acid deposition is still a serious
problem in the region and reaffirmed their commitment to promoting the activities
of the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) and joint
research on Long-range Trans-boundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP).
The Ministers stressed the importance of information exchange, capacity building
and joint research and showed great expectation for the future development of
EANET and LTP. (TEMM, 2006)

Development of LTP
In 1995, the government of the ROK organized an international workshop titled
the First Northeast Asian Workshop on Long-range Transboundary Pollutants which was
held in Seoul. At this workshop, participants from China, Japan, and the ROK agreed to
“launch a working group composed of government officials and experts from each of the
three countries to support a joint research on LTP” and to “establish an interim secretariat
at the National Institute of Environmental Research in Korea for supporting LTP
organization and affairs of the working group” (Secretariat of Working Group for LTP
Project, 2010a, p. 3). Two working group meetings were held in the following years to
prepare for a full-fledged launch of the joint research (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1
List of LTP Meetings
Year

Working Group
Meetings

Sub-Working Group
Meetings

1995

Northeast Asian Workshop on Long-range
Transboundary Pollutants
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Location
Seoul, ROK

1996

1st Expert Meetinga

-

Seoul, ROK

1997

2nd Expert Meeting

-

Seoul, ROK

1999

-

1st

Seoul, ROK

2000

3rd Expert Meeting

2nd

Seoul, ROK

2001

4th Expert Meeting

3rd

Seoul, ROK

2002

5th Expert Meeting

4th

Gyeongju, ROK

2003

6th Expert Meeting

5th

Jeju, ROK

2004

7th Expert Meeting

6th

Xiamen, China

2005

8th Expert Meeting

7th

Seogwipo, ROK

2006

9th Expert Meeting

8th

Daegu, ROK

2007

10th Expert Meeting

9th

Busan, ROK

2008

11th Expert Meeting

10th

Unknown, ROK

2009

12th Expert Meeting

11th

Jeju, ROK

Note: Adapted from Annual Report: The 10th Year’s Joint Research on Long-range
Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia, by Secretariat of Working Group for LTP
Project, 2010a, pp. 3-7; press releases from MOEK in various years.
a

The full title of the meeting is the First Expert Meeting for Long-range Transboundary Air
Pollutants in Northeast Asia. Since 2000, the LTP has separated the Expert Meetings for
Long-range transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia into two groups of meetings:
Working Group Meetings and Sub-Working Group Meetings. For example, the 10th Expert
Meeting for Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia was divided into the
10th Working Group and the Ninth Sub-Working Group Meeting.

At the First Expert Meeting of LTP in 1996, the participating countries agreed to
perform joint research involving both monitoring and modeling and to upgrade the
interim secretariat to an official secretariat to support the activities of the working group.
At the Second Expert Meeting for LTP in 1997, two sub-working groups were created:
one for monitoring and another for modeling. At the First Sub-Working Group Meeting
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in August of 1999, 104 the participants agreed to launch the Five-Year (September 1999December 2004) Plan for the Joint Research to discuss research plans and methods for
conducting three stages of research and to adopt the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the
Joint Research.
The three agreed-upon stages were (a) building an International Co-operation
Platform for monitoring, modeling, and emission inventory to be accomplished between
1999 and 2004; (b) focusing on the analysis of LTP monitoring data, development of
LTP emission inventories, and model evaluation of transboundary transport of sulfur and
source-receptor relationships of SO2 between 2005 and 2007; and (c) continuing analysis
of monitoring data and development of emission inventory and moving on to investigate
the source-receptor relationships of NOx, Ozone, and PM between 2008 and 2012. 105
Each working group consisted of nine members, including three delegates
(governmental officials, researchers, or professors) nominated by each country. Since the
two sub-working groups were established at the Second Expert Meeting in 1997, the subworking group for monitoring has been led by Japan, and the sub-working group for
modeling has been led by China and Japan (Chang, 2012). The National Institute of
Environmental Research (NIER) in the ROK has served as the secretariat of LTP.

104

In 1999, no working group meeting was held.
According to Lim-Seok Chang, the LTP deals with anthropogenic particulate matter,
excluding dust and sandstorms, to avoid duplication of work between the LTP and the TDGM.
(Interview with Lim-Seok Chang on March 31, 2010.)
105
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Working Group
Secretariat

Sub-Working Group
for Monitoring

Sub-Working
Group for Modeling

Joint Research
Figure 5.2. Organization of LTP. Adapted from “LTP Project Assessment and Future Activity,”
by Lim-Seok Chang, 2012. http://www.iges.or.jp/en/gc/pdf/activity20121207/LIMSEOKCHANG.pdf.

LTP’s Achievements and Limitations
As the organizational chart in Figure 5.2 shows, LTP project has established basic
organizational settings for monitoring, including which items to monitor and how to
share the collected data. LTP can be categorized as a formal cooperative program because
governmental officials and experts from all three countries have participated in the
meetings. The Working Group includes working-level officials, most from ministries of
environment, and experts at the national research institutes, such as the National Institute
of Environmental Research (NIER) in the ROK, the National Institute of Environmental
Studies (NIES) in Japan, the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences
(CRAES), and professors in academia. The Working Group was established to play the
role of governing body. Although the main actors in the LTP programs are drawn from
the staff of environmental research institutes in the three countries, active involvement by
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officials from the countries’ ministries of environment gives LTP greater status as a form
of international cooperation than that of a research institution (Chu, 2005; MOEK,
2009a). 106 Furthermore, in February 2000, the LTP project became one of the nine
projects managed by Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting (TEMM), 107 indicating
that the LTP project has become recognized as an official cooperative activity rather than
simply a joint research project conducted by scientists from three countries.
There are two kinds of monitoring activities: intensive monitoring and long-term
monitoring. Through its long-term monitoring, LTP collects three kinds of data: existing
continuous monitoring station data; PM (2.5 or 10), SO2, O3, NOx, and meteorological
data; and precipitation data (pH, EC, anion, cation, rainfall) (Kim, 2008). The items to be
measured and periods over which intensive monitoring would take place were agreed
upon at the annual expert meeting. For example, the participants in the 10th Expert
Meeting in 2007 agreed to measure specific air pollutants: SO2, NO2, PM10, and ionic
components (O3 and PM2.5 optional). They also agreed to conduct intensive monitoring
from May 20 to May 29, 2008, and from October 9 to October 18, 2008.
In 2012, the LTP Secretariat made a presentation on “LTP Project Assessment
and Future Activity” at the Better Air Quality (BAQ) Conference in Hong Kong. The
Secretariat argued that LTP has contributed to creating research plans and capacity
building on transboundary air pollutants and to enabling central compilation of
106

For China, the organization is the Ministry of Environmental Protection rather than the
Ministry of Environment.
107
The nine projects are (a) Korea/China/Japan Tripartite Joint Environmental Training; (b) Fresh
Water Pollution Prevention Project; (c) Korea/China/Japan Environmental Industry Round Table;
(d) The Tripartite Environmental Education Network; (e) TEMM Web Site; (f) Long-range
Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP); (g) The Acid Deposition Monitoring
Network in East Asia (EANET); (h) Tripartite Ecological Conservation in Northwest China; and
(i) Northeast Asian Center for Environmental Data and Training (MOEK, 2009).
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monitoring results and regional analysis results based on modeling, fulfilling one of its
objectives, improving regional understanding on long-range transport of air pollutants.
Nonetheless, this chapter argues that LTP falls far short of achieving formal
collective action as defined in this study because it lacks the following three
characteristics: (a) a clear division of labor within its organizational entities; (b) clear
financial arrangements for its joint research; and (c) endorsement of the joint research
reports by member countries. As to the first characteristic, there is little indication of the
assigned tasks and responsibilities of different units within the organization. Specifically,
it is unclear whether the Working Group has fulfilled its role as the organization’s formal
governing body. Although the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the joint research were
agreed upon at the First Sub-Working Group Meeting in 1999, the specific duties of the
separate organizational entities have not been further clarified. In a 2012 presentation of a
self-evaluation of LTP at the Better Air Quality Conference in Hong Kong, Lim-Seok
Chang, a key participant from the ROK, pointed out that the responsibilities of the
Working Group and the Sub-Working Group need to be clarified for the LPT to develop
further. He also advised that the Working Group should focus on determining the work
scope and budgetary issues of LTP and that the Sub-Working Group should concentrate
on research activities, including an examination of the specifics of monitoring and
modeling.
Regarding the second characteristic, no financial arrangement has been set up for
conducting the joint research projects. As will be discussed in the political leadership
section, little cost sharing has occurred, and the ROK, as the initiator of the organization,
has shouldered most of the financial burden. Although the Secretariat and the Network
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Center of the EANET have reported their expenditures each year to the member countries
at the Intergovernmental Meetings, no such reporting system has been established for
LTP and none of the three countries has requested or shared financial information about
their participation in the LTP project at the annual meetings. For instance, even though
the ROK has provided financial assistance for China to participate in the joint research
project, it has no information about how China has used this financial assistance because
there is no forum for discussing the LTP’s financial arrangements. This problem has been
recently recognized by the Secretariat of the LTP Working Group, which has
recommended that the Working Group focus not only on the scope of the work to be done
but also on budgetary issues (Chang, 2012).
The third of these characteristics, a lack of willingness to endorse research results,
also demonstrates LTP’s limited extent of formal collective action. Participating
countries have not endorsed the publication of the annual reports as official, regionallevel announcements, and thus the reports are for internal use only. Nam and Lee contend
that this “low visibility and limited access to its information for outsiders” has meant that
“LTP has rarely been a subject for scholarly discussions on atmospheric governance in
North-East Asia” (2012, p. 2). By agreement, the LTP-related press releases of each
country include only its own national research results without mentioning those of any
other country. For example, the ROK’s Ministry of Environment has issued press releases
that include only the modeling results from the research conducted by ROK researchers
(MOEK, 2009b).
In addition to having developed little formal structure, LTP has established few
concrete forms of collective action. If we consider its stated main objectives, it becomes
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clear that the LTP project has failed to develop concrete forms of collective action over
two decades. Those five objectives are the following:
1. To present and discuss the results of the preceding year of research with a form of
national report being submitted by each country
2. To discuss the needs of scientific research required to clarify uncertainties and
gaps in our knowledge
3. To improve our understanding on long-range transport of air pollutants in
Northeast Asia
4. To contribute to laying a foundation for the research on long-range transports of
air pollutants
5. To provide policy-makers with science-based information, aimed to prevent or
reduce adverse impact on the environment of Northeast Asia. (Secretariat of
Working Group for LTP Project, 2010a, p. 3)

Concerning the lack of formulating concrete forms of collective action, the
Secretariat of the LTP Working Group has recommended that the Sub-Working Groups
“examine the specifics of modeling and monitoring” for more consistent research across
countries (Chang, 2012).
For instance, the method and frequency of long-term monitoring in the three
countries vary (Table 5.2). Aircraft measurement is optional and based upon its
availability in each country rather than fixed measurement periods.
Table 5.2
Description of Monitoring Methods for Essential Items
China

Japan

ROK

Method

Freq.

Method

Freq.

Method

Freq.

pH

pH Meter

D or P

Glass
Electrode

Daily

pH Meter

Daily

EC

EC Meter

D or P

Conductivity
Cell

Daily

EC Meter

Daily

Wet
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Precipitation

Rain Gauge

D or P

Rain Gauge

Daily

Rain Gauge

Daily

Anions

IC

D or P

IC

Daily

IC

Daily

Cations

AAS

D or P

IC

Daily

AAS

Daily

NH4+

IC

D or P

IC

Daily

UV

Daily

C

UV Fluorescence

Hourly

UV Fluorescence

C

Chemiluminescence

Hourly

Chemiluminescence

C

UV Fluorescence
(Dalian)
SO2
DOAS-open
Path
(Xiamen)

NOx

Chemiluminescence
(Dalian)

C

NO

DOAS-open
Path
(Xiamen)

PM mass

N/A

-

TEOM, ß-ray

Hourly

N/A

-

O3

N/A

-

UV
Photometry

Hourly

UV
Photometry

C

C

N/A

ß-gauge

C

Dry

ß-gauge
(Dalian)
PM10
TEOM
(Xiamen)
PM2.5

N/A

-

N/A

3 Stage Filter
Pack System

-

CO

N/A

-

N/A

NDIR

C

PM2.5,
PM10,
comp.

N/A

-

N/A

IC and AA

C: Continuous
D or P: Daily or when precipitation
N/A: Not Analyzed
TEOM: Tapered Element Oscillating Microbalance
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_

DOAS: Differential Optical Absorption Spectrometry
Note: Adapted from Annual Report: The 10th Year’s Joint Research on Long-range
Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia, by Secretariat of Working Group for LTP
Project, 2010a, p. 17.

Furthermore, comparing the research results presented by the various participants
can be difficult given that monitoring methods and air pollutants are unique to each
country. This lack of comparability of monitoring results is problematic. According to
Levy, coordination of national research programs is “the bedrock” of all activities under
CLRTAP because “it ensures comparability of results across Europe” (1993, pp. 87-88).
He contends that
Without standardization of data collection, measurement, and analysis procedures,
even those countries with an active interest in acidification would be unable to
pool their results. With harmonized research methods it is possible to make
comparative assessments of environmental quality, and to make better
assessments of changes over time. It also enhances the credibility of national
research in foreign capitals. (Levy, 1993, p. 88)

The participants in LTP meetings from different countries have discussed their
own research results at the annual meetings, and their research reports have been
compiled in the annual reports by the secretariat of LTP. Moreover, at the Third Working
Group and the Second Sub-Working Group Meetings in 2000, the participants agreed to
“acknowledge all the activities of LTP and identify the need for annual reports in addition
to LTP meeting proceedings” (Secretariat of Working Group for LTP Project, 2010a, p.
4). Since then, the participants have presented their individual research results at the
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annual meetings and discussed the format and contents of the annual reports and the work
plan. 108
Despite these efforts, the annual reports have become merely a collection of
national reports submitted to the Secretariat of LTP, who combines and reorders each
country’s research results according to the previously agreed-upon format and contents.
Thus, the annual reports do not include any evaluations or comparisons between nations.
Moreover, the submission of data is voluntary, and the monitoring methods to be used
and the types of air pollutants to be monitored in long-term monitoring are determined by
each country because no specific guidelines and requirements have been defined. The
only common feature of the countries’ monitoring is the use of common units of density
for a few air pollutants, which was agreed upon in 2004. 109
This is very different from European practices on data sharing through
Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission
of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP). As described in chapter 6, EMEP has not only
succeeded in establishing reliability of monitoring results of participating countries in
various verification manners but also produced a matrix of emission trajectories with
which “it is possible to identify where a country’s deposition originates and where its
emissions finally end up” (Levy, 1993, p. 88). In contrast, as far as modeling is
concerned, each participating country of Northeast Asia has adopted its own model for
analyzing source-receptor relationships rather than creating a common model. Because of
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The expert meetings have been held late in the year, such as October or November, and the
annual reports have been released early the next year, such as in February or March.
109
Specifically, the participants agreed to use common units of density of air pollutants--ppb for
SO2, NOx (or NO2), and O3; µg/m³ for PM--at the Seventh Expert Meeting held in 2004.
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the lack of standard methods for monitoring and research results for modeling, this
chapter argues, LTP has developed less concrete collective action than EANET has.
Largely as a result, there appears to be little common understanding developed
among the participating countries, even though the modeling results of each country have
not been that different, as described in the knowledge section later in this chapter. Chanwoo Kim, Director-General for International Cooperation at Ministry of Environment of
the ROK, has recognized this challenge and asserted that LTP “should double its efforts
to produce any meaningful outcome for policy-makers” (Kim, 2009, p. 29).
Responding to this challenge, participating countries have begun to search for
answers to the question of how countries can perform a central compilation of monitoring
and modeling data despite the current lack of organization. The recent Proposal for the
Future Development of the LTP Project, presented at the 2012 meeting, “suggests
forming a Science Advisory Committee that consists of authoritative experts from the
three countries that would be in charge of publishing a comprehensive report for
policymakers by integrating and analyzing reports by countries” (Nam & Lee, 2012, p.
10), which bodes well for the future development of LTP activities; however, it is too
early to evaluate whether the committee can achieve its purpose.
In relation to the fourth objective of laying a foundation for research on
transboundary air pollutants, the Secretariat has concluded that LTP has succeeded in
accumulating and distributing datasets it produces, in publishing national/regional
reports/clinical manuals and scientific papers on LTP,” and in supporting and developing
websites and computer software for data interpretation and modeling. For the fifth
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objective, providing policy-makers with scientific information, the Secretariat has
determined that the LTP project has enabled policy-makers to learn about estimates of the
influence and severity of long-range air pollutants in Northeast Asia through their
national reports.
Despite the LTP Secretariat’s insistence that the LTP project has made
contributions, however, how much it has actually accomplished over two decades
remains unclear. I would argue that its objectives are not specific enough, particularly
regarding the scope of the countries’ research and the role of science beyond providing
policy-makers with “science-based information” that can lead them to act to “prevent or
reduce adverse impacts on the environment of Northeast Asia.” It is difficult to anticipate
what kinds of action plan can be drawn based on the LTP joint research, particularly
regarding the policy-making processes of each country. Some participants in Northeast
Asian environmental cooperation on transboundary air pollution are not sure of the LTP’s
objectives, which remain somewhat general. For example, during an interview, one key
Japanese participant in the EANET expressed uncertainty about the goals of the LTP
project: “Japan asked Korea of what their next step, but it was not sufficiently clear..
What would Korean colleagues be willing to do with LTP?” 110
A recent scientific paper, “Sulfur Deposition Simulations Over China, Japan, and
Korea: a Model Intercomparison Study for Abating Sulfur Emission,” (Kim et al., 2012)
seems to show some progress in the clarification of the LTP objectives and production of
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Interview with Katsunori Suzuki on April 23, 2010. He has had various occasions to meet the
LTP participants from Japan and the ROK.
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shared research results. Unlike the somewhat vague objectives of LTP, this article states
the objectives of LTP more explicitly:
The trilateral agreements among China, Japan, and Korea have launched the
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in Northeast Asia (LTP) project, aimed
at lowering sulfur and nitrogen emissions by setting a target percentage level of
deposition for each country. To do so, the concept of critical loads was utilized.
Critical load is the maximum allowable depositions without increasing the
probability of damage to the soil ecosystem. . . However, the critical loads
approach requires a simulation based on a high resolution acid deposition model
in order to diagnose the current acidic loadings for the purpose of maximizing
cost effectiveness in abating emissions. Toward this end, the primary focus of the
LTP project was agreed to better understand the capabilities of regional
comprehensive acid deposition models for quantification of source-receptor (S–R)
relationships. (Kim et al., 2012, p. 4074)

This might be the first explicit statement of LTP objectives that indicates a
specific role of science and direction for LTP research activities. Along with clarifying
the objectives of LTP, this scientific article (Kim et al., 2012) contributes to the
development of shared views on modeling activities. Even though the participants of the
three countries have performed model inter-comparisons since 2007 and agreed to
calculate source-receptor relationships for total nitrate with the Method III of EMEP in
2008, they have not produced research results upon which they can agree; therefore, the
recent publication of this paper (Kim et al., 2012) jointly authored by 21 researchers
from Northeast Asia (most of whom have attended annual expert meetings of LTP as
representatives of each government), is significant.
A senior researcher at NIER, the Secretariat of Working Group for LTP project,
states that:
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Scientific research has been conducted for the future, when China changes their
attitudes and becomes more cooperative on regional environmental cooperation.
Science tries to prepare for the answers to the future questions that China might
raise for the evidences of transboundary pollution. As of now, there is no
organization to put the transboundary concerns on the table except the TEMM
which has no regulatory power in practice. We need to create the table for us to
discuss transboundary pollution issues. (Interview with Lim-seok Chang on
August 17, 2009)

Finding “answers to the future questions that China might raise for the evidences of
transboundary pollution” may result in the evolution of shared knowledge about sourceand-receptor relationships on transboundary air pollutants in Northeast Asia.
This paper (Kim et al., 2012) might serve as a cornerstone for the development of
common understanding among China, Japan, and the ROK about transboundary air
pollutants in Northeast Asia. Although it is uncertain whether this scientific research
paper can represent the accomplishment of the LTP objectives, this jointly authored
article could be a late but essential starting point for developing common ground for
further policy initiatives, particularly in a situation in which there has been no official
publication of the joint research results.
To summarize, LTP has developed little formal collective action because of the
lack of a clear definition of the functions of the Working Group as the governing body
and of the financial responsibilities of individual countries and has developed only a
small degree of concrete collective action because of the varying research methods
employed by participating countries and lack of specific guidelines for performing joint
research. Although the participation of governmental officials and experts from national
research institutes and academia in its annual meetings demonstrate that LTP has been
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recognized as an official international mode of cooperation (Chu et al., 2005), LTP has
faced many challenges in its attempts to build formal and concrete collective action. The
following sections examine how the three factors - political leadership, shared scientific
knowledge, and socialization - have affected the least development of formal and
concrete collective action in the LTP project among the three regional cooperative
mechanisms that this dissertation deals with.

Political Leadership
This section tests Hypothesis 1, which predicts that the stronger the political
leadership exercised by individual participating countries in regional environmental
cooperation efforts, the more formal and the more concrete the collective action in the
region will be. This study aims to investigate whether stronger political leadership taken
by any country in the region, regardless of its material power, increases the likelihood of
developing more formal and concrete collective action.
Since the inception of the LTP project, the ROK, as its initiator, has exerted the
most significant political leadership. The ROK has exerted extensive structural leadership
through making dominant financial contributions and hosting most of the annual expert
meetings of LTP. It has also exercised a small amount of directional leadership through
its delivery of a variety of monitoring activities, such as aircraft monitoring. However, no
country has wielded instrumental leadership within the organization. Despite the
participation of governmental officials from the ministries of environment, most
participants have tended to be scientists, who have focused on developing scientific
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projects rather than crafting structures of LTP or on applying diplomatic skills in
international meetings. Neither China nor Japan has shown any interest in exerting any
form of leadership for LTP. These two countries might consider LTP as a scientific
research organization rather than an international cooperative effort.
Structural Leadership in LTP
As stated in the previous chapters, this dissertation assumes that any state in the
region could exercise any form of political leadership if it were willing to do so,
regardless of its material power. Based on this assumption, this study regards political
leadership as independent of rather than predetermined by a state’s material capabilities.
This contention differs from the realists’ assertion that political leadership can only come
from the most powerful country and be exercised by the international structure or the
powerful countries themselves.
The structural leadership of LTP can be investigated in terms of two aspects:
contributions toward its financing and meeting venues. In this, the LTP’s structural
leadership resembles that of TDGM in the sense that the ROK government has
shouldered the majority of the costs. Without the assignment of specific financial
responsibilities, the ROK has provided the dominant financial contributions to supporting
the joint research and meetings, and also travel expenses for meeting participants from
China.
Even though LTP is a joint research program, member countries have not reached
any official form of financial agreement similar to EANET’s Decision on the Further
Financial Arrangement for EANET. The Terms of Reference (TOR) is the only shared
document that affirms the organizational structure of LTP, and thus, as mentioned earlier,
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it has no forum similar to the intergovernmental meetings of EANET at which to discuss
financial issues and report expenditures for the joint research. As the initiator, the ROK
government has been the only financial contributor to the joint project, providing around
US$600,000 a year between 2000 and the mid-2000s and around US$1,000,000 in 2007
for joint research. The ministry of environment in the ROK expected the Korean
government to spend US$950,000 in 2011 and US$1,450,000 a year between 2012 and
2014 (MOEK, 2009a). China and Japan have not added funding for LTP activities to the
LTP budgets. On the contrary, the ROK government has provided China with 6% of the
LTP total budget to assist China in its research.
Although Japan has allocated US$10,000 a year to the LTP’s activities, it is used
only to reimburse its own scientists for travel costs incurred to attend the various LTP
meetings beyond that provided by the NIER. As a senior researcher in charge of the LTP
projects in Japan emphasized, however, “even this amount of budget is included in the
budget for domestic monitoring, rather than being recognized as separate for LTP.” 111
The vast difference in expenditures made by Japan (US$10,000 a year) and the
ROK (around US$1,000,000) for LTP clearly demonstrates that the ROK has exercised
considerable structural leadership. This making of a dominant contribution by one
participating country resembles the financing of EANET, in which Japan has contributed
more than 94% for the Secretariat and 99% for the Network Center, and of TDGM, in
which the ROK was the only financial source for joint research on the prevention of DSS
in Working Group II. The commonality among all of these cases is that the initiating
country makes the largest financial contribution. This dominant structural leadership
111

Interview with Keiichi Sato, a senior researcher at the Atmospheric Research Department and
Data Management Department of Asia Center for Air Pollution Research (ACAP) on February 8,
2011.
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exerted by one member country is quite different from the financing of the Cooperative
Programme for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air
Pollutants in Europe (EMEP), as will be discussed in chapter 6.
In addition to its dominant financial role, the ROK has also provided most of the
meeting venues of LTP. As Table 5.1 shows, all meetings except the Seventh Expert
Meeting have been held in the ROK. The Seventh Expert Meeting was the only meeting
hosted by China, supported by the SEPA. It thus appears that not only the financing but
the organizational efforts have not been shared equally by all participating countries.
Based on the financial contributions and the provision of meeting venues, the
ROK’s structural leadership of LTP has not been shared by the other two countries.
Unlike China’s various domestic efforts to reduce its emissions, its participation in LTP
has not been that strong; rather, it has been the recipient country of financial support for
the joint research. Nor has Japan paid any significant amount of attention to LTP,
although it has made a minor gesture toward sharing the financial burden. The ROK
seems to be the only country that has exercised structural leadership and displayed formal
interest and concrete action in strengthening LTP activities. Thus, it can be argued that
the ROK’s significant political leadership has not driven formal and concrete collective
action in the LTP project.
Directional Leadership in LTP
As defined earlier, directional leadership is the ability to provide other member
countries with a direction for their participation in international cooperation. There are
two paths to exerting directional leadership. States can either generate intellectual capital
or provide substantive solutions based on knowledge, thereby changing the perceptions of
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risks and particular information, or they can present a good example of policy
implementation for other countries to follow through unilateral policy implementation
related to certain issues. Providing an example of success can increase other countries’
perceptions of what is both desirable and possible.
Because LTP is a joint research project without well-established policy goals, as
previously described, it does not offer examples of participating countries taking the
second path to directional leadership. As this leaves only the first path, increasing
influence through knowledge, this study analyzes the amount of monitoring data that
each country contributes to the annual reports. As shown in Table 5.3, participating
countries have submitted significantly different types and amounts of information
regarding monitoring results. Although for some categories, the number of reports has
been the same across countries, the length and detail of information in those reports (as
measured by pages) has varied considerably.
Table 5.3
Contributions of Each Country to Monitoring Data, in Number of Pages
Item of
Measurement
Annual
Reports

Long-term
Monitoring

China

Japan

ROK

2010

2005

2010

2005

2010

2005

Gaseous
measurements

2

1

3

3

7

3

Particulate
matter

1

1

2

3

2

1

4

3

3

2

7

6

2

2

Surface
meteorology
Precipitation

Not
Not
submitted submitted
2

2
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Gaseous
Not
measurements submitted
Particulate
matter

Intensive
Monitoring

7

N/A

2

2

8

3

6

9

8

42

5

Surface
meteorology

Not
Not
submitted submitted

5

4

5

2

Precipitation

Not
submitted

N/A

2

1

1

N/A

Satellite data
and remote
sensing

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

2

N/A

Aircraft
measurement

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

17

N/A

9

10

29

30

80

18

Total Pages Contributed

China has reported very limited monitoring results, while Japan has made
moderate contributions to the annual reports in terms of the specificity of information in
its research. The ROK has exhibited more effort in preparing its national reports for the
LTP project, substantially increasing the contents of its results in the 2010 annual report
compared to those in the 2005 report. Most of this increase can be attributed to the
intensive monitoring of particulate matter and aircraft measurement. The ROK was the
only country that conducted aircraft measurements after the countries agreed at the
Twelfth Expert Meeting in 2009 to conduct aircraft observation as an option for
monitoring activities, depending on their monitoring capabilities and “situations of the
participating countries” (Secretariat of Working Group for LTP Project, 2010a, p. 7). For
China and Japan, conducting aircraft measurements might exceed their capabilities or
willingness since it requires using complicated equipment, time performing data analysis,
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and expenditures. This excerpt from the ROK’s report displays the complexity involved
in aircraft measurements:
The aircraft used for measurements was Chieftain (PA31-350) made by Piper Co.
In the cabin of aircraft, GPS (GARMIN, GPS II) was installed to monitor the
longitudes, latitudes and altitudes. To analyze the concentration of SO2, NOx and
O3, the equipments by THERMO Co. were set up. Ambient air was introduced
into the cabin of the aircraft through a stainless steel tube connected to the inlet of
a bottom of the airplane and into gas analyzers, which were automatically saved
in a computer data logger for each 5 seconds. (Secretariat of Working Group for
LTP Project, 2010a, p. 133)

The Japanese consider their participation in LTP monitoring activities
supplementary to those they conduct for the EANET. A Japanese participant in LTP
revealed that to prepare their national report for LTP, the Japanese use their EANET
monitoring results for the long-term monitoring. For the intensive monitoring of LTP, the
Japanese tend to ask EANET’s monitoring sites in Japan to send equipment rather than
keeping them in their own institute. 112 Japan thus duplicates some areas of work for LTP
and EANET rather than investing extra effort and resources in building monitoring
capacity specifically for LTP activities, which may explain why it has not conducted the
optional aircraft measurements. According to Levy, one of benefits of collective research
programs is that “they foster research efforts in countries that might not otherwise
undertake them” (Levy, 1993, p. 88). However, LTP does not seem to have fostered
Japan’s research efforts through LTP’s research activities.

112

Interview with Keiichi Sato.
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Since 2002, China has participated in long-term monitoring at three sites in
Dalian and two sites in Xiamen; since 2003, it has also participated in the 10-day semiannual intensive monitoring program held in Dalian in the spring and in Xiamen in the
fall (Meng & Yang, 2012). However, China’s sharing of monitoring results has been very
low, as can be seen in the missing information and lack of elaboration in the annual LTP
reports in Table 5.3.
On the other hand, the ROK’s 2009 aircraft measurement may offer new
possibilities for the measurement of transboundary air pollutants. In fact, these aircraft
measurement results have already helped the region better understand how the air stream
affects the transportation of air pollutants through tracking the air stream and back
trajectory analysis by region. The ROK’s 2009 flight measurements during the intensive
monitoring period found that long-range air pollutants were transported in various
patterns (Secretariat of Working Group for LTP Project, 2010a, p. 140). This ROK standalone measurement might serve as an excellent example of the development of
measurement methods for monitoring transboundary air pollutants in the region. If so, it
can be argued that the ROK has exerted directional leadership for LTP, particularly
regarding monitoring. Some might argue that the ROK’s aircraft measurements reflect a
lack of Korean directional leadership since no other countries have adopted this practice.
However, because aircraft measurement is a relatively new practice, it might be too early
to deem the ROK’s initiative a failure. If the data derived from the aircraft measurement
is used in an efficient way, the ROK might become an exemplar of a country that has
tried an expensive measurement method resulting in advancements in monitoring.
Instrumental Leadership in LTP
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As discussed earlier, instrumental leadership consists of using negotiating skills
during institutional bargaining processes. Countries with instrumental leadership function
as agenda setters for certain issues, popularizers of issues to which they draw attention,
inventors of innovative policy options, or brokers of various negotiation deals. As LTP
has had a limited negotiating agenda for policies due to its focus on research rather than
policy development, no participants in the expert meetings seem to have pursued
instrumental leadership. No country has exerted instrumental leadership in regards to
research activities.
For example, when participants at the 10th Expert Meeting in 2007 agreed to
prepare a manuscript describing model results of deposition and concentration of
transboundary air pollutants in Northeast Asia in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, none
of the countries showed any notable level of instrumental leadership. Participants agreed
to exclude the sensitive source-receptor relationship, even though it is the most critical
issue of the LTP project. No country has stepped up to lead the way in bringing the issue
of source-receptor relationships into the joint research.
As stated in chapter 2, participating countries have been more willing to extend
the scope of air pollutants, geographical areas, and time periods for the LTP’s monitoring
joint research project than for EANET’s monitoring activities. At the Sixth Expert
Meeting in 2003, the participants agreed to carry out a model simulation for March and
July of 2002 cases; to assess source-receptor relationships for sulfur in five regions,
including North Eastern China (Region 1), Central Eastern China (Region II), South
China (Region III), the ROK (Region IV), and Japan (Region V); and to conduct model
intercomparison (Figure 5.3). Since then, the experts for modeling have attempted to
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expand their studies on sulfur deposition. At the Seventh Expert Meeting in 2004, the
participants decided to extend the area to be included in the LTP model domain from 2050° N latitude and E 115-150° longitude to 20-50° N latitude and 100-150° E longitude
to better simulate the long-range transport process.

Figure 5.3. Five regions for model simulation in LTP. Adapted from “Joint Research Project on
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollutants in North East Asia: Progress and Outcomes,” by
Jeong-Soo Kim, 2008, p. 18.
http://www.neaspec.org/documents/airpollution/PDF/S3_18am_JeongSoo_Kim(NIER)_LTP.pdf.

The countries also agreed to include 4 more months of model simulation (January,
April, August, and October of 2002) at the Eighth Expert Meeting in 2005, and an
additional 6 months (February, May, June, September, November, and December of
2002) to include the full year for calculating concentration and deposition at the Ninth
Expert Meeting in 2006. At the 10th Expert Meeting, the participants finally agreed to
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compile all of the results of the simulation for 2002 and to perform model intercomparison. In addition to the source-receptor relationship for sulfur, countries agreed to
examine the source-receptor relationship for total nitrate for 4 months (March, July,
October, and December of 2006) at the 11th Expert Meeting in 2008.
As explained in chapter 3, China’s objection to the extension of the scope of
EANET has circumscribed Japan’s intention to exercise instrumental leadership. China
has stressed the step-by-step process on the issue of extending EANET’s scope in terms
of substances to be monitored and activities to be performed. In the case of LTP, the
potential for extending the scope of air pollutants for monitoring was addressed in the
opening remarks by Suk-jo Lee, Director General of Climate and Air Quality Research
Department at National Institute of Environmental Research in the ROK, at the LTP
meetings in 2010:
Up to now, LTP project has focused on sulfur and nitrogen compounds to
quantify the impact of acid pollutants on the ecosystem. Now, it is the time to
consider entering a new stage of the LTP project. We confront new challenges of
short-lived climate forcers such as ozone and particulate, as well as new
hazardous pollutants of Hg, PAH and POPs. (Secretariat of Working Group for
LTP Project, 2010b, p. 3)

Unlike their response to EANET, however, China has not expressed opposition to the
LTP’s ambitions to extend the scope of its research because, as argued in chapter 2, the
LTP project is more research-oriented, and also because China might consider itself less
threatened by the ROK’s firm exertion of leadership as compared to its more competitive
relationship with Japan. The fact that participating countries may be willing to extend the
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scope of the LTP research project even without any country at the helm is another reason
to doubt that any of the countries have exercised firm instrumental leadership.
In short, the ROK has practiced political leadership within LTP. As the initiator, it
has exercised structural leadership through making significant financial contributions and
hosting most LTP meetings over the past two decades. It has also demonstrated
directional leadership through providing the most effective monitoring data in its national
reports, as well as developing a new aircraft measurement method. However, no country
seems to have pursued instrumental leadership, as seen in the failure to address the
sensitive issue of the source-receptor relationship that would allow for more
understanding about transboundary air pollutants.

Knowledge
The main objective of LTP is to accumulate scientific knowledge to provide
greater understanding of long-range transport of air pollutants in Northeast Asia and
science-based information to policy-makers to help them design policies that will reduce
adverse effects of air pollutants on the regional environment. This section examines why
the cooperative joint research LTP has conducted over the past two decades has brought
little common understanding on the topic
Each country used its own model for conducting research on source-receptor
relationships of SO2 for 2003 and NOx-related deposition for 2006. China used the
Community Multi-scale Air Quality (CMAQ) regional air quality model, Japan used the
Regional Air Quality Model (RAQM), and the ROK used the Comprehensive Acid
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Deposition Model (CADM). These three models were used to run a simulation for the
same period, domain, and emission data to identify air pollutants’ trajectories. According
to former Secretary of LTP, Ilsoo Park, “It would be good to have a common model like
Europe. However, it might be better to regard the medium results of different models as
more appropriate results. As three countries apply same emission data, the modeling
results have been similar.” 113 Since the countries first agreed to perform model intercomparison at the 10th Expert Meeting in 2007, participants have “attempted to
investigate the sensitivity to model variability arising from different model types,
assumptions, and meteorological parameterizations including microphysics, cloud
schemes, and other surface boundary forcing parameterizations” (Kim et al., 2012, p.
4086). As part of the LTP project, two scientific articles compared these three models,
focusing on sulfur deposition simulations for the year 2002 (Kim et al., 2012) and on the
sulfur concentrations over Northeast Asia (Kim et al., 2011) to examine the models’
discrepancies. Both articles confirm that there are “lower aggregated uncertainties
between the three models” (Kim et al., 2011, p. 399).
The three chemical models calculate “concentrations of chemical species in the
gas phase, ion concentration in cloud droplets and rainwater, and amounts of wet and dry
depositions” (Kim et al., 2012, p. 4075). The only parameters shared by the three models
were the emission rates for SO2 and NOx, obtained from the national reports for the LTP
project. This model inter-comparison study revealed “overall similarity between models”
(Kim et al., 2012, p. 4083). The ensemble average of total sulfur depositions over the
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Interviewed on March 29, 2010
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three countries for 2002 revealed “only a small deviation (5-7%) among the three models,”
and “nearly identical sulfur deposition patterns” (Kim et al., 2012, p. 4083).
Before the recent publication of these two articles, little common understanding
on transboundary air pollutants existed among the three countries. As noted earlier,
annual LTP reports have been published by collating national reports presented at the
annual expert meetings, and these reports have not been adopted as official international
findings. Thus, the joint research of LTP appears to be unlike the 1970s OECD study that
became a cornerstone for CLRTAP and concluded that “air quality in any European
country is measurably affected by emissions from other European countries” and that “if
countries find it desirable to reduce substantially the total deposition of sulphur within
their borders individual national control programmes can achieve only a limited success”
(Semb, Eliassen, & Dutchak, 2004, p. 9).
That these articles, drafted by multiple LTP meeting participants, have been
published does point toward the expansion of shared knowledge on transboundary air
pollutants in Northeast Asia. Yet this is a very recent phenomenon, and more importantly,
it remains uncertain whether this academic version of research will be accepted by three
governments as official findings. It is doubtful if countries would understand the
similarities of the rest of research results as shared understanding among countries just
because this model inter-comparison study showed the overall similarity between models
on the accumulated total sulfur deposition.
Furthermore, the source-receptor relationships calculated by the three different
models have yielded some controversial results among member countries (see Table 5.4
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and Table 5.5). Northwesterly March winds favor long-range transport from the continent
in general, and wet deposition in downwind regions in particular, along with high
precipitation. In contrast, the continent’s influence on downwind countries lessens
because the synoptic pattern in summer is “characterized by a subtropic high over the
ocean south of Japan and low pressures over most of continent, combined with cyclones
moving northward over west Pacific ocean” (Secretariat of Working Group for LTP
Project, 2005, p. 212). Equipped with this knowledge, the three countries pay particularly
close attention to the contribution rate of source to receptor for sulfur and nitrate
depositions.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 compare the research results of the three countries and show
the models’ significantly different results. The sulfur depositions in the downwind
regions, Region IV (the ROK) and Region V (Japan), vary in each country’s research
results. According to the ROK’s modeling research results, 8.3% of sulfur deposition in
Region IV is attributable to sulfur emissions from Region III (South China), while the
Japanese model attributes only 3% and the Chinese model only 0.1% to that source. For
the total nitrate depositions in the downwind regions, the ROK modeling research results
indicate that 23.3% of nitrate deposition in Region IV is due to the nitrate emissions from
Region III, while the Japanese and Chinese model results indicate only 7% and 12.8%,
respectively. That the most sensitive issue of source-receptor relationships of the
transboundary air pollutants has not been commonly understood among countries might
explain why they agreed to exclude the source-receptor relationship section from
published modeling results of the sulfur concentration and deposition in Northeast Asia in
a peer-reviewed journal.
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Table 5.4
Sources and Receptors for Total Sulfur Deposition in March 2002 (%)
Source
receptor

Region I

Region II

Region III

Region IV

Region V

C

J

K

C

J

K

C

J

K

C

J

K

C

J

K

Region
I

74.7

73

62.6

4.3

4

36.9

1.5

1

0.1

10.3

6

0.1

10.3

9

0

Region
II

24

26

1.3

92

91

91.2

18

20

7.3

14.5

10

0.2

14.5

16

0

Region
III

1.2

1

0

3.5

5

26.3

80.4

76

73.2

3.8

3

0.1

3.8

3

0

Region
IV

0.1

0

3.7

0.2

0

38.2

0.1

3

8.3

69.2

80

49.1

69.2

11

0.3

Region
V

-

0

12.2

-

0

36.4

-

0

9.6

2.2

1

20.1

2.2

61

19.9

Note: C stands for research results from China; J for research results from Japan; K for research
results from ROK, revised from Secretariat of Working Group for LTP Project, 2005.

Table 5.5
Sources and Receptors of Total Nitrate Deposition in March 2006 (%)
Source
receptor

Region I

Region II

Region III

Region IV

Region V

C

J

K

C

J

K

C

J

K

C

J

K

C

J

K

Region
I

37.7

39

35.9

2.6

2

60.3

1.1

1

1.5

10.7

11

1.5

10.1

13

0.9

Region
II

49.8

55

8.3

70.9

61

69.7

29.7

19

16.1

55.3

64

2.2

33.7

55

3.6

Region
III

0.3

4

2.0

20.2

37

26.4

56.5

80

70

4.3

16

0.3

4.07

10

1.3

Region
IV

1.8

1

14.9

0.6

0

29.9

0.1

0

5

12.8

7

23.
3

10.7

7

26.8

Region
V

0.3

0

17.6

0.2

0

24

0.1

0

3.3

5.6

2

11.
8

33.3

15

43.2
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Note: C stands for research results from China; J for research results from Japan; K for research
results from ROK, revised from Secretariat of Working Group for LTP Project, 2010.

Despite these differences in results, according to Nam and Lee, “the value
disparity among the countries has been in fact narrowed compared to the past” (2012, p.
6). 114 Based on the most recent annual report from 2012 of the LTP project, Nam and Lee
tried to show discrepancies among the three countries’ modeled average values over
February, May, June, and November of 2006 for the source-receptor relationships for
total nitrate dry and wet depositions (Figure 5.4).
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For specific degrees of discrepancies of different research projects on the source-receptor
relationships, see Kim, 2007.
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Figure 5.4. Relative contribution from sources to receptors for total nitrate dry and wet deposition.
Adapted from “Reverberating Beyond the Region in Addressing Air Pollution in North-East Asia,”
by Nam and Lee, 2012, p. 6.

In addition to the disparity between assessments of source-receptor relationship
for sulfur and nitrate in the five regions since 2003, LTP has not identified the extent to
which its research activities should be expanded to provide policy makers with sciencebased information. Reducing “emissions of acidifying substances usually is accomplished
by setting ambient-air-quality standards and then specifying specific fuels or technologies
to ensure that those standards were met” (Clark, Jäger, Cavender-Bares, & Dickson, 2001,
pp. 32-33). Europe has taken ambitious efforts since the early 1990s to “design ‘effectsbased’ acid rain management strategies that scale emission decreases to estimates of the
‘critical loads’ of deposition that down-wind ecosystems can tolerate” (Clark et al., 2001,
p. 33).
LTP has also discussed the method of critical load related to the impact of longrange transboundary air pollutants. At the Eighth Expert Meeting in 2005, the participants
agreed to begin considering the critical load in relation to the impact of long-range
transboundary air pollutants in Northeast Asia and “check the capacity of current research
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and potential activities on critical load in each country” (Secretariat of Working Group
for LTP Project, 2005, pp. 5-6). Until recently, however, no specific research outcomes
have been shared. This slow development of understanding the critical load in the region
contrasts with Europe’s speedy development. It took only a decade for the CLRTAP to
utilize the concept of critical load in its protocols. In the mid-1980s, Scandinavians
promoted the concept of critical loads which was developed in Canada (Levy, 1993). The
Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulfur Emissions, adopted in 1994, was the first
protocol which was based on the critical loads approach to identify differentiated
emission reductions on the basis of the effects of air pollutants. Even though the research
on critical load appears significant, it might also lead LTP to study the topic endlessly
without actually providing the region with useful scientific criteria for taking political
action. For that reason, one ROK participant in the Working Group maintains that
It is important to determine the scope of the research to identify research phases.
If we have research objects, it would be good enough to understand the current
status and its implications of pollutants to achieve scientific goals that could
provide political momentum for consensus. For example, if we aim to understand
critical load, it would take 10 more years to achieve scientific goals. 115

To summarize, Northeast Asian countries have developed very little shared
understanding about transboundary air pollutants through the LTP cooperative
mechanism. Even though LTP is a joint research program of these three countries, each
country has developed its own model for conducing impact assessment of air pollutants
in Northeast Asia and calculating the source-receptor relationship for sulfur and nitrate
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Interview with Jinseok Han on March 31, 2010.
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depositions. Despite relying on different modeling tools, researchers from the three
countries agree that source-receptor results for sulfur are “similar among the three models”
(NEASPEC, 2012d, p. 12). Nonetheless, this similarity of the research results has not
influenced policy making for dealing with long-range transboundary air pollutants. LTP
is still hesitant to adopt conclusive formal or official research results, stating that “the
final result of full year simulation still needs one or two years to become available”
(NEASPEC, 2012d, p. 12). The ambitious study on the critical load has not produced any
conclusive research results that call for specific policy options. Given the lack of clear
research objectives and an agreed-upon scope of research activities beyond some recent
clarification in an academic journal article, LTP appears to have a long way to go to gain
the type of shared knowledge necessary to successfully meet its goals.

Socialization
This section examines Hypothesis 3, which holds that if participating countries in
regional environmental cooperation efforts adopt the learning rather than the adaptation
as a process of socialization, they are more likely to create more formal and concrete
collective action through regional cooperation. Following Ernst Haas’s classification,
through the adaptation process, it holds, international actors can change their behavior by
responding to new events without questioning their beliefs about underlying values or
basic causal mechanisms. In contrast, through the learning process, international actors
can change their behaviors by engaging in new thinking that reflects a more fundamental
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process than adaptation because they can question their originally held theories and
values through learning.
This section investigates which of the two processes of socialization, adaptation
and learning, the participating countries have engaged in. To determine the socialization
processes, this study qualitatively measures the participation patterns of member
countries through navigating two questions: (1) whether countries are more likely to have
engaged in the learning process of socialization if they have found intrinsic motivations
for their regional cooperation rather than indirect political concerns; (2) whether
delegates are more likely to have engaged in the learning process of socialization if they
have been able to attend international meetings for an extended period in a consistent
manner. It is found that Northeast Asian countries have taken the adaptation process of
socialization rather than the learning mostly due to the lack of consistent participation
patterns.
Regarding the first measurement of participation patterns, it is difficult to explain
the political motivations for China and Japan to participate in LTP activities because
these two countries appear to regard LTP as simply one of the many research projects in
which the Chinese and Japanese scientists are engaged in, as stated above. The political
motivations of the ROK’s initiative are not that clear as shown in the discussion of LTP’s
objectives. One possible explanation might be that the ROK was alarmed by the Japanese
initiative for the first regional cooperative mechanism in East Asia through the creation
of EANET. The ROK might have not been comfortable with the Japanese leadership for
regional environmental cooperation due to its distrust resulting from the legacy of the

245

colonial and World War II eras which has affected “virtually all of these countries’
international relations, not just environmental issues” (Wilkening, 2006, p. 445).
Regarding the second measurement of the participation patterns, this subsection
analyzes the socialization processes of two groups of participants in the Expert Meetings:
(a) governmental officials from the three countries, mostly drawn from ministries of
environment, and (b) scientists from national research institutes and academia. As in the
cases of EANET and TDGM, the bureaucratic rotation systems have affected
participation possibilities for public officers in the LTP meetings.
Governmental officials among the delegates, mostly from ministries of
environment of China, Japan, and the ROK, hold the same positions for a limited time
period and are rotated every year or year and a half. In fact, no governmental officials
from any of the three countries’ ministries of environment attended more than one Expert
Meeting during 2003, 2009, or 2010, the only years for which information is available
(see Table 5.6).
Table 5.6
Participants in Expert Meetings of LTP (Name /Affiliation)

China

6th Expert Meeting in
2003
Zelin Wang / MEP
Gang Li / CNEMC

12th Expert Meeting in
2009
Jun Yu / MEP
Bing Liu / CNEMC

13th Expert Meeting in
2010
Haibo Liu / MEP
Fan Meng / CRAES

Dagang Tang / CRAES

Fan Meng / CRAES
Xiaoyang Yang / CRAES
Min Hu / Peking
University
Jianjun Li / CRAES
Youjiang He / CRAES
Lei Duan / Tsinghua
University

Min Hu / Peking
University
Shuai Wang / CNEMC
Youjiang He / CRAES
Yuanhang Zhang / Peking
University
Lei Duan / Tsinghua
University
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Japan

ROK

Wada Tokuya / MOEJ
Shiro Hatakeyama / NIES
Tsuyoshi Ohizumi /
ADORC
Matsuda Kazuhide /
ADORC
Hiromasa Ueda / Kyoto
University
Kannari Akiyoshi /
Independent researcher

Nobuhiro Kino / MOEJ
Akinori Takami / NIES
Hiroaki Yagoh / ADORC
Keiichi Sato (ADORC)
Mizuo Kajino / University
of Tokyo

Kazuhiro Yoshikawa /
MOEJ
Tsuyoshi Ohizumi / ACAP
Yayoi Inomata / ACAP
Akinori Takami / NIES
Keiichi Sato / ACAP
Toshihiro Kitada /
Toyohashi University of
Technology

Moon-soo An / MOEK
Seok-jo Lee / NIER
Il-soo Park / NIER
Jin-seok Han / NIER
Tae-young Lee / Yonsei
University
Shang-Gyoo Shim / KIST

Cheon-gyu Park / MOEK
Lim-seok Chang / NIER
Shang-Gyoo Shim / KIST
Young-jun Kim / GIST
Cheol-hee Kim / Busan
University
Jung-heon Woo / Kunkuk
University

Sang-jin Lee / MOEK
Shang-Gyoo Shim / KIST
Young Sunwoo / Konkuk
University
Lim-seok Chang / NIER
Min-do Lee / NIER
Young-joon Kim / GIST
Cheol-hee Kim / Busan
National University
Jung-hun Woo / Konkuk
University

Note: Information based on MOEK, 2003, 2009; Secretariat of Working Group for LTP, 2010.
Names of 2010 repeaters from 2009 bolded to show lots of moving around in the government
agencies.
ACAP: Asia Center for Air Pollution Research in Japan (former ADORC)
ADORC: Acid Deposition and Oxidant Research Center in Japan
CNEMC: Chinese National Environmental Monitoring Center
CRAES: Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences
GIST: Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology in the ROK
KIST: Korea Institute of Science and Technology
NIER: National Institute of Environmental Research in the ROK
NIES: National Institute for Environmental Studies in Japan

As mentioned in chapter 3, due to the brief period for which governmental
delegates are seated in the national focal points of the LTP meetings, it can be assumed
that these participants have put most of their effort into absorbing their predecessors’
self-understandings and their perceptions of the other participants, especially those from
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other countries. Frequent rotation are unlikely to give successors enough time to question
their understandings, underlying values, or the basic causal mechanisms of regional
cooperation, processes that would lead to a learning process that move beyond adaptation.
Because 1 or 2 years are not long enough for governmental officials to engage in such a
learning process, they adapt themselves to the international settings. This adaptation
process might create little room for resolving misunderstandings or difficulties among
participants from other countries, particularly on formerly disagreed-upon issues, such as
whether to endorse the annual reports of LTP or whether source-receptor relationships
should be included in a joint research paper. Under these circumstances, few of the
behavioral changes necessary for the further development of LTP can be expected to take
place among government participants.
In contrast, the participation of national scientist delegates has been relatively
stable as shown, as also shown in Table 5.6. Five of the seven ROK scientists who
attended the 13th Expert Meeting in 2010 had participated in earlier meetings in 2003 and
2009. Five out of six participating Chinese scientists and three out of five Japanese
scientists had attended earlier meetings and participated in research activities in previous
years. Thus, scientist delegates, who have participated in the learning process through
more consistent and diverse involvement in the various international meetings, have
engaged in the learning process of socialization.
In addition to their relatively continuous participation in the Expert Meetings of
LTP, the scientist delegates from all three countries have enjoyed greater opportunities to
meet their counterparts from other countries and discuss transboundary air pollution in
various cooperative mechanisms than have the governmental official delegates. For
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example, the North-East Asian Subregional Programme for Environmental Cooperation
(NEASPEC) has organized international meetings as a part of its project activities on
Mitigation of Transboundary Pollution from Coal-fired Power Plants in North East Asia.
The NEASPEC meetings include International Conference on Transboundary Air
Pollution in North-East Asia in 2008, Expert Consultation Meeting on NEASPEC
Activities in the Field of Transboundary Air Pollution in North-East Asia in January 2011,
and a Workshop on Transboundary Air Pollution in North-East Asia in November 2011
(Table 5.7).
Table 5.7
List of Participants in Meetings Organized by NEASPEC (Name/Affiliation)
2008 (in Japan)
International Conference
on Transboundary Air
Pollution in North-East
Asia

Jan. 2011 (in ROK)
Expert Consultation
Meeting on NEASPEC
Activities in the field of
Transboundary Air
Pollution in North-East
Asia

Fan Meng / CRAES
Jun Wang / CEC
Hezhong Tian / Beijing
Normal University
-

China

Japan

Hiroshi Hayami / CRIEPI
Hiroshi Moritomi / Gifu
University
Hirofumi Aizawa / MOEJ
Shigehiro Matsuda /
Tokyo Electric Power

Jesada Luangjame / ACAP
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Nov. 2011 (in ROK)
Workshop on
Transboundary Air
Pollution in North-East
Asia

Sheng Chen / MEP
Fan Meng / CRAES
Xiaoyang Yang / CRAES
Youjiang He / CRAES
Lei Duan / Tsinghua
University
Min Hu / Peking
University
Xuesong Wang / Peking
University
Shuai Wang / CNEMC
Ken Yamashita / ACAP

Company
Akira Nitta / ADORC

ROK

Lim-Seok Chang / NIER
Cheol-Hee Kim / Pusan
National University
Ki-Suh Park / Korea

Lim-Seok Chang / NIER
Heung-Kyeong Park /
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade

Cottrell Company
Jeong-soo Kim / NIER

Seog-yeon Cho / Inha
University
Changsub Shim / Korea
Environment Institute

Lim-Seok Chang / NIER
Jong-Choon Kim / NIER
Seog-yeon Cho / Inha
University
Sinae Choi / NIER
Sang-Woo Kim / Seoul
National University
Jung-Hun Woo / Konkuk
University
Young-il Ma / Konkuk
University
Younha Kim / KonKuk
University

Note: Information based on NEASPEC 2008; 2011a; 2011b.

Two out of 11 ROK scientist delegates and five out of 13 Chinese scientist
delegates to the LTP Expert Meetings in 2003, 2009, and 2010 had attended one of these
three NEASPEC meetings. This attendance pattern shows that some participants with
science backgrounds have had first-hand experiences with the LTP and taken time to
think critically about its roles and limitations. Some of the 21 participants from the three
countries who authored a recent journal article (Kim et al., 2012) have attended the expert
meetings of the LTP and the NEASPEC conferences and workshops. Three (Cheol-Hee
Kim, Lim-Seok Chang, and Shang-Gyoo Shim) of the 11 ROK co-authors attended the
LTP meetings, and three (Cheol-Hee Kim, Lim-Seok Chang, and Jeong-Soo Kim) of 11
attended the meetings organized by the NEASPEC. Four (Fan Meng, Youjiang He, Jun
Xu, and Lei Duan) out of six Chinese authors attended the LTP meetings, and three (Fan
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Meng, Youjiang He, and Lei Duan) attended the NEASPEC meetings. All four of the
Japanese authors had attended the LTP meetings.
In contrast to the participation of Chinese and ROK scientists, Japan has sent only
a few delegates to the NEASPEC meetings. No Japanese delegates to the LTP expert
meetings had attended the NEASPEC meetings. Only one Japanese delegate participated
in the meeting in January 2011 and another in November 2011. 116
Thus, it can be argued that the scientist delegates to the LTP expert meetings have
had a greater opportunity to meet and discuss their research with participants from other
countries and to understand the developments reported in others’ studies on
transboundary air pollution. Scientists from the region have more access to
communication with each other through various scientific meetings than do governmental
officials who are rotated frequently.
As mentioned above, the article co-authored by Kim et al. in 2012 demonstrates
that progress is being made toward solidifying the LTP objectives and addresses the
significant similarities of the modeling methods among the three countries. Although it
does not represent an official government-level position on transboundary air pollutants,
it does prove that scientists from three countries are capable of sharing information about
transboundary air pollution and that each country’s studies can be considered and
accepted by other countries in the pursuit of deeper understanding. This progress can be
attributed to the learning process that scientist delegates to the LTP expert meetings have
taken in various international settings.

116

Five Japanese delegates participated in the International Conference on Transboundary Air
Pollution in North-East Asia in 2008, but the relatively large number of Japanese delegates to this
meeting may have been a result of the meeting’s having been held in Japan, while the other two
meetings were held in the ROK.
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In summary, the two groups of participants at the LTP meetings have experienced
different socialization processes. The group of governmental officials from the three
countries has taken the adaptation process due to bureaucratic rotation systems that allow
them to maintain their positions for only a year or so. Meanwhile, the group of scientist
delegates has taken the learning process of socialization because they have had chances
to communicate with scientist delegates from other nations through a variety of channels,
such as international conferences and workshops organized by other regional
environmental cooperative mechanisms.
However, as the case of EANET and TDGM showed, it is unclear whether the
learning process of socialization of scientist delegates through their consistent patterns of
participation have helped governmental officials engage in the more learning process of
socialization. The short terms of service of the governmental official delegates due to
bureaucratic rotation systems have limited the amount of interaction that they can have
with scientist delegates and thereby have taken not the learning but the adaptation
processes of socialization.

Conclusions
This chapter examined how political leadership, scientific knowledge, and
socialization have affected the extent of collective action regarding transboundary air
pollutants. Even though LTP developed as a regional cooperative mechanism through the
active involvement of governmental officials from ministries of environment of China,
Japan, and the ROK, it was found that LTP has attained little in the way of either formal
or concrete collective action. The Working Group has not functioned well as the
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governing body due to a lack of job clarification and budgetary power. The two SubWorking Groups have been unable to agree upon common monitoring and modeling
methods for joint research. Furthermore, the three countries have used different
monitoring methods and modeling tools, making it difficult to directly compare research
results.
This chapter concludes that political leadership is not positively associated with
this lack of the extent of formal and concrete collective action, yet the lack of shared
scientific knowledge regarding transboundary air pollutants among the participating
countries of LPT and the adaptation process of socialization are positively associated
with the little development of formal and concrete collective action. Regarding political
leadership, the slow and limited development of the LTP project as a regional cooperative
mechanism in Northeast Asia seemed odd because the ROK has practiced significant
structural leadership of the organization through making dominant contributions for
financing the joint research activities and hosting more annual meetings than any other
country. The ROK has also wielded directional leadership through trying a new method
for monitoring activities, its aircraft measurement for the LTP research.
It is surprising to see that the ROK’s extensive political leadership for the
organization’s joint research activities has not produced any formal and concrete
collective action over the past two decades. Considering comparative magnitudes of
financial contributions made by leadership countries, the ROK’s structural leadership for
LTP (US$1,000,000 a year) is significantly less than Japan’s for EANET
(US$16,000,000 a year). Nonetheless, the ROK’s financial contributions to LTP projects
can be seen as significant considering the smaller number of participating countries –
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only three for LTP and 13 for EANET. In addition, its expenditures for LTP are much
larger than its contributions for the TDGM (US$75,000 a year), which has succeeded in
achieving formal cooperation in only half a decade, a relatively short period of time.
Therefore, the hypothesis that political leadership contributes to developing more formal
and concrete collective action is not supported by the LTP case.
In contrast, this chapter upholds the hypothesis on shared knowledge that the
greater the commonly shared knowledge among participating countries in regional
environmental cooperation efforts, the more formal and the more concrete will be the
collective action found in the region. The LTP case confirms that the lack of commonly
shared knowledge among participating countries can explain the limited extent of
collective action. It also supports the hypothesis on socialization, which asserts the less
the learning process among participants in regional environmental cooperation efforts,
the less formal and the less concrete will be the collective action found in the region even
if a participating country exerts significant political leadership. Thus, little development
of shared scientific knowledge and the learning process of socialization can explain the
lack of the extent of collective action in the joint research conducted by LTP.
This chapter confirms the social mechanisms between these variables that were
found in the previous two chapters. The case of LTP also shows that strong political
leadership alone does not lead participating countries to engage in the learning as the
socialization process. The adaptation process of socialization among participants in the
regional cooperative mechanisms is attributable to the lack of shared scientific
knowledge.
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CHAPTER 6
NOT LIKE EUROPE:
COMPARING EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES TO NORTHEAST ASIAN ONES
REGARDING TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION

Introduction
To better understand Northeast Asian experiences in dealing with transboundary
air pollution issues, this chapter compares those experiences to Europe’s. To explain the
differences between the two regions, this chapter analyzes political models that European
countries have employed to tackle transboundary air pollution problems through
examining the three major factors examined in the previous chapters: the exertion of state
leadership, the development of shared scientific knowledge, and adoption of socialization
processes.
The chapter argues that unlike Europe, which has achieved positive institutional
and environmental outcomes in reducing air pollution by developing better air quality
management mechanisms within regional regulatory regimes, Northeast Asia has failed
to generate broader cooperation and produce useful measurement data that could lead to
the creation of a regional environmental regime despite two decades of efforts. The
previous three chapters have analyzed the varying degrees of collective action or
negotiated outcomes accomplished by three different cooperative mechanisms, EANET,
TDGM, and LTP.
This is the first study to specifically compare Europe and Northeast Asian efforts
to deal with transboundary air pollution. Most comparative studies in the field have
focused on economic cooperation, as it has been the most institutionalized area of
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regional cooperation. Europe has expanded its regional cooperation from economic issues
to constitutional integration within the European Union, and North America’s regional
cooperation was also initiated through economic collaboration, including the Automotive
Pact and the Defense Sharing Agreement in the 1960s, the North American–Canadian
Free Trade Agreement in 1988, a and the North American Free Trade Agreement
between Mexico, Canada, and the United States in 1992 (Akaha, 1999, p. 4). The history
of economic collaboration in the West may explain why most studies on regional
intergovernmental collaboration in Asia have focused on trade liberalization, trade
facilitation, and economic cooperation (see for example, Ravenhill, 2001). Although
numerous studies have focused largely on European successes in environmental
cooperation, this study compares Europe’s cooperative experiences with those of
Northeast Asia.
By examining the differences in those experiences, the findings in this chapter
can contribute to efforts to improve regional environmental cooperation in other regions
as well as in Asia. As the previous chapters have shown, Northeast Asia (and in a wider
sense, East Asia) has developed various environmental cooperative mechanisms
regarding transboundary pollution even though those mechanisms have not yet succeeded
in reaching any binding regional agreement. Nonetheless, these regional efforts in
Northeast Asia have inspired other regions to also initiate environmental cooperation
regarding transboundary air pollution, including in Latin America since 2007 and in
Africa since 2008, through the Global Atmospheric Pollution Forum (GAPF), a
partnership of international organizations and regional air pollution networks.
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In Africa, these efforts have led to the development of the Eastern Africa
Regional Framework Agreement on Air Pollution, the Air Pollution Information Network
for Africa (APINA), and the Clean Air Initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa (CAI-SSA).
Latin America has established the Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean InterGovernmental Network on Air Pollution, the Clean Air Initiatives in Latin America
(CAI-LA), and the Inter-American Network for Atmospheric and Biospheric Studies
(IANABIS). Given the presence of these cooperative frameworks, a greater
understanding of the regional environmental cooperation within Northeast Asia as the
first region outside Europe to adopt cooperation on acid rain and other environmental
issues can provide other regions of the developing world with specific guidance on what
lessons can be drawn from the European experience that may be applicable to their own
regions.
Summary of the Northeast Asian Experiences
Based on the findings of the previous chapters, this section examines the political
models that Northeast Asian countries have taken to deal with transboundary air pollution
issues. The preceding three case chapters examined the varying forms and degrees of
collective action developed by the participating countries in terms of their formalization,
specificity or concreteness, and legalization. Given that none of these cooperative
mechanisms have developed into regulatory regimes, the rest of this section examines the
formalization and specificity of their collective action.
Negotiated Outcomes: Empirical Findings
This dissertation has examined the hypothesized effects of leadership, shared
knowledge, and the learning mode of socialization on variations among different
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regional environmental cooperative mechanisms in terms of their degree of
formalization, concreteness, and legalization. 117
Based on its analysis of the three modes of leadership—structural, directional, and
instrumental—within the three regional environmental cooperative mechanisms, this
study finds that a single participating country has dominated the political leadership of
each one. In the case of EANET, Japan’s contributions toward the financing of the
secretariat constituted 94% of the total expenditures of the secretariat and 99% of the
budget of the network center. In the other two cooperative mechanisms examined, the
TDGM and the LTP, the ROK has been the dominant financial contributor to joint
research projects and borne the cost of most annual meetings and the traveling expenses
of Chinese participants.
In terms of shared scientific knowledge, Northeast Asia has been struggling with
a lack of scientific standardization despite continuous research efforts for more than two
decades. To examine the socialization processes within these cooperative mechanisms,
this study investigated the external and internal contexts that have shaped cooperation
around environmental issues in the region. These external contexts included international
pressures or situations that Northeast Asian countries faced before initiating their regional
cooperation efforts regarding their own particular environmental issues related to
transboundary pollution. The analysis of internal contexts included an examination of the
participation patterns of delegates to the international meetings of the three mechanisms
and revealed that they have engaged in the adaptation rather than learning processes of
socialization, primarily because of the bureaucratic rotation systems in China, Japan, and
the ROK. This study asserts that the frequent turnovers in and inconsistent participation
117

Table 6.2 shows the results of these variables in the three cases along with the European case.
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of delegates have decreased the chance of developing socialization patterns that could
enhance international cooperation and encourage behavioral changes by the participating
states by building personal relationships among representatives.
Negotiated Outcomes: Analytic Findings
An analysis of these empirical findings indicates that all three independent
variables are partly associated with varying degrees of collective action as measured by
formal and concrete collective action. Regarding the political leadership, the cases of
EANET and TDGM provided strong evidence supporting my hypothesis that the stronger
the leadership, whether structural, instrumental, or directional, exercised by a
participating country in a form of regional environmental cooperation, the more formal
and the more concrete will be the collective action developed in the region. That EANET
demonstrated the most formal organization and of concrete outcomes among the three
regional cooperative mechanisms are positively associated with Japan’s outstanding
political leadership. The ROK’s dominant but more modest political leadership within the
TDGM also appears to be associated with the development of formal but less concrete
collective action. The hypothesis is not supported, however, by the failure to develop
formal and concrete collective action on the part of LTP despite the ROK’s significant
exercise of political leadership.
The knowledge model was also partly upheld by the three cases. The hypothesis,
which predicts that the greater the commonly shared knowledge among participating
countries in regional environmental cooperation efforts, the more formal and the more
concrete will be the collective action found in the region, was not supported by the
EANET case because it has achieved the most successful extent of formal and concrete
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collective action without commonly shared scientific knowledge. The TDGM case did
not uphold the knowledge model either because the lack of shared scientific knowledge
about DSS among the participating countries of TDGM cannot explain why TDGM has
succeeded in establishing the formal mode of collective action through creating the first
governmental-level, multilateral cooperative mechanism that focuses exclusively on DSS
issues in Northeast Asia in a relatively short period of time, from 2007 to the present.
However, the LTP case upheld the knowledge model because the lack of shared scientific
knowledge regarding transboundary air pollutants among the participating countries are
positively associated with the little development of formal and concrete collective action.
The data show that despite their continuous monitoring and modeling efforts over
two decades, scientists in the region have not reduced uncertainties about the significant
adverse consequences of acid deposition through EANET, the major causes of DSS
beyond natural phenomena through TDGM, and the shared source-receptor relationships
of air pollutants between countries through LTP. The lack of a common understanding of
impacts and anthropogenic causes of atmospheric phenomena has led participating
countries to prefer voluntary participation over developing the cooperative mechanisms
into regulatory regimes. The socialization model was also partly upheld by the three cases.
The hypothesis, which asserts that that it is more likely that participating countries in
regional environmental cooperation efforts will create formal and concrete collective
action through regional cooperation if they take the learning rather than the adaptation
process of socialization, was not supported by the EANET case because the adaptation
process of the participating countries in EANET cannot explain the most successful
collective action in terms of formalization and concreteness. The TDGM case also did not
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uphold the socialization model because TDGM achieved formal mode of collective
action without the learning process of socialization. However, the LTP case upheld the
socialization model because LTP did not develop formal and concrete collective action
with the adaptation rather than learning process of socialization.
The earlier chapters have shown that external and internal contexts of Northeast
Asia and the participating countries’ other experiences in global and regional
environmental cooperation have not led the countries in the region to take the learning
process of socialization. Responding to external and internal political contexts of the
region, the countries in the region chose to create and participate in EANET for their own
political reasons rather than out of a genuine concern for tackling the acid deposition
problem. For the creation of EANET, Japan chose the issue of acid deposition as a
subject of regional environmental cooperation because of its enough scientific
accumulation to lead regional environment, rather than its recognition of the acid
deposition as a serious environmental problem in Japan. Both China and the ROK also
recognized joining the EANET as their chance to achieve their own political objectives
such as Japan’s investment in building the Sino-Japan Friendship Center for
Environmental Protection in China and Japan’s agreement on the ROK’s initiative for
NEASPEC. In the process of developing regional cooperation on DSS, China had
particular political interests such as acquiring the technical and financial assistance from
the international community and changing its poor reputation on its air quality to hold the
2008 Beijing Olympics. Japan also had political motivations in participating in the
international discussions on desertification through the UNCCD such as increasing its
reputation among developing nations and aiming to export its expertise in forestry. It is
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difficult to explain the political motivations for the participation of China and Japan in
the LTP projects because both countries appear to regard LTP as simply one of the many
scientific research projects in which their scientists are engaged in. One possible
explanation for the political motivations of the ROK’s initiative might be that the ROK
was alarmed by the Japanese initiative for EANET and was uncomfortable with the
Japanese leadership due to its distrust.
There has also been little interaction between the national experts in the UNCCD
and delegates to the TDGM meetings and between participants of various NEASPEC
meetings related to transboundary air pollution and delegates to the LTP meetings.
Moreover, the frequent turnover among participating governmental officials and
diplomats because of bureaucratic rotation systems has led countries in the region to
engage in the adaptation process of socialization by giving participants little physical
chance to engage in the learning process of socialization.
Although these three hypotheses are only partly supported by the data, the
examination of these variables has uncovered two useful insights. First, it has
demonstrated that strong political leadership is not itself sufficient to lead member
countries to engage in the learning process of socialization and that a lack of shared
scientific knowledge is positively associated with the adaption process of socialization
among participants in the cooperative activities of these three regional mechanisms. The
second is that the lack of shared knowledge and of the learning mode of socialization
helps explain why all three regional cooperative mechanisms have failed to advance to
become legally binding cooperative mechanisms.
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It thus can be argued that knowledge and socialization barriers are key
determinants of the development of regulatory regional environmental regimes. Even
given strong political leadership by a participating country, a region is unlikely to
develop a legally binding regional environmental regime without shared scientific
knowledge and engagement in the learning process of socialization.
Environmental Outcomes
As noted in the previous chapters, the reduction in airborne pollutants emissions
in Northeast Asia has not been impressive. Since the beginning of its modernization in
the mid-19th century, Japan has achieved rapid economic growth as a result of
industrialization and urbanization. During 1955-64, the economic development of Japan
was supported by tripled energy consumption, resulting in various air pollution problems
that peaked in the 1960s. However, Japan’s technological innovation, institutional
development, and collaboration between government and industry led to a significant
decrease in SO2 emissions, nearly 40%, between 1974 and 1987 (UNEP, 2001, p. 32).
Since the first half of the 2000s, Japan’s SO2 and NOx emissions have shown downward
trends (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1. Emissions of SO2 and NOx in Japan. Adapted from “Current Situation of Japan and
the World (1),” Annual Report on the Environment, the Sound Material-Cycle Society and the
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Biodiversity in Japan 2012, by Ministry of Environment of Japan, 2012, p. 12.
http://www.env.go.jp/en/wpaper/2012/pdf/03_chpt1-1.pdf.

As discussed in chapter 2, the ROK has dealt with severe air pollution problems
since the early 1980s through various domestic measures such as the 1981 Standard for
Sulfur Content, the 1985 Prohibition of Solid Fuel Use, and the 1988 Clean Fuel Use
Duty. Particularly owing to the government’s continuous efforts to strengthen fuel
regulations, the concentration level of SO2 in the major cities of the ROK has been
constantly improving (Figure 6.2). The emission reductions for NOx are not as significant
as those for sulfur, but the Korean government emphasizes that NO2 emissions have been
controlled at a certain level (Figure 6.3).

Figure 6.2. Concentration levels of SO2 in ROK. Adapted from ECOREA: Environmental Review
2011, Korea, by Ministry of Environment of Korea, 2012, p. 18.
http://eng.me.go.kr/board.do?method=view&docSeq=9728&bbsCode=law_law_paper&currentPa
ge=1&searchType=&searchText=. SO2 annual average air quality standard is 0.020ppm.
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Figure 6.3. Concentration level of NO2 in ROK. Adapted from ECOREA: Environmental Review
2011, Korea, by Ministry of Environment of Korea, 2012, p. 19.
http://eng.me.go.kr/board.do?method=view&docSeq=9728&bbsCode=law_law_paper&currentPa
ge=1&searchType=&searchText=. NO2 annual average air quality standard is 0.03ppm.

The rapid industrialization and urbanization in China have continued to
significantly increase energy demand, resulting in large anthropogenic SO2 emissions
from the combustion of coal. After a relatively stable trend of SO2 emissions in China
during 1995-1999, such emissions increased by 53% from 2000 to 2006, with an annual
growth rate of 7.3% (Lu et al., 2010). This change was driven by an increase in fossil fuel
consumption due to the economic boom during this period. To deal with this increasing
use of fossil fuels, the Chinese government reaffirmed its commitment to reduce SO2
emissions in its 11th Five-Year Plan during 2006-2010, relative to the 2005 level and set
emission reduction requirements that resulted in the wide installation of flue-gas
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desulfurization (FGD) 118 devices in coal-fired power plants in China. Since July 2007,
the government has encouraged the use of FGD equipment through multiple measures
such as “the installation of the continuous monitoring systems in all power plants with
FGD devices, and the implementation of a premium/penalty scheme of electricity price
that varies with the FGD’s operation rate” (Lu et al., 2010, p. 6316). As a result, even
though GDP and energy consumption in China continued to grow after 2006, its SO2
emissions began to decrease due to phasing out small, high-emitting power generation
units as well as the application of FGD technology.
In contrast, NOx emissions in China have been constantly increasing due to the
country’s rapid increase in energy consumption and its soaring number of motor vehicles
(Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4. Trends of air pollutants emissions in China. Adapted from “Trend of Energy

Use and Nitrogen Oxides Emissions in China,” by Tian, 2008.
http://www.neaspec.org/documents/airpollution/PDF/S2_17pm_Tian[1].pdf.

Despite the lack of regulatory regimes to tackle airborne pollutants problems in
Northeast Asia, China, Japan, and the ROK have achieved steady decreases in sulfur
118

FGD is a set of technologies used to remove SO2 from exhaust flue gases of fossil-fuel power
plants and from other emitting processes.
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emissions resulting from domestic measures taken on their own initiative. Even though
Japan achieved a nearly 40% reduction of SO2 emissions between 1974 and 1987, this
figure was not impressive compared to the reductions that have been made by many
industrialized European countries. Moreover, even though Japan has shown a decrease in
NOx emissions resulting from domestic measures since the mid-2000s, the increase in
NOx emissions in China has been high enough to degrade the general state of NOx
emission conditions in Northeast Asia. The geographical location of China as a source
makes this increase particularly worrisome given the dominant downwind in the region in
the spring season.
In addition to the problems associated with specific air pollutants that both
EANET and TDGM have focused on, environmental problems related to DSS have also
increased in the region, as discussed in chapter 4. The frequency and intensity of these
problems have been worsening for a few decades. Without international regulatory
regimes, numerous bilateral projects have been so sporadic that they have not produced
fruitful results, particularly regarding forestation.
Thus, we can conclude that Northeast Asia has not advanced its management
system regarding transboundary air pollution in the absence of a regulatory regional
environmental regime. This result is different than has been the case in Europe, which has
developed better air quality management with the regulatory regime created by the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP). In particular, it
took only a decade for Europeans to go from recognizing the problem to negotiating a
binding agreement, whereas Northeast Asian countries are still working for scientific
understanding and standardization since they started to discuss transboundary air
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pollution in the early 1990s. It took Europe less than a decade after initiating two key
joint research projects in 1972 to adopt a framework convention in 1979 and less than
two decades to adopt binding regulatory protocols in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast,
Northeast Asia did not start its own joint research until the early 1990, and their efforts
over the past two decades have not culminated in a framework treaty or regulatory
protocols. To better understand why, the following sections analyze the ways in which
the differences in the speed of development and the degree of collective action between
Europe and Northeast Asia can be attributed to political leadership, shared scientific
knowledge, and modes of socialization.

Summary of European Experiences: CLRTAP
Unlike most regional cooperative mechanisms regarding transboundary air
pollution in Northeast Asia that fall into UNEP’s second category of such mechanisms
with permanent structure and a science focus but without legally binding agreements,
CLRTAP has developed as the most successful regional cooperative structure with not
only formal and concrete collective action but also legal infrastructure and a policy focus.
The following subsections introduce the major treaties, briefly explain how well they
have worked in terms of compliance, environmental emission declines related to
particular protocols, and the effectiveness of the CLRTAP system in general.
Development of CLRTAP
The CLRATP was a framework convention that established “a basis for
continuing research and information sharing, and policymaking” (Selin & VanDeveer,
2011, p. 67). The convention itself merely stated that the monitoring activity and
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information exchange should start with sulfur dioxide without specifying any particular
pollutants that should be controlled. Since then, eight subsequent protocols have been
established, six of which are relevant to atmospheric environmental problems associated
with sulfur, nitrogen, and VOCs. Table 6.1 lists these protocols with a brief description of
their major provisions and information on signatories and implementation.
Table 6.1
CLRTAP and Its Protocols
1979
CLRTAP: Adopted in Geneva, November 13, 1979; entered into force
March 16, 1983; 51 parties as of August 18, 2013
1984
EMEP Protocol: Creates a multilateral trust fund for the long-term
financial support of EMEP activities; adopted in Geneva September 28,
1984; 44 parties as of August 18, 2013
1985
Protocol on the Reduction of Sulfur Emissions or Their Transboundary
Fluxes (First Sulfur Protocol): Adopted in Helsinki July 8, 1985; entered
into force September 2, 1987; 25 parties as of August 18, 2013
1988
Protocol Concerning the Control of Nitrogen Oxides or Their
Transboundary Fluxes (Nitrogen Oxides [NOx] Protocol): Adopted in
Sofia October 31,1988; entered into force February 14, 1991; 34 parties as
of August 18, 2013
1991
Protocol Concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic
Compounds or Their Transboundary Fluxes (VOCs Protocol): Adopted in
Geneva 18 November 1991; entered into force September 29, 1997; 24
parties as of August 18, 2013
1994
Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulfur Emissions (Second Sulfur
Protocol): Adopted in Oslo June 14, 1994; entered into force August 5,
1998; 28 parties as of August 18, 2013
1998
Protocol on Heavy Metals: Targets three particular harmful metals—
cadmium, lead, and mercury—and aims to cut emissions from industrial
sources, combustion processes in power generation and road transport, and
waste incineration; adopted in Aarhus, Denmark June 24, 1998; entered
into force December 29, 2003; 33 parties as of August 18, 2013
1998
Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs): Targets 16 particular
substances including industrial chemicals and byproducts/contaminants;
adopted in Aarhus, Denmark June 24, 1998; entered into force October 23,
2003; 33 parties as of August 18, 2013
1999
Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication, and Ground-Level Ozone
(multipollutant/multieffect protocol): Adopted in Gothenburg November
30, 1999; entered into force May 17, 2005; 25 parties as of August 18,
2013
Note: Adapted and expanded from “Institutional Linkages and European Air Pollution Politics,”
by Selin & VanDeveer, 2011, pp. 68-69.
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As other researchers have noted, these protocols have “become more complicated
over time” (Lidskog & Sundqvist, 2011, p. 7) and represent “a steady development” in
which they have progressively covered “more substances with regulations that are
gradually becoming both binding and specific and more fine-tuned to ecological and
economic variations between the countries” (p. 47). The so-called first-generation
protocols, including the 1985 Sulfur Protocol, the 1988 NOx Protocol, and the 1991
VOCs Protocol, were based on the flat-rate reduction of emissions of pollutants, which
meant that all member countries were expected to achieve the same emission cuts. In
contrast, the second-generation protocols, including the 1994 Second Sulfur Protocol and
the 1999 multipollutant/multieffect Protocol, “focused on varying national reduction rates
based on the approach of critical loads—that is, effects in relation to what nature can
withstand-and cost effectiveness” (Lidskog & Sundqvist, 2011, p. 8). In particular, the
1985 Helsinki Protocol mandated uniform reductions of 30% in sulfur dioxide emissions
from 1980 levels by 1993, but the 1994 Oslo Protocol mandated country-specific cuts of
sulfur dioxide emissions based on the critical loads concept that indicates “regionallyspecific emissions targets below which there would be no observable environmental
effects from sulfur emissions,” resulting in considerably varying emission-reduction
targets among countries based on “weather patterns and country sizes and locations”
(Forster, 2010, p. 5).
Organization
Since its initiation, the LRTAP convention has built “a multilayer organization to
arrange for the various countries’ participation and to include scientific assessments on
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the numerous technical and scientific questions of air pollution” (Siebenhüner, 2011, p.
97). The Executive Body, composed of representatives of all parties to the convention, is
the CLRTAP’s final decision-making entity and meets at least annually to review the
implementation of the convention and to adopt plans. Under the Executive Body, there
are three main operating bodies: the Cooperative Programme for Monitoring and
Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP)
Steering Body, the Working Group on Effects, and the Working Group on Strategies and
Review. 119
The CLRTAP secretariat has only about five full-time positions and organizes
meetings, prepares annual work plans, and collects information from member states. It
sends technical emission data to EMEP for compilation in EMEP reports. The EMEP
Steering Body “oversees the activities of the EMEP programs, including an
environmental monitoring system and the collection of emission data, measurement of air
and precipitation quality, and modeling of atmospheric transport and deposition of air
pollution” (Selin & VanDeveer, 2003, p. 24). The EMEP Steering Body meets and
reports to the Executive Body on its activities annually.
Compliance with Regulatory Protocols: Emissions Reductions
Wettestad has characterized national compliance with those protocols as high
overall (2011, p. 47). In the 1985 Helsinki Protocol, states agreed to reduce sulfur
emissions or their transboundary fluxes by 30% from 1980 levels by 1993. Compliance
119

The earlier Working Group on Abatement Technologies was dissolved and the Working
Group on Strategies was renamed the Working Group on Strategies and Review after some major
restructuring following the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol “in order to extend its responsibility to the
review of the current protocols and for possible revisions and initiatives” because the main task of
Working Group on Abatement Technologies was limited to the “preparation of technical annexes
to the protocols” without concern for integrated assessment modeling (Siebenhüner, 2011, pp.
102-103).
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with sulfur emission reduction commitments by many countries, including both some
Western European and some transition countries in Eastern Europe, was high and in fact
marked by “substantial overcompliance” (ibid.). As a result, Europe achieved a reduction
of more than 70% in sulfur emissions between 1980 and 2004 (55Tg to 15Tg) (Vestreng,
et al., 2007).
The Oslo Protocol was conceived of as “a more effective treaty through focusing
the issue on environmental rather than political objectives, thus increasing participation
and compliance” (Forster, 2010, p. 5) due to the introduction of differentiated obligations
based on the concept of a critical load, which is defined as “a quantitative estimate of an
exposure to one or more pollutants below which significantly harmful effects on specified
sensitive elements of the environment do not occur according to present knowledge”
(Levy, 1993, pp. 101-102).
For the 1991 VOC Protocol, the UNECE argued in a more recent review that
progress was very good regarding VOC reductions given that emissions had decreased
41% by 2006 and exceeded the 2010 target of 40% (Wettestad, 2011, p. 49). For the most
recent 1999 Gothenburg Protocol, Wettestad notes that the 2010 UNECE review
indicated that emissions of ammonia decreased by 22%, greater than the 17% reduction
target, and he also argues that “in the period covered by the Gothenburg Protocol (i.e.,
with a 1990 baseline), by 2006 such emissions had been reduced by 65 percent” (2011, p.
47).
There are, however, pessimistic views on the extent of successful compliance of
CLRTAP. For example, for the reduction in SO2 emissions, it has been suggested that the
reduction of industrial emissions may be attributable to “economic reasons or during
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recent years to air pollution control” such as developing technical measures to limit their
dependence on oil and to switch from coal and oil to gas, nuclear, and biomass as a
consequence of the 1973 oil crisis, rather than to compliance with the protocols (UNESC,
2004, p. 162). A more pessimistic view of the Helsinki Protocol’s contributions to the
reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions is taken by Finus and Tjøtta (2003), who contend
that they resulted primarily from a non-cooperative abatement policy. According to this
argument, many countries had already achieved the targeted reduction when they signed
the agreement, and all signatories not only met the target in 1993 but reduced emissions
well above beyond the required 30% (Appendix IV).
Reducing nitrogen oxides, however, proved more challenging than reducing
sulfur dioxides. Despite other scholars’ criticism of the Sofia Protocol for adopting only a
freeze (Levy, 1993), a recent implementation review by UNECE argues that progress in
NOx reductions has been substantial. NOx levels dropped by average 35% between 1990
and 2006, a little less than the average target of a 41% cut (Wettestad, 2011, p. 49). In
comparison to sulfur emissions, it appears that in the case of reductions in NOx
emissions, “environmental control requirements have played a much more important role
and other reasons have been of less importance” (UNESC, 2004, p. 162).
Compliance with Protocol Obligations
Along with high compliance with emissions reduction requirements, compliance
monitoring has also been high, even though some countries have failed to report. As the
organizational entity that manages the monitoring of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxides,
ground-level ozone, and other substances, EMEP has coordinated all the monitoring data
for CLRTAP. According to Lidskog and Sundqvist, EMEP has become a “channel for
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exchanging standardized scientific information and empirical data” that has enabled the
“growth and spread of a common knowledge base concerning both the seriousness of the
acid rain issue and ecosystem mechanisms” (2011, p. 9).
EMEP measures pollutant levels at about a hundred stations throughout Europe,
and each participating government also reports emission levels to EMEP. Given EMEP’s
verification procedures, its data monitoring has reached a high level of reliability;
according to Levy, “there has never been any suspicion that nations cheat on their
emissions reports” (1993, p. 89). In particular, measuring sulfur dioxide emissions by
converting fuel consumption figures is so relatively simple that participating countries
have high confidence in the EMEP data. 120
In 2007, the Implementation Committee, established at the 1994 Second Sulfur
Protocol to review implementation of and compliance with the protocol, reported an
improvement in countries’ compliance with reporting obligations. According to the
Implementation Committee in its report in 2007, the degree of compliance with protocol
obligations was good and improving (Selin & VanDeveer, 2011).
Effectiveness
In terms of effectiveness, Wettestad gave CLRTAP only a “medium” rating in
comparison to the regime to protect the ozone layer, which has achieved more significant
behavioral change, and to the climate-change regime, which has achieved little
behavioral change and seems unlikely to accomplish much productive problem solving in
the near future (2011). To measure effectiveness of international institutions, scholars
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When it comes to reporting NOx and VOCs levels, however, the performance of participating
countries has been poor because CLRTAP “offers few binding and/or stringent emissions
reduction requirements” (VanDeveer, 2006, p. 39).
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applied the two perspectives: problem characteristics and problem-solving capacity (for
example, see Underdal, 1999; Wettestad, 2011). 121 Wettestad determined that CLRTAP’s
high malignity was attributable to its “perhaps not more than medium success”
(Wettestad, 2011, p. 50). In addition to the malign problem characteristics, its problemsolving capacity is moderate in terms of its “institutional aspects such as a limited and
stable secretarial capacity. . . and a consensual decision-making style,” despite some
flexibility in the consensual requirements which was possible because countries were
reluctant and had not signed the protocols were holding back the remaining countries
(Wettestad, 2011, p. 50). 122

Potential Explanations for Differences between Environmental Cooperation in
Europe and Northeast Asia
This section defends the structural comparability of the regions. It might be
argued that the differences between environmental cooperation in Europe and Northeast
Asia can be explained by that these two regions have experienced different degrees of
regionalism and that they have achieved different levels of economic development within
each of the two regions. It sheds light on these two potential explanations and explains
why this dissertation focuses on the political leadership, knowledge, and socialization
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As Underdal points out, “a problem may be difficult to solve in two different respects: it may
be intellectually complex or poorly understood, and it may be politically malign” (1999, 55).
Thus, an analysis based on problem characteristics emphasize the “fundamental aspects of the
environmental problems addressed by the regimes,” and an analysis based on problem-solving
capacity focuses on “a combination of the institutional efforts established and the entrepreneurial
efforts made to address and solve the environmental or resource problems (Wettestad, 2011, pp.
42-43).
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According to Wettestad, this flexibility was possible because countries were reluctant and had
not signed the protocols were holding back the remaining countries.
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instead of focusing on the influence of comparative regionalism on regional
environmental cooperation and the influence of disparity in economic development.
Comparative Regionalism
Scholars who argue that environmental cooperation is a dependent variable in the
development of regionalism tend to highlight the under-institutionalized and disjointed
features of Northeast Asia, as discussed briefly in chapter 2. Those who claim that
environmental cooperation is an independent variable for broader regionalism, argue that
the differences in environmental governance result from different political cultures of the
regions, characterized in Northeast Asia by a preference for soft agreement, reciprocal
promises without formal clauses, a “distaste for legalization,” and “consensus-based
decision making practices” (Yoon, 2013, p. 43).
The relative lack of cooperative regional mechanisms in Northeast Asia is in great
contrast to those among European states, who have also established the European Union
(EU), which Akaha calls “the most developed stage of regional integration in the world to
date” (1999, p. 31). Akaha attributes the elaborate organizational structure and the timely
expansion of membership in the EU to a “combination of enlightened political leadership,
common civilizational background, shared security concern during the Cold War era, and
common economic interests” (p. 33). 123 In contrast, according to Akaha, Northeast Asia
is characterized by “state-to-state conflicts and rivalries, with nationalism remaining a
powerful force that commands the loyalty of citizens” (p. 42). As a result of “multiple
territorial disputes, jurisdictional conflicts, and ethnic animosities,” Akaha argues,
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By “enlightened state intervention” Akaha means the belief that “the state should actively
remove barriers to trade, investment, and other forms of economic exchange” rather than
controlling “how the economies of the region interact with each other” (1999, p. 45).
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The States in the region lack experience in collective problem solving; they are
suspicious of each other; and they rarely encourage their citizens to engage with
one another without their direct control or monitoring. As a result, “Northeast
Asia” remains today a geographic referent rather than a political, much less a
cultural community. (p. 42)
The uneven power distribution among states in the region, along with the diversity of
political systems and cultural backgrounds, has resulted in the development of slow,
deliberate, and incremental processes toward regional cooperation. To encourage greater
cooperation, Akaha suggests,
A realistic framework would start with issues that are removed from issues of
national sovereignty, political independence, or territorial integrity. Issues of
economic development, trade liberalization, technical cooperation, environmental
changes would be more palatable as initial agenda items. Deep integration at the
level of a common market or an economic union would be distant goals, if ever.
(Akaha, 1999, p. 45)

Although cooperation on issues of economic development and trade liberalization
may, as Akaha suggests, appear to be the most promising areas for increased cooperation,
even that has proven difficult or fragile because of the rivalries among countries in the
region. As discussed in chapter 1, China and Japan are currently competing for the status
of the world’s second largest economy in terms of GDP. At the same time, Japan’s
economic challenges have offered the ROK opportunities to improve its economic
situation. The Yen’s high exchange rate, for instance, is beneficial to Korean exporters
who compete with the Japanese in the global market. Examples of such competition can
be seen in the rivalries between Hyundai and Toyota and between Samsung and Sony.
According to Lee and Moon, the “intensified competition” among Northeast Asian
countries that “have been moving into more value-added, capital- and technologyintensive industries” has strengthened a “swarming sparrow” economic pattern marked
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by “deepening economic competition among regional rivals” rather than a “flying geese”
model predicated upon “a harmonious intra-industrial division of labor among countries
in the region” (2008, p. 49).
An overriding concern for sovereignty has also influenced the development of
regionalism in Northeast Asia. In the case of China, for instance, the “sovereignty issue
has always been a central concern of the Chinese government in its diplomatic activities,”
according to Zhao, and its “historical memories of victimization” in the late 19th century
and the early 20th century have led to a “deeply rooted fear among Chinese elites” about
the possible erosion of sovereignty by outsider powers (2011, p. 64). Therefore, “China
has preferred an informal and soft approach toward regional cooperation to avoid legally
binding resolutions that could infringe on the sovereignty of member states” (Zhao, 2011,
p. 64).
Yet China’s preponderant concern with maintaining its sovereignty has been
shared by many Northeast Asian countries. Northeast Asian regionalism has emphasized
“a consensus decision-making process, consultative procedures, voluntarism, and noninterference in member states’ internal affairs” (Zhao, 2011, p. 65). This so-called soft
approach “is different from North American and European regionalism where formal
procedures, rule-making and enforcement are emphasized” (Zhao, 2011, p. 65). Yoon
describes the relatively informal nature of regional environmental cooperation in
Northeast Asia as follows:
While the agreements entail reciprocal promises or actions for implementation on
the part of the individual parties, none of them contains formal clauses that
describe the parties’ commitments as binding obligations or legal sanctions for
non-compliance. Consequently, the interpretation and implementation of the
agreements are largely up to the governments of the member countries and their
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practices are not subject to formal scrutiny under the agreements. (Yoon, 2013, p.
2)

Although this dissertation focuses on the variations among different regional
environmental cooperative mechanisms in Northeast Asia rather than on regional
characteristics in general, it does not disregard regional characteristics in explaining
regional environmental cooperation, as some factors in that cooperation may be more
closely related to regional characteristics than to characteristics of the issues themselves.
Disparity of Economic Development among Participating Countries
It also might be argued that the differences between Europe and Northeast Asia
have resulted from different levels of economic development within each of the two
regions. Certainly, with the exception of Hungary, the gap in economic development
among European countries when CLRTAP was founded in 1979 or the NOx Protocol
was signed in 1988 was not very significant, as shown in Figure 6.5. In contrast,
Northeast Asian countries demonstrate dramatically different levels of economic
development, as shown in Figure 6.6. It is well-known that GDP per capita of Eastern
European countries was much lower than GDP per capita of Western European countries.
However, it would be argued that the difference is not as great as the difference between
Japanese per capita GDP and Chinese per capita GDP.
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Figure 6.5. GDP per capita of European countries in 1979 and 1988 in 2013 value of US$. Data
gathered at the World Bank. http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4. The
World Bank did not have data for many Eastern European countries such as Czech Republic,
Estonia, Slovak Republic and Ukraine.
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Figure 6.6. GDP per capita in East Asia (EANET member countries) in 1993 and 2001 in 2013
value of US$. Data gathered at the World Bank.
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4.

The relationship between the environment and development has been exhibited in
an inverted-U Kuznets curve, which indicates that environmental quality initially worsens
as per capita income rises, but at some point eventually begins to decline (Panayotou,
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1993; Rock, 2002). Grossman and Krueger (1993) estimated that the “turning points” for
atmospheric concentrations of suspended particulate matter (SPM) and sulfur dioxide
(SO2) were under US$5,000 (in 1985 value). Many studies observed this same pattern
despite finding different turning points for different air pollutants. 124 With the exception
of most Eastern European countries, the GPD of European countries exceeded US$5,000
in 1979 when they first reached an agreement on international environmental
cooperation.
Some countries in Northeast Asia have demonstrated a similar pattern. In Japan,
as mentioned above, domestic institutional development and collaborations between
government and industry began a significant decrease in sulfur dioxide emissions when
its GDP per capita tipped US$5,000 in 1974. During the ROK’s post-1965 high-growth
era, “energy consumption increased two times faster than it did for other upper-middleincome countries,” leaving “little doubt that their early structural shifts in the
composition of production contributed to rising portions of inverted-U environmental
Kuznets curves” (Rock, 2002, p. 10). After rising, the pollution intensities of industrial
activity declined because of shifts in the composition of industrial output as well as the
introduction of various domestic measures to limit pollution in the 1980s. The ROK’s
turning point regarding pollution coincided with the year in which it attained a GDP per
capita of US$5,000. That the GDP per capita of China did not tip US$5,000 until around
2010 (Figure 6.7) may help explain why it had not been prepared to control air pollution
and take regional initiatives for decreasing transboundary air pollution in Northeast Asia
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Selden and Song estimated the turning points for these two air pollutants to be US$8,000, but
they asserted that the turning point estimates for NOx and carbon monoxide (CO) “appear quite
sensitive to the method of estimation” even though “aggregate emissions of these pollutants also
appear to peak at moderately high levels of income” (1994, p. 154).
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to that point. Indeed, the Kuznets curve may predict that China will further develop its air
pollution measures since its recent turning point. How China’s economic development
may influence its political leadership, shared knowledge, and socialization regarding
environmental cooperation will prove an interesting topic for future research.
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Figure 6.7. GDP per capita in China, Japan, and the ROK in 2013 value of US$. Data gathered at
the World Bank. http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=3&id=4.

The findings of this dissertation do not rule out the potential influence of varied
degrees of economic development among the nations of Northeast Asia. Indeed, this
factor might explain China’s apparent lack of willingness to contribute financially to the
operations of the TDGM and LTP joint research projects. As discussed in chapter 1, this
study instead focuses on the political models that each region has established to tackle
transboundary environmental problems. The following sections investigate whether the
success of European cooperation through CLRTAP can be attributed to the exertion of
political leadership, development of shared scientific knowledge, and engagement in the
learning process of socialization.
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Political Leadership
This section examines whether the European case supports Hypothesis 1, that the
stronger the leadership (whether structural, instrumental, or directional) by a participating
country (not necessarily a hegemon or the regionally dominant state actor) or a group of
countries in a form of regional environmental cooperation, the more formal and the more
concrete the collective action developed in the region will be. As discussed earlier, this
study assumes that leadership is a necessary component of international cooperation and
that any country can lead regardless of its material capability.
This dissertation has identified three types of political leadership: structural,
instrumental, and directional. For the purposes of this study, contributions to the
financing of the regional cooperative mechanisms are treated as evidence of structural
leadership under the assumption that states will spend more freely to exercise structural
leadership. Instrumental leadership is demonstrated by “negotiating skills to frame issues
in ways that foster integrative bargaining and to put together deals that would otherwise
elude participants endeavoring to form international regimes through institutional
bargaining” (Young, 1991, p. 293). Intellectual or directional leadership refers to
developing substantive solutions based on knowledge and changing perceptions of risks.
As this section will show, political leadership in the CLRTAP has been shared by
numerous countries. This is particularly true in the Cooperative Program for Monitoring
and Evaluation of the Long-Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP).
Unlike EANET, TDGM, and LTP, which have been dominated by a single Northeast
Asian country, the Nordic countries exerted their leadership in the 1970s through
CLRTAP, and this initial Nordic instrumental leadership coalition “has increased over
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time, related primarily to the catalytic change in German air policies” (Wettestad, 2011, p.
51).
Structural Leadership
This sub-section investigates the contributions made to the CLRTAP Trust Fund
or in kind through EMEP to examine which countries have exercised structural leadership
within CLRTAP. The 1984 EMEP Protocol created a multilateral trust fund for the longterm financial support of EMEP activities that entered into force on January 28, 1988.
According to the CLRTAP Executive Body’s 1999 report on contributions for the
financing of the EMEP Program between 1988 and 1998 (Appendix V), many countries
shared in the burden of supporting the EMEP and no single country dominated the
contributions. Between 1988 and 1998, Germany, the Russian Federation, and France
were the most significant contributors (contribution US$2,639,228, US$2,434,909, and
US$2,212,388, respectively). 125 Several other countries contributed smaller but still
significant amounts, including the United Kingdom (US$1,649,635), Italy (US$895,136),
Spain (US$691,451), the European Community (US$596,184), and the Netherlands
US$594,327). Twenty out of the 39 countries each contributed over US$100,000 during
this period (UNESC, 1999). 126
Although it could be argued that these financial arrangements resulted from the
mandatory characteristics of the 1984 EMEP Protocol and the high level of economic
development of European countries, a closer examination of EMEP’s financial
arrangements shows that contributions were not mandatory and were marked by extra125

This data is 12 years old. I believe it is relevant to comparing because it refers to a similar
period since conclusion of the initial agreements Northeast Asia today.
126

The 39 parties include the European Community and two voluntary members (Canada and the
United States, which had not made any contributions for during this period).
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budgetary funds, such as in-kind donations, voluntary contributions of non-signatories,
and arrears on the part of many countries. Member countries participated to different
extents and contributed varied amounts to the EMEP.
Several countries made extra budgetary contributions to the Meteorological
Synthesizing Center–West (MSC–W) and the Chemical Coordinating Center (CCC).
Norway and the United Kingdom contributed to the MSC–W in 1994 (US$278,660), in
1995 (US$795,100), and in 1996 (US$811,460). Norway contributed US$1,181,030 and
the United States donated US$30,000 in 1997. Additionally, Norway contributed
US$616,292, or 51% of the total expenditures, in 1998. The host institute, the Norwegian
Institute for Air Research (NILU), made contributions to the CCC in 1994 (US$40,606),
in 1995 (US$238,920), and in 1996 (US$186,115). In 1998, Belarus and Bulgaria also
made in-kind contributions to the work of the Meteorological Synthesizing Center–East
(MSC–E) (UNESC, 1999).
Along with EMEP, the Working Group on Effects oversees another series of
research programs, and a lead country operates each International Cooperative Program
(ICP) on a voluntary basis (Levy, 1993; UNECE, 2013b). There are six ICPs, each under
the leadership of a certain country: forests (Germany), waters (Norway), materials
(Sweden), vegetation (United Kingdom), integrated monitoring (Sweden in collaboration
with Finland), and modeling and mapping (Germany in collaboration with the
Netherlands). National governments are encouraged to participate in these programs
voluntarily. Participating countries pay their own research costs, and the lead countries
provide the coordinating expenses of the research programs (Levy, 1993). Levy notes that
the voluntary nature of these financial contributions may have led the CLRTAP protocols
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to become “instruments of normative persuasion instead of as regulatory rules” (1993, p.
132), arguing that although the protocols’ instruments appeared to be rules, they served
the function of normative persuasion, which was a key determinant to CLTRAP’s
success.
In contrast to these voluntary extra-budgetary contributions, the contributions of
several countries were in arrears in various years, amounting to a total in cash arrears in
during 1991-1998 of US$ 464,920. 127 Arrears for contributions in kind from the Ukraine
totaled an additional US$283,445 even though most countries have contributed their
expected amounts for the financing of the EMEP. Reservations of the positions on the
mandatory contributions which means delayed payments, made by the biggest
contributors, including Germany and France, illustrate the limited nature of the
mandatory contributions to the EMEP Trust Fund. In 1995, “the Executive Body
approved the use of the United Nations formula for assessments as a basis for the annual
revision of the cost sharing for the financing of the EMEP programme, starting in 1998”
(UNESC, 1999, p. 2). 128 This decision was made “taking into account the announcement
of the Russian Federation that from 1998 it would pay its mandatory contribution in cash
to the Trust Fund” (ibid.).
However, at the 16th session of the Executive Body in 1998, “Germany reserved
its position on its 1999 and 2000 mandatory contributions calculated on the basis of the
127

The former Yugoslavia had arrears in cash for 1991, Italy and the former Yugoslavia for 1992,
Yugoslavia for 1993 and 1994, Italy for 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Italy and Yugoslavia for
1996, 1997 and 1998 (UNESC, 1999).
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The United Nations scales of assessment are decided by the UN General assembly for all UN
Member States. EMEP calculates its scale of contributions on the basis of the UN scale of
assessment. For example, Germany took part in 8.662% of the UN assessment rate in 2004, and
20.8952% of the EMEP scale of contributions. Based on this calculation, Germany was scheduled
to contribute US$447,860 in 2007 for the financing of the EMEP programme (UNECE, 2006).
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United Nations scales of assessments for these years, which would lead to a steep
increase in Germany’s contributions” (ibid.). In the following sessions of the Steering
Body, Germany reemphasized its disagreement on the use of the United Nations scales
for the allocation of EMEP contributions. The reservations have been continued by now.
The French and German delegations “expressed their reservations regarding the 10 per
cent increase for the EMEP budget and regarding their contributions for 2008” at the 25th
session of the Executive Body in 2007 because in their view the current allocation of the
EMEP budget “represented a disproportionate share of the budget” (UNECE, 2012, p. 5).
Even though the Executive Body encouraged Germany and France to drop their
reservations, Germany reaffirmed its reservation with regard to its financial contribution
for 2009 at the 26th session of the Executive Body in 2008. Again, the Executive Body
encouraged Germany to give up its reservation as soon as possible.
In short, the financing of the EMEP program based on the 1984 EMEP Protocol
has led many member countries to share the financial burden for running the program
through making contributions as pledged. Even though Germany, the Russian Federation,
and France were the biggest contributors, most other countries also took responsibility
based on the United Nations assessment scales. On the other hand, Germany and France
opposed what they considered to be an excessive share for the EMEP budget. Despite
their reservations, the EMEP operated on funding from other countries and voluntary
extra-budgetary contributions of a few countries. Shared responsibility rather than
reliance on a few dominant countries has buttressed the sound financial conditions of the
EMEP and other research programs under the Working Group on Effects. It can be
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argued that the structural leadership of the CLRTAP has been shared by several countries
rather than exerted by only one or two wealthy countries.
Instrumental Leadership
The instrumental leadership of the CLRTAP also has been shared by several
countries. In the early phases of the CLRTAP, the Nordic countries exerted considerable
instrumental leadership through active participation in various CLRTAP bodies.
According to Wettestad, “Nordic negotiators and scientists have over time acquired a
strong standing within the various CLRTAP bodies” (2004, p. 91). Examples include the
Norwegian chairman of the Executive Body in the late 1990s and the Swedish chairmen
of the Working Group on Strategies and the CLRTAP secretariat. Germany has also
exerted instrumental leadership after the “catalytic change in German air policies” due to
the domestic forest dieback problem (Wettestad, 2011, p. 51). Wettestad argues that
German leadership added considerable political weight to the processes in the
1980s and 1990s and was exercised with continuity at the point in the regime
development process where several Nordic countries’ interests became much
more complicated and the initial Nordic leadership coalition broke down (from
the mid-1980s on) (2011, p. 51).
Thus, I contend that Germany and the Nordic countries have shared instrumental
leadership for CLRTAP. This instrumental leadership exerted by several countries must
have been helpful in developing CLRTAP which had few specific provisions with ample
room for policy development in the first place and added later more specific protocols.
Directional Leadership
In terms of directional or intellectual leadership, Norway has played a major role
in establishing and implementing CLRTAP. As Siebenhüner has noted, “the complexity
of ecological systems with their interconnectedness, numerous causal mechanisms,
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synergies, and accumulation effects between different substances and abrupt system
changes” meant that rigorous research and monitoring was necessary to cope with limited
scientific knowledge and great uncertainties (2011, p. 93). As a result, the “weight given
to enhancing scientific knowledge in the Convention necessitated the establishment of a
substantial ‘complex’ of scientific and technological working groups,” making Norway,
which already had “interests and substantial scientific/technical competence in this issue
area,” the obvious candidate to take a “formal and informal leadership role” in the early
phase of the CLRTAP (Wettestad, 2004, p. 91). In fact, the Norwegian Institute for Air
Research took responsibility for coordinating the founding of two international projects:
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Program on
Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants (1972-1977) and the Norwegian research project
Aid Precipitation – Effects on Forest and Fish (1972-1980).
Despite this strong Norwegian intellectual leadership, the member countries of
CLRTAP seem to have shared intellectual leadership through international bodies such as
the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), which developed and
implemented the RAINS model (Siebenhüner, 2011). As discussed in the following
section, the RAINS model gained prominence quickly, and other alternative models were
unable to keep pace with its advancements, leading to its adoption in much of the
CLRTAP research.
Thus, this study’s analysis of the three modes of political leadership finds that
Hypothesis 1 is proven. Strong leadership has been provided by participating countries,
allowing the CLRTAP to deal successfully with transboundary air pollution issues in
Europe. From CLRTAP’s founding, European countries have shared leadership
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responsibilities rather allowing one country to dominate the leadership, unlike the
Northeast Asian cooperative mechanisms examined in this study, in which one country,
usually the initiator, has dominated the leadership. This analysis confirms Hypothesis 1,
which predicts that the stronger the political leadership that one participating country or a
group of countries in the region exert, the more formal and the more concrete the
collective action in the region will be. Furthermore, it is not strong leadership alone but
shared leadership among participating countries that most enhances regional
environmental cooperation.

Knowledge
This section tests Hypothesis 2, which asserts that the greater the commonly
shared knowledge among participating countries in regional environmental cooperation
efforts, the more formal and the more concrete will be the collective action found in the
region. After Europe launched various research projects in the early 1970s, it took only a
decade for the participating European countries to agree on a framework convention and
another decade to agree on a series of regulatory protocols. In contrast, Northeast Asia
has not reached any conclusive scientific findings although it has undertaken a variety of
research efforts since the early 1990s. The rest of the section reviews the status of
scientific knowledge in Europe.
Although Robert Smith’s 1872 Air and Rain: The Beginnings of a Chemical
Climatology had introduced research on acid rain as early as the mid-19th century, acid
rain did not become a policy concern until the 1930s and 1950s, when European
researchers first launched studies on aquatic ecosystems and the relationships between
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the loss of alkalinity in surface waters, precipitation acidity, and fossil fuel emissions. In
the 1960s, Svante Odén, a soil scientist working at Sweden’s Agricultural College,
synthesized diverse strands of research and concluded (a) that acid rain was a large-scale
phenomenon across Europe, (b) that many areas were indeed experiencing the increasing
acidity of precipitation, and (c) that this increase would cause detrimental effects on fish,
forests, and materials (Clark et al., 2000). These hypotheses were pursued by scientists
sponsored by the Swedish government, which led to the presentation of a case study on
“Air Pollution across National Boundaries: The Impact of Sulfur in Air and Precipitation”
at the 1972 Stockholm U.N. Conference on the Human Environment.
Following these early Scandinavian efforts, two research projects shaped
scientific discussions in the earlier phases of CLRTAP: the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Program on Long-Range Transport of Air
Pollutants (1972-1977) and the Norwegian research project on Aid Precipitation – Effects
on Forest and Fish (1972-1980). The results of the OECD study, published in 1977,
confirmed that the air quality in every European country was affected by the emissions of
other European countries and that air pollutants were transported long distances. It further
concluded that “if countries find it desirable to reduce substantially the total deposition of
sulphur within their borders individual national control programmes can achieve only a
limited success” (OECD, 1977, quoted in Semb, Eliassen & Dutchak, 2004, p. 9).
CLRTAP participants and analysts agreed with and supported these findings. According
to VanDeveer,
The OECD research constituted an important contribution to awareness raising
among many Western European policymakers and publics. Importantly, it helped
to de-legitimize flat denials of the occurrence of transboundary pollution
transport, such as those previously voiced by British and West German officials. .
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. . In this way, the OECD study altered the foreign policy of some opponents of
air pollution cooperation, establishing the understanding that pollutants were
being transported across borders and shifting the debate toward issues of
assessing damages and policy proposals. (2006, p. 29)
Following the OECD reports and growing public and media attention, in 1977 a
number of European states began negotiating an international convention to deal with the
long-range transboundary transport of air pollutants. The United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE) was selected as the appropriate forum “because of the
perception that it was the only existing organization with both environmental and
economic interests that also included national members from both East and West”
(VanDeveer, 2006, p. 30).
These initial negotiations and took place largely between highly committed
Nordic states, including Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and other, more reluctant
Western European parties, including West Germany and the United Kingdom. Even
though the Soviets had begun an initiative to promote cooperation in nonmilitary spheres
for détente at the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
Soviet Union and Central and Eastern European nations played a minor role in the
negotiations for a monitoring and regulatory program regarding transboundary air
pollutants pushed by Sweden and Norway.
As noted earlier, the initial CLRTAP expressed only “an intent of the signatories
to limit and gradually decrease transboundary air pollution to the extent that technologies
and economics allowed” (Clark et al., 2000, p. 33) and did not spell out any specific or
binding commitments for pollution control or reduction, “leaving all specifics of
multilateral environmental policy development for subsequent international agreements”
(VanDeveer, 2006, p. 30). Even so, Clark et al. argue that CLRTAP successfully brought
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major players to the table and “enhanced the foundations of monitoring and assessment
on which alter action would build, expanding EMEP to include all of Europe,
establishing a number of ongoing multilateral assessment processes, and providing an
institutional home for subsequent international efforts” (Clark et al., 2000, p. 33).
In this process, shared scientific knowledge on transboundary air pollutants
played a key role. Especially crucial was the additional scientific knowledge produced
from cooperative monitoring results by EMEP. EMEP led the discussions about emission
reductions based on “yearly calculated blame matrices, from which the overall
export/import budgets for all countries in Europe could be considered” and “formed a
platform for negotiations on emission reductions” (Erisman et al., 2004, p. 160). Through
“the large participation and commitment from the European countries to the EMEP
programme” and the participation of both scientists and policymakers, European
countries were able to “reach a common understanding of the problems and solutions
(ibid.).
EMEP was this effective because it combined monitoring and modeling and
established source-receptor relationships for acidic substances across the member
countries. The EMEP network monitoring acidic gas and the wet deposition of acidic
species has quantified the patterns of acid deposition and compared them to its adverse
effect measures (e.g., critical loads). This has enabled EMEP to quantify both the extent
of the acidification problem and trends in improvement. In addition to the notable success
of this monitoring, the construction of emission inventories has provided an “extremely
important building block of the modelling work” (Williams, 1999, p. 777). Although the
individual parties to the convention carried out a large amount of the work in their own
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countries, the EMEP program provided an important coordination function and quality
assurance, including acquiring data in a consistent form that made cross-country
comparisons possible. As a result, the EMEP emission inventories for various air
pollutants, including SO2 and NOx, “have found wide use and application not just in the
CLRTAP area, but amongst scientists and researchers in many other areas in Europe and
elsewhere” (ibid.). Through all these efforts, EMEP provided the shared scientific
knowledge on which the specific and regulatory protocols developed in the early years of
the CLRTAP were based.
As mentioned above, it took less than a decade for Europe to transform this
shared scientific knowledge into regulatory protocols, unlike the slow development of
shared scientific knowledge through the efforts of Northeast Asian environmental
cooperative mechanisms. This was facilitated in part by European scientists’
development of the critical-loads approach in response to criticism of the flat-rate
reduction protocols (both 1985 First Sulfur Protocol and 1988 Nitrogen Oxides Protocol).
Europe has taken a significant step toward “differentiated commitments” and away from
the “common cuts” called for in the 1994 Second Sulfur Protocol by employing the
critical loads concept.
This process of knowledge development was facilitated by the Regional
Acidification Information System (RAINS), an integrated assessment model. It was
developed by IIASA in 1983 as a “scenario-generating device” for the reduction of
acidification and other damaging effects on a regional scale. In Europe, the yearly
calculated source-receptor matrix (the so-called “blame matrix”) buttressed scientific
discussions and negotiations, making it possible for European participants to build a
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common understanding of the transboundary pollution problems and to formulate
solutions. The RAINS team attempted to facilitate understanding among policymakers by
presenting model results clearly and simply. In doing so, the team rejected the EMEP
atmospheric transfer model (ATM), which is complex and demanding in terms of time to
collect data, and instead designed the blame matrix to help others visualize and identify
pollution emitters and receivers. The RAINS model has also been improved through
competition with alternative models such as the Abatement Strategies Assessment Model
developed by the Imperial College London and the Coordinated Abatement Strategy
Model developed by the Stockholm Environment Institute, which forced the RAINS team
to clarify the model’s differences and merits and thereby made it “more relevant and
acceptable to the policymakers” (Ishii, 2011, p. 184) than other models. As a result, the
“RAINS model was finally chosen as the guiding model, and other models were used for
checking (or relativizing) its runs and outputs” (ibid.).
In short, European countries reached a scientific consensus about their
vulnerability to and the extent of transboundary air pollution in Europe before agreeing
on a framework convention. Despite initial opposition to these findings from a few
countries, including the United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany, European
countries agreed to adopt specific protocols to regulate air pollutants for the following
decade. This analysis thereby confirms Hypothesis 2, which posits that a region will
develop more formal and more concrete forms of collective action if the participating
countries in its environmental cooperation efforts develop greater shared scientific
knowledge.
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Socialization
This study defined socialization as the internalization of the values, roles, and
understandings. This study examines adaption and learning as the two different processes
of the internalization of norms that operate within these regional cooperative mechanisms.
While, according to Haas (1990) and Johnston (1996), the adaptation process refers to the
acceptance and adoption of preexisting, external norms and behaviors without changing
the broad goals of countries, the learning process refers to a more transformative process
which brings behavioral changes because actors question and examine fundamental and
original values.
This section examines Hypothesis 3, which asserts that participating countries in
regional environmental cooperation efforts are more likely to create formal and concrete
collective action through regional cooperation if they adopt learning rather than
adaptation as a process of socialization. To examine which of these two processes of
socialization the participating countries have engaged in, this section qualitatively
measures the participation patterns of member countries through navigating two
questions: whether the participation of countries in the region has been prompted by
indirect, rather than intrinsic, concerns about particular transboundary air pollution issues;
and whether delegates are more likely to have engaged in the adaptation process of
socialization if they have had the opportunity to attend international meetings for only a
short period or in a sporadic manner, and to have engaged in the learning process of
socialization if they have been able to attend international meetings for an extended
period in a consistent manner. It is found that European countries have engaged in both
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the learning and adaptation processes of socialization while committing to the CLRTAP
activities.
Regarding the question of the political motivations for European countries to
participate in the CLRTAP, I argue that there were two groups of European countries
engaged in different processes of socialization. The countries which had varying political
motivations and reasons to participate in implementing the CLRTAP can be argued to
have engaged in the adaptation process. According to Levy (1993), Denmark, the Soviet
Union, and the United Kingdom had all different non-environmental reasons for making
the reductions associated with the participation in the CLRTAP: Demark because of its
membership in the Nordic Council, which was also participating; the Soviet Union
because it perceived CLRTAP as an important political issue for advancing détente; and
the United Kingdom so as to change its image from the “dirty man of Europe” and in
response to “political pressure from a wide variety of sources” (pp. 123-124). Other
countries which were highly motivated to solve the problem of acid rain internationally
can be argued to have been engaged in the learning process of socialization. Norway,
Sweden, and later Germany are good example countries for this process in the 1970s and
early 1980s.
For the NOx protocol, Germany also seemed to have political motivations.
Reducing NOx emissions by any significant magnitude “would require strict automobile
emission standards” because nitrogen oxides are emitted both from power plants and
automobiles (Levy, 1993, p. 95). For Germany, which had already required catalytic
converters in automobiles through 1983 legislation, reductions in nitrogen oxides would
not particularly difficult, and thus it supported the Scandinavians’ efforts to add a
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nitrogen oxides protocol immediately following the adoption of the sulfur protocol in
1985. But the United Kingdom, France, and Italy did not support a protocol to reduce
nitrous oxides, as their automakers argued that emission standards would place them at a
comparative disadvantage with Germany, which was already able to produce “much of
the equipment needed to meet strict standards, such as fuel injectors and catalytic
converters” (Levy, 1993, p. 95). Likewise, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union opposed
nitrous oxide reductions because their automobile manufacturing industries were rapidly
expanding and they foresaw that reducing automobile emissions would have negative
economic consequences in the near future. 129 These varying political motivations of
many European countries show that they have engaged in the adaptation process of
socialization to some extent.
Regarding the second measurement of the participation patterns, unlike the
inconsistent participation of governmental official delegates to international meetings in
the Northeast Asian environmental cooperative mechanisms examined in this study, the
patterns of delegates’ participation in Europe’s CLRTAP can be described as
significantly consistent. This section analyzes the participation of delegates to the EMEP
Steering Body between 2008 and 2011 because of its role as the organization’s governing
body. As it shows, most of the European countries have sent the same delegates to these
meetings for a number of years (Appendix VI). Many delegates have been dispatched by
129

Since reaching the 1988 Nitrogen Oxides Protocol, the average European reductions in NOx
emissions have reached around 25%, while Eastern Europe, Germany, and Switzerland have
achieved a nearly 50% reduction. According to European Environment Agency, the reduction in
NOx mainly resulted from technical measures within the transport and industrial sectors,
including the installation of catalytic converters in gasoline-fueled cars, the introduction of motor
modifications in diesel-fueled cars, and “the introduction of combustion modification
technologies (such as use of low NOX burners), implementation of flue-gas abatement techniques
(e.g., NOX scrubbers and selective…and non-selective…catalytic reduction techniques) and fuelswitching from coal to gas” (2012b).
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their ministers of environment or similar institutions, and most hold a high rank, such as
heads of departments, within their organizations. Through continuous participation by
delegates who have remained the same for a long period of time and who hold decisionmaking power within the organizations with which they are affiliated, member countries
have imbued the organization’s proceedings and decisions with considerable credibility.
Moreover, delegates have been able to build and expand their own understandings of
EMEP activities and issues through accumulated experiences with the EMEP.
Appendix VI shows the recent participation patterns of participants in the annual
meetings of EMEP Steering Body, which are also similar to those exhibited during the
first decade of the CLRTAP. As Siebenhüner argues, “one of the main success factors for
the CLRTAP and its assessments has been the continuity of a large percentage of its
personnel, especially in the first decade of its existence,” and that “[n]ewly acquired
technical and procedural knowledge could thereby be kept inside the process and passed
on through individuals” (2011, p. 105). Given this continuity, participating members have
been able to engage in learning as a socialization process, which can change the
behaviors of international actors through allowing them to question fundamental theories
and their values.
At the same time, it should be noted that there were considerable discrepancies in
the participation in international meetings by major Western countries, such as Germany,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and by the Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) countries. Whereas early scientific interest in environmental issues
in the West was spurred by identifiable and observable environmental effects, scientists
in CEE countries had developed little interest in these issues because they had “little
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access to mass media or domestic public policymaking” (VanDeveer, 2006, p. 40). Only
a small number of delegates from the CEE participated in the two major international
conferences on acidification research and policies that were sponsored by the Dutch
government in cooperation with UNECE. In fact, only 10 delegates from five CEE
countries—around 4.3% of all the delegates attending —participated in the 1986
conference, and only three delegates from Eastern Europe participated in the 1991
conference. 130
In contrast, conference delegates from the five big player countries in CLRTAP
made up 60% and 85% of attendees in 1986 and 1991, respectively. Most European states
sent national representatives to meetings of CLRTAP’s high-level bodies, such as the
Executive Body, Working Group Strategies, and EMEP Steering Body. Whereas
attendance of delegates from some transition states “has been generally less frequent and
more sporadic,” 14 out of the 16 states with perfect attendance at mid-1990s working
group meetings were from Western Europe (VanDeveer, 2006, pp. 41-42). Despite these
discrepancies in the delegation size between the big player countries and CEE countries
at international CLRTAP meetings, delegates from the CEE countries might have had
enough time to develop personal relationships with national and governance-level
delegates from other countries if they had been able to participate consistently and to gain
scientific knowledge through iterative communication with various scientists.
The positive effect of continuity among a large percentage of national delegates
and personnel for the implementation of CLRTAP has been reinforced by the learning
process of socialization among scientists and political negotiators. The “continuous,
130

These 10 delegates included one participant from Czechoslovakia, two from Hungary, three
from Poland, two from the Soviet Union, and two from Yugoslavia.
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iterative communication among scientists and negotiators” has been recognized by other
scholars as “one of the crucial preconditions for the successes of the convention process”
(Siebenhüner, 2011, p. 104). Through formal and informal communication and
relationships among the working groups and the Executive Body, which are mostly
mediated through the Working Group on Strategies and Review, scientific and technical
information has flowed into the negotiation processes.
Political decision makers as well as scientists have engaged in the learning
process of socialization. For instance, in the negotiations for the Second Sulfur Protocol,
the political decision makers were able to learn “all the possible scenarios for emission
reductions and their likely outcomes” from the scientists, and the scientists urged the
negotiators to agree on a clear emission target for the protocol (Siebenhüner, 2011, p.
104). According to Siebenhüner, this case “demonstrates the strong impact that scientists
had on the actual decision making, which became possible through the good informal
communication networks and the trust that negotiators had in the scientists” (2011, p.
105).
In an examination of how advisory scientists to the CLRTAP regime have learned
collectively throughout the process of scientific assessment, Atsushi Ishii (2011) argues
that the scientists similarly learned diplomacy as well as science. For instance, throughout
the process of developing the critical loads approach and the RAINS model, advisory
scientists “abandoned their positivistic paradigm and shifted to a more diplomacyoriented paradigm that would hold them accountable to country parties, which is a
prerequisite in diplomatic settings and makes scientists adhere to the overall norm of
usefulness in the diplomatic context” (Ishii, 2011, p. 184).

301

The process of defining the critical loads also shows how participants have
reconciled scientific understandings with political applicability. Given the criticism of the
flat-rate reduction protocols, Scandinavian scientists and 30 experts gathered for a
workshop in Oslo sponsored by the Nordic Council of Ministers and adopted a scientific
definition of critical loads for sulfur and nitrogen: “the highest load that will not cause
chemical changes leading to long-term harmful effect on the most sensitive ecosystems”
(Ishii, 2011, p. 177). However, the last part of this definition, “most sensitive ecosystems,”
was changed to “significant harmful effects” and the phrase “according to present
knowledge” was added to the final definition by a workshop held by the CLRTAP’s
Working Group on Effects in 1988, a change that, Ishii argues, “broadened the political
applicability and strengthened the robustness of the scientific assessments” of the critical
loads concept (2011, p. 178). This change followed “the definition agreed upon by the
UNECE Working Group on Nitrogen Oxides in February 1988 in a deliberation in which
both negotiators and scientists participated” (ibid.), and Ishii points out that the
development of the RAINS model also involved communication among a wide range of
various stakeholders. The “interactive learning among potential users” of the RAINS
model was one of the key guidelines for its development, and thus “the RAINS team did
not consider learning from external actors as ‘residual,’ but rather incorporated it into the
modeling process as an inherent component from the outset to win policymakers’
acceptance of the RAINS model” (Ishii, 2011, p. 181).
In short, the first measurement of participation patterns of the participants in the
CLRTAP activities through examining the existence of indirect political concerns and
motivations rather than intrinsic interests in regional cooperation to solve transboundary
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air pollution problems indicates that some countries have engaged in the learning process
of socialization and other countries in the adaptation. The second measurement of
participation patterns through examining the existence of enough consistent participation
and interactive communication with delegates from other countries shows that both
governmental officials and scientists alike have engaged in the learning process.
Accordingly, comparing with the Northeast Asian case studies which have shown only
the adaptation processes of socialization, it can be argued that the learning process of
socialization among participants in the CLRTAP have contributed to its development into
what the UNEP categorizes as the highest level regional entities with an established
infrastructure and a policy focus. For the first measurement of participation patterns, both
Northeast Asia and Europe seemed to have been motivated by varying political interests
in participating in regional environmental cooperation, which showed that they have been
engaged in the adaptation process of socialization to some extent. However, unlike
Northeast Asia, Europe has presented consistent participation and interactive
communication with delegates from other countries, which showed the learning process
of socialization among European countries. In this sense, European experiences through
the CLRTAP support Hypothesis 3: If participating countries in regional environmental
cooperation efforts adopt learning rather than adaptation as a process of socialization,
they are more likely to create formal and concrete collective action through regional
cooperation.

Conclusions
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This study makes two sets of conclusions regarding: (1) the general utility of the
three hypotheses for explaining regional environmental governance; (2) the specifics of
Northeast Asian cooperation, with the question of why the driving forces identified in the
hypotheses have not been as influential there as in Europe. For the first set of conclusions,
this study contends that shared scientific knowledge and the learning process of
socialization are key determinants of the development of regulatory regional
environmental regimes. It means that even given strong political leadership by a
participating country, a region is unlikely to succeed in creating a legally binding regional
environmental regime without development of shared scientific knowledge and
engagement in the learning process of socialization. Table 6.2 summarizes the findings of
four case studies including EANET, TDGM, and LTP in Northeast Asia, and CLRTAP in
Europe.
Table 6.2
Summary of Findings of Case Studies

EANET
TDGM
LTP
CLRTAP

Independent Variables
Learning
Leadership Knowledge
Mode
Yes
No
No
Some
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Dependent Variables
Formal

Concrete

Legal

Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
No
No
Yes

No
No
No
Yes

Note: As indicated in Table 1.4, the “formal” degree of collective action is measured through
examining the permanent structures of cooperative mechanisms, such as a secretariat, and the
division of labor of their entities, such as the secretariat, governing body, and scientific advisory
body, as well as formal financial structures shared by member countries. The “concrete” degree
of collective action is measured through examining the existence of agreed-upon shared formats
and guidelines for joint monitoring and modeling activities. The “legal” form of collective action
is measured through examining the existence of legally binding agreement among participating
countries.
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This study argues that Europe has succeeded in reducing air pollution through
developing better air quality management with regional regulatory regimes, whereas
Northeast Asia has encountered increasing air pollution due to the rapid growth of energy
consumption in China. The trends of NOx emissions in Europe and Northeast Asia
clearly show this contrast in the state of air pollution in the region. A comparative
analysis between cooperative efforts in Northeast Asia and Europe demonstrates that the
Northeast Asian cooperative efforts through EANET, TDGM, and LTP have failed to
generate broader cooperation and produce useful measurement data that could lead to the
creation of a regional environmental regime with a solid infrastructure and a policy focus
such as that which European cooperative efforts have achieved through CLRTAP.
An analysis of these empirical findings indicates that all three independent
variables are only partly associated with varying degrees of collective action as measured
by formal features and concrete collective action in Northeast Asia. However, political
leadership is more associated with varying degrees of collective action in terms of formal
and concrete collective action because none of the three cooperative mechanisms has
developed shared knowledge and the learning process of socialization. Although the
ROK’s dominant and significant exercise of political leadership did not explain why the
LTP exhibited the least amount of formal and concrete collective action, the cases of
EANET and TDGM provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that the stronger the
leadership by a participating country in a form of regional environmental cooperation, the
more formal and the more concrete will be the collective action developed in the region,.
For the second set of conclusion, this study examined whether political leadership
and shared scientific knowledge are necessary or sufficient factors for the engagement in
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the learning process of socialization of participating countries in the first place, and
whether the learning process of socialization can lead the region to achieve more formal
and concrete collective action. The study’s comparison of the varying degrees of
collective action in Northeast Asia and Europe and among the three studied Northeast
Asian environmental cooperative mechanisms focusing on these two questions discovers
two useful insights.
First, the analysis supports the hypothesis on social mechanisms among political
leadership, shared knowledge, and socialization, which asserts that the stronger the
political leadership and the greater the shared knowledge in the region, the more likely
participants in regional cooperation are to engage in the learning process of socialization
and thereby create the most formal and concrete collective action. The study finds that
strong political leadership is not itself sufficient to lead member countries to engage in
the learning process of socialization and that a lack of shared scientific knowledge is
positively associated with the adaptation process of socialization among participants in
the cooperative activities of these three regional mechanisms.

Another insight is that the combination of lack of shared knowledge and the
learning mode of socialization helps explain why all three regional cooperative
mechanisms have failed to advance to become the legally binding regional environmental
regimes rather than the comparatively higher degrees of collective action in terms of
formalization and concreteness among regional entities within the UNEP’s second
category of regional action. This study argues that knowledge and socialization barriers
are key determinants of the development of regulatory regional environmental regimes.
Without shared scientific knowledge and engagement in the learning process of
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socialization, even given strong political leadership by a participating country, it is not
likely for a region to develop a legally binding regional environmental regime. Strong
political leadership exercised by a participating country itself did not explain the different
extents of collective action between Northeast Asia and Europe because the three
Northeast Asian cases have had strong political leadership by initiator countries, as has
the CLRTAP.

Based on these findings, this study suggests that if their regional environmental
cooperative mechanisms are to advance to the next stage of development, Northeast
Asian countries must build sound infrastructures to ensure consistent participation of the
same delegates of member countries to international meetings to increase the chance that
the learning process of socialization will take place, enhancing international cooperation
and resulting in more fundamental behavioral changes by states in the region.
Additionally, this infrastructure should also reinforce greater interactive communication
between the two groups of delegates, political negotiators and scientists, participating in
international meetings by achieving more consistent participation in international
meetings. The significance of consistent participation by delegates to the CLRTAP and
particularly the EMEP is a key lesson that Northeast Asian countries can take from the
European case, as the consistent attendance of European delegates has created personal
relationships among delegates that seem to have contributed to their developing common
understanding on scientific issues and reaching agreements on specific budgetary issues.
The examination of institutional linkages has proven that the governance and
actor linkages between CLRTAP and EU air policy have contributed to strengthening
their regulatory policies in Europe (Selin & VanDeveer, 2011). Thereby it can be
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suggested that Northeast Asian cooperative mechanisms need to develop strategies for
creating synergistic effects among their existing overlapping research projects. While the
EMEP focuses on three activities, including collection of emission data, measurements of
air quality and modeling of atmospheric transport, and deposition of air pollutants, the
EANET focuses only on measurements of acid deposition and the LTP on measurements
and modeling of the source-and-receptor relationships of SO2 and NOx emissions, which
may explain why these two Northeast Asian cooperative mechanisms have lacked the
driving force necessary for moving beyond their current research activities. According to
Haas and Stevens,
studies of international environmental assessments and science panels suggest the
need for fluid bodies that can bring together multiple sources of information and
are not beholden to one single funder or political sponsor. . . . Studies of nationallevel environmental policy processes have convincingly argued against relying on
individual institutions for research and policy advice because they may bias the
information flow and control resources (2011, p. 129).
In the CLRTAP, no single source of policy advice dictates the production of
knowledge; instead, “the European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP), the
working groups, and the Network on Air Pollution and Health (AIRNET) all serve to
identify research questions and guide science with some degree of autonomy from the
policy process” (ibid., pp. 129-130). This suggests another lesson for Northeast Asia:
EANET and LTP are not necessarily competitive with each other. The two should be
combined into a single organization like EMEP with possessing autonomy from the
policy process through serving to identify research agendas.
In addition to the strategies of combining existing cooperative efforts into a more
efficient entity of regional cooperation, Northeast Asia needs to address concerns about
the flow of biased information both within a country and with other countries. Chinese
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participants in the International Experts Workshop on International Framework and Cobenefits Approach to Promote Air Pollution Control in East Asia, held in January 2011 in
Japan, argued that studies by international bodies demonstrating the urgency and
necessity of international cooperation would be most effective in persuading the Chinese
government to participate in regional environmental cooperation, while scientists from
other countries argued that more active advocacy for regional cooperation by Chinese
scientists would be necessary because the Chinese government tends to be suspicious of
scientific research conducted by scientists from other countries. This kind of ping pongstyle discussion can be counter-productive and suggests that rather than blaming one
another for the lack of development of shared scientific knowledge, regional scientists
need to collaborate more efficiently and effectively to produce research outputs.
In addition to these horizontal institutional linkages, vertical institutional linkages
also need to be developed in Northeast Asia. Two key comprehensive cooperative
mechanisms mentioned in chapter 2, the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting
among the ROK, China, and Japan (TEMM) and the North-East Asia Sub-regional
Program for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC), should develop clear objectives
and strategies for implantation of issue-specific cooperative projects to reduce duplication
of research projects in different organizations and to create synergistic effects among
various cooperative mechanisms.
A delegate to the Korean government stated in an interview that money does not
matter at this point for regional environmental cooperation as both the Japanese and
Korean governments have shown their willingness to become key financial resource
countries through EANET and LTP, respectively. What seems to matter most for
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environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia is to share the leadership among
participating countries, relaxing the ownership for the cooperative mechanisms that
countries initiated and to support each other among participating countries. In doing so, it
is necessary for Northeast Asian countries to develop shared scientific knowledge among
participating researchers in cooperative programs, and to create bureaucratic supports for
the learning process of socialization among policy makers and scientists both within each
country and with other countries.
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APPENDIX I
LIST OF INTERVIEWS
Country

Japan

Name

Interview
Date

Affiliation

Nobuhiro Kino

05/10/2010

Ministry of Environment

Katsunori Suzuki

4/23/2010

Kanazawa University

Shohei Yonemoto

3/1/2010

Tokyo University

Hajime Akimoto

6/1/2010

ADORC

Norichika Kanie

8/27/2010

Tokyo Institute of Technology

Shunji Matsuoka

10/5/2010

Waseda University

Alice Kim

10/6/2010

Waseda University

Mark Elder

10/6/2010

Institute for Global Environmental
Strategies (IGES)

Xiaofeng Zhou

10/6/2010

IGES

Asami Miyazaki

10/4/2010

Osaka University

Atsushi Ishii

10/17/2010

Tohoku University

Atsushi Shimizu

12/17/2010

National Institute for Environmental
Studies (NIES)

Nobuo Sugimoto

12/17/2010

NIES

Ken Yamashita

2/8/2011

Asia Center for Air Pollution
Research (ACAP)

Hajime Akimoto

2/8/2011

ACAP

Keiichi Sato

2/8/2011

ACAP

Tsuyoshi Ohizumi

2/8/2011

ACAP

Toshimasa Ohara

3/8/2011

NIES

Masataka
Nishikawa

3/8/2011

NIES
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11/23/2010

He Youjiang

11/23/2010

XIE Shuyan

11/23/2010

Haibin ZHANG

01/18/2011

Peking University

8/17/2009,
12/23/2010
12/30/2009,
12/29/2010

National Institute of Environmental
Research (NIER)

China

LimSeok Jang
Chu Jang Min

Republic of
Korea

Indonesia
Malaysia
Switzerland

Policy Research Center for
Environment and Economy
Chinese Research Academy of
Environmental Sciences
China National Environment
Monitoring Center

ZHOU Jun

Korea Environment Institute

Il-Soo Park

3/29/2010

Hankuk University of Foreign
Studies

Jinseok Han

3/31/2010

NIER

Seog-Yeon Cho

10/29/2009,
11/22/2010

Inha University

Su-Hee Hwang

11/22/2010

Ministry of Environment (MOEK)

Chang-Keun Song

8/17/2009

NIER

Yong-Seung
Chung

12/24/2010

KCAER

Sang-Joon Lee

12/23/2010

MOEK

Kyu Il Park

12/23/2010

MOEK

Dong Young Kim

12/28/2010

Korea Development Institute

Suh-Yong Chung

12/28/2010

Korea University

Sangwoo Park

12/29/2010

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade

11/23/2010

Ministry of Environment

11/22/2010

Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment

11/23/2010

UNECE

Agus Harya
SETYAKI
Wan Izar Haizan
Wan Rosely
Krzysztof
Olendrzynski
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APPENDIX II
LIST OF DELEGATES TO THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL MEETING OF EANET 2001-2010
IG3 2001,
Thailand

IG4 2002,
Thailand

IG5 2003,
Thailand

IG6 2004,
Cambodia

IG7 2005,
Japan

IG8 2006,
Vietnam

Chea Sina /
MOE

Heng
Nareth /
MOE

Hang Dara
/ MOE

Khong
Samnuon
/ MOE

Hang Dara
/ MOE

Chrin
Sokha
/ MOE

same

Cambodia

Li Xue /
MOE / MOE

Guo Jing /
MOE

same

Heng
Nareth
/ MOE
Long
Rithirak/
MOE

IG9 2007,
Lao PDR

Thiv
Sophearith
/ MOE
same

same

Tang
Dingding
/ MOE

Wang
Ruibin /
CNEMC

same

Tang
Dingding /
MOE

same 2004,
2005

Fang Li
/ MOE

same

same

Xia
Yingxian
/ MOE

same

Dong Yao
/ MOE

Zhou
Guomei
/ MOE
Zheng
Haohao
/ CNEMC

China
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IG10 2008,
Thailand

IG11 2009,
Thailand

IG12 2010,
Japan

Ngoun
Kong /
MOE

same

Khieu
Muth /
MOE

Ken
Choviran /
MOE

same 2009

Lonh Heal /
MOE
Ken
Choviran /
MOE

same

Lin Jun /
MOE

Zhu
Jianping /
MOE

Xia
Yingxian /
MOE

Liu
Shusheng /
MOE

same 2005

He
Youjiang /
CRAES

Gu Li /
MOE

same

Zhou Jun /
MOE

same

Xie Shuyan
/ CNEMC
same

Same

Sri Kaloka
Prabotosari /
National
Institute of
Aeronauties
and Space
(LAPAN)

Gunardi /
MOE

Liana
Bratasida
/ MOE

0

Tjang
Mushadji
Sutamihardja /
Professor

Indonesia
Sigit Sadiono
/ Indoneshian
Embassy

Sulistyowati /
MOE

Halimah
Syafrul/
MOE

same

same

Nixson F.
Silalahi /
MOE

Kusmulyani
Sugiarto
/ MOE

same

same 2003

same 20052006

same

Ina Binari
Pranoto /
MOE

Agus
Harya
Setyaki /
MOE

Ratnasari
Anwar /
MOE

Hideki
Okumura
/ Embassy of
Japan,
Thailand

Kenichi
Kamae /
Embassy of
Japan

Hajime
Endo/ MOE

Chieko
Tatsumi /
MOFA

Yuriko
Koike and
8 officials
/ MOE

Hiroyasu
Tokuda
/ MOE

same

Keiko
Segawa
/ MOE

same

Reiko
Sodeno /
MOE

Yoshiko
Endo
/ MOFA

Taira
Iwasaki
/ MOFA

Takaaki
Kato/
MOFA

same

Shinichi
Arai
/ MOE

same

Tokuya
Wada/
MOE

same

Yasuhiro
Shimizu /
MOE

Satoshi
Tanaka /
MOE

Toshiro
Segawa /
MOE

Shintaro
Fujii /
MOE

same

same

Nobuhiro
Kino /
MOE

Tetsunori
Hatta with
8 more /
MOE

Toshihisa
Kato /
MOFA

same

same

Same

Norichika
Kanie / TIT

same

same

Same

Yukari
Takamura,
Ryukoku
University

same

Japan
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Same

0

0

Lao PDR

Monemany
Nhoybouakong
/ MOE

same

Sisouphanh
Luangrath
/ MOE

same

same

Phakkavanh
Phissamay
/ MOE

same

same 2003

Bounthanh
Bounvilay /
MOE

Setouvanh
Phanthavongsa /
MOE

Same

same

same

Darounny
Vilaythong
/ MOE

same 20032007

same 2008

Lian Kok
Fei/ MOE

Che Kodir
Baharum /
MOE

Danial Lee
Abdullah /
MOE

Engku
Mustaffa /
MOE

Wan
Rosely /
MOE

Maznorizan
Mohamad /
Malaysian
Meteorological
Department

Siniarovina
Urban /
Malaysian
Meteorological
Department

Olivia Chin
Su Fung /
Attorney
General's
Chambers

Nik
Myhamad
Majid /
University
Putra
Malaysia

Sakhone
Chaleunvong
/ MOE
Muhamad
Bin
Awang /
Professor

Letchumanan
Al Ramatha /
MOE

Malaysia

Chow Peng
Leong
/ Meteorological Service

Che Asmah
Ibrahim
/ Dep. of
Environment

same

same

same

same

Wong
Fook Lian
/ Dep. of
Chemistry
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same

Zamba
Batjargal /
Ambassador

Enebish
Dugerjav
/ MOE
Ministry of
Nature and
Environme
nt

Enkhtuvshin
Gombosuren
/ MOE

Erdenebulgan Davaa
/ MOE

Lamjav
Batnyam/
NAMHEM

Bulgan
Tumendemberel /
Central
Laboratory
of Environmental
Monitoring

Batbayar
Tsemeenmyadar
/Ministry
of Nature
and
Environment

Dugarsuren
Enkhtuul /
MOE

Erdenebaatar
Enkhmen
d
/ MOE

Enkhtuvshin Sevjid
/
NAMHEM

Erdenebat
EldevOchir/
NAMHEM

same

Tseesodroltsoo
Dashdorj /
NAMHEM

Bayarsaikhan
Purevjav /
NAMHEM

Uranchimeg
Ochirbat /
MOE

same

same

same

Same

Tin Ngwe /
MOT

Sein Maw
Oo / MOT

Tin Hla /
MOT

Same

Htwe Htwe
Win / MOT

Same

Mongolia

Maung
Maung
Tun /
MOT
Kyaw Moe
Oo
/ MOT

Myanmar

Philippines

Erlinda A.
Gonzalez/
MOE

Pio
Lofamia
Tejada
/ MOFA

Ella S.
Deocadiz/
MOE

same

Fernandino Y.
Concepcion
/ MOE
Adrian
B.C.
Candolada
/
Embassy

Alan
Benito de
Gala/
MOE
Regina
Perol/
Embassay

Corazon
C. Davis
/MOE

Samuel R.
Penafiel
/ MOE

Tun Thein /
MOT
Julian D.
Amador /
MOE

Letecia R.
Maceda /
MOE

same 2007

Same

Cesar
Siador, Jr. /
MOE

Jean N.
Rosete /
MOE

same

Same

Demetrio
L.
Iganacio,
JR / MOE
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Seog-Yeon
Cho /
Professor

same

same

same

same

Yeonsoon
Ahn /
MOE

Park
Kwang-Suk
/ MOE

Lee Seung
Han / MOE

same 20012005

Same

Jin-Seok Han
/ NIER

same

same

same

Park Ju
Young /
MOFA

Jin-Seok
Han /
NIER

Park JeongSu / MOE

Kang Seuk
Woo /
MOE

Kim JeongSoo / NIER

Chang
Lim-Seok /
NIER

Se Chang
Ahn/ MOE

Soo Yun
Ma/MOE

Lee SukJo /NIER

Lee JaeHyun/MOE

Kim
KyungSik
/MOE

Beom-Sik
Yoo/MOE

Yang JaeMoon
/MOE

same

same

Dzhumshid
Dzhangirov
/
Environment
Pollution
Monitoring
Department

same
2001

same

same

Marina
Kotlyakova /
RFSHEM

same 2001,
2003-2005

same

same

Yuri
Peshkov /
RFSHEM

Veronika
Ginzburg /
RFSHEM

same

same

same

same

same 2001

same

same

Same

same

Monthip
Sriratana
Tabucanon/MOE

Mingquan
Wichayarangsa

Phunsak
Theramongkol /
MOE

Nisakorn
Kositratna /
MOE

same 2007

ROK

Valery V.
Chelukanov
/ RFSHEM

Russia

Thailand

Serguei A.
Gromov
/Institute of
Global
Climate and
Ecology
Tamara V.
Khodjer /
research
institute
Suvit
Yodmani/Asi
an Disaster
Preparedness
Center

Mingquan
Wichayar
angsaridh/
MOE
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Oh Heum
Jin / MOE

same 2004

Ahn Joon
Young /
NIER

Hwang
Suhee /
MOE

Sirithan
Pairojboriboon /
MOE
Supat
Wangwongw
atana /MOE

same

same

same

Pichaid
Atipakya/
MOE

Unnop
Buranasate
/ MOFA

Chatri
Archjananun /
MOFA

Wijarn
Simachaya
/ MOE

same

Pornsook
Chongprasith / MOE

same

same

Same

same

same

Same

Chavanart
Thangsumphant /
MOFA

Alisa
Chobisara /
MOFA

Seksan
Sangdow
/ MOE

Pichaid
Atipakya/
MOE

Vietnam

Vu Van Tuan
/Hydrometeorological
Service

Nguyen
Van Tue/
Hydrometeorological
Service

Vu Van
Tuan
Deputy /
Hydrometeorological
Service

Hang Thu
Pham
/Hydrometeorological
Service

Hoang
Manh Hoa
/ Hydrometeorological
Service

Tran Van
Sap/Hydrometeorological
Service

same

Duong
Hong Son
/ MOE

Tran Thuc
General /
MOE

Le Nguyen
Tuong/
MOE

Be Thi
Nguyen
/ MOE

Nguyen
Khac Hieu
/ MOE
Nguyen Le
Tam
/ MOE
Duong
Hong Son
/MOE

Ngo Thi
Hang /
National
Institute of
Meteroloy
Hydrology
and
Environment
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Dinh Thai
Hung /
National
Institute of
Meterology
Hydrology
and
Environment

same 2006

same 2003

Duong
Hong Son
/ MOE
(same
2005)
same 2006

Same
Ahn MoonSoo
Manjit
Iqbal

UNEP/
ROAP

Same

same 20062007
Wanhua
Yang

YoungWoo Park

Keith Bull

UNECE

same

Catherine
S. Masson

Krzysztof
Olendrzynski

Sangmin
Nam

UN ESCAP

M.Iyngararasan
Lars
Nordberg

UNEP headquarters
ScandEnvironment

Note: China National Environmental Monitoring Center (CNEMC); For Lao PDR, MOE is Science
Technology and Environment Agency; For Malaysia, MOE is Ministry of Science, Technology and the
Environment; For Mongolia, MOE is Ministry of Nature and Environment; NAMHEM: National Agency
for Meteorology, Hydrology and Environment Monitoring of Mongolia; MOT: Ministry of Transport;
HMS: Hydrometeorological Service; RFSHEM: Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and
Environmental Monitoring, a service in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment; For
Thailand, MOE is Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment; UNEP/ROAP: UNEP Regional
Office For Asia and the Pacific

319

Same

APPENDIX III
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS OF TDGM MEETINGS
2008

2009

2010

2011

2013

Steering
Committee

WG II

WG I

WG I

WG I

WG I

Steering
Committee

WG I

Yingxian Xia /
MEP

Fahe Chai /
CRAES

Ruibin Wang /
CNEMC

Ruibin Wang /
CNEMC

Xiaochun Zhang
(CMA)

Jianjun Li /
CNEMC

Xuefeng Sun /
MEP

Benfeng Pan /
CNEMC

Yanchao Tong
/ CNEMC

Yunjiang Yu /
CRAES

Yanchao Tong /
CNEMC

Haohao Zheng /
CNEMC

Haohao Zheng /
CNEMC

Dandan Cui /
MEP

Yao Dong /
MEP

Wei Wang /
CNEMC

Qingxin Zhang
/ Liaoning
Environment
Monitoring
Centre

Wei Wang /
CRAES

Qingxin Zhang /
Liaoning
Environmental
Monitoring
Center

Feng Shi /
CNEMC

Feng Shi /
CNEMC

Deqian Fu /
CNEMC

Jun Lin / MEP

Xiaochun
Zhang (CMA)

Jun Yu / MEP

China

Xiaochun Zhang
/ China
Meteorological
Administration
(CMA)

Shihai Lv /
CRAES

Wei Wang /
CNEMC

Satoshi Tanaka
/ MOEJ

Ken
Yoshikawa /
Okayama
University

Masataka
Nishikawa /
NIES

Masataka
Nishikawa /
NIES

Masataka
Nishikawa /
NIES

Masataka
Nishikawa /
NIES

Masataka
Nishikawa /
NIES

Toshiya Okuro
/ University of
Tokyo

Nobuo Sugimoto
/ NIES

Nobuo Sugimoto
/ NIES

Nobuo Sugimoto
/ NIES

Nobuo
Sugimoto /
NIES

Japan
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Shihai Lv /
CRAES
Wei Wang /
CNEMC
Xia Li / ChinaASEAN
Environmental
Cooperation
Center
Hana Otsuka /
MOEJ

Hidemasa
Yamamoto /

Hidemasa
Yamamoto /
MOEJ

MOEJ

Ken
Yoshikawa /
Okayama
University

Norikazu
Yamanaka /
Tottori
Univeristy

Itsushi Uno /
Kyusyu
University

Shintaro Fujii /
MOE

Shintaro Fujii /
MOE

Hitoshi
Yoshizaki /
MOEJ

Hitoshi
Yoshizaki /
MOEJ

Hitoshi
Yoshizaki /
MOEJ

Takashi Maki /
Japan
Meteorological
Agency

Takashi Maki /
Japan
Meteorological
Agency (JESC)

Takashi Maki /
Japan
Meteorological
Agency

Takashi Maki /
Meterological
Research
Institute

Masataka
Nishikawa /
NIES

Masataka
Nishikawa /
NIES

Masao Mikami /
Meteorological
Research
Institute

Katsuyuki
Takahashi /
Japan
Environmental
Sanitation Center
(JESC)

Toshiya Okuro /
University of
Tokyo

Nobuo
Sugimoto /
NIES

Masakazu
Kusakabe
(JESC)

Takashi Maki /
Japan
Meteorological
Agency

Aya Horiuchi /
Overseas
Environmental
Cooperation
Center

Itsushi Uno /
Kyusyu
University

Masao Mikami /
Meteorological
Research
Institute
Ken Yoshikawa
/ Okayama
University
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Yukari Hara /
Kyusyu
University

ROK

Youngjin Kim /
MOEK

Byung-Ho Yoo
/ NIER

Seungbum Kim /
KMA

Youngsin Chun
/KMA

Youngsin Chun
/KMA

Sumin Kim /
NIMR

Sanghoon Kim /
MOEK

Sumin Kim /
NIMR

Yong-Ho Jeong
/ Korea Forest
Research
Institute

Yong-Ho Jeong
/ Korea Forest
Research
Institute

Jeong-Soo Kim /
NIER

Seungbum Kim /
KMA

Seungbum Kim /
KMA

Eun-Hee Lee /
NIMR

Bongwoo Shin /
MOEK

Bongwoo Shin /
MOEK

Seungbum Kim
(KMA)

Jang-Min Chu /
Korea
Environment
Institute

Hee-Jin In /
KMA

Sumin Kim /
KMA

Sumin Kim /
KMA

Youngsin Chun
/ National
Institute of
Meteorological
Research
(NIMR)

Youngsin Chun /
NIMR

Youngsin Chun
/ (NIMR

Ji-Youn Im
(Korea Forest
Service)

Mee-Hye Lee /
Korea University

Mee-Hye Lee /
Korea University

Mee-Hye Lee /
Korea
University

Young-San Park
/ NIMR

Jong-Chul Ha /
NIMR

Soo Yeon Park
/KMA

Soo Yeon Park
/KMA

Jaebok Lee /
NIMR

Sang-Sam Lee /
NIMR

Eun-Hee Lee /
KMA

Eun-Hee Lee /
KMA

Kyong ha Kim /
Korea Forest
Research
Institute

Chang-Seok
Lee / Seoul
Women's
University

13 participants

131

131

Yowhan Son /
Korea University

Yowhan Son /
Korea
University

Suh-Yong
Chung / Korea
University

Hye Jun Shin /
NIMR

They are from KMA, Center for Atmospheric and Environmental Modeling, Korea, Korea University, Pusan National University, Environment Energy
Engineering.
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Mongolia

Jugder Dulam /
National Agency
for Meteorology
and Environment
Monitoring

Jugder Dulam /
National Agency
for Meteorology
and
Environment
Monitoring

Munkhtsetseg
Erdenebayar /
National Agency
for Meteorology
and Environment
Monitoring
(NAMEM) & 4
researchers from
NAMEM

Munkhtsetseg
Erdenebayar /
NAMEM

Munkhtsetseg
Tungalag /
Omnogobi
Province

323

Munkhtsetseg
Erdenebayar /
National
University of
Mongolia

APPENDIX IV
HISTORICAL EMISSIONS AND STATUS OF SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION

Note:Adapted from “The Oslo Protocol on Sulfur Reduction: the Great Leap Forward?” Journal
of Public Economics, by Finus & Tjøtta, 2003, p. 2035. Emissions (columns 2–4) are expressed
in 1,000 tons SO2 / year. Reductions (columns 5–6) are expressed as percentage reduction with
respect to 1980 annual emissions. Parentheses means that a country is a signatory but has not
ratified the agreement yet; reverse parentheses indicate that a country was a non-signatory but
succeeded later. Ge=1979 Geneva Framework Convention; H=1985 Helsinki Protocol; O=1994
Oslo Protocol; and Go=1999 Gothenburg Protocol. “Other countries” includes Africa, Albania,
Bosnia, Cyprus, Georgia, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, and the FYR Macedonia. Natural
sources include the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the North Sea, the remaining N.E.
Atlantic, Natural Oceanic, and Volcanic. It is notable that even the non-signatories such as
Ireland and Spain had reduced their annual sulfur emissions by more than 30% by 1985.
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APPENDIX V
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE FINANCING OF THE EMEP PROGRAMME
BETWEEN 1988 AND 1998

Note: UNESC, 1999, p. 5.
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APPENDIX VI
PARTICIPANTS IN THE ANNUAL MEETINGS OF EMEP STEERING BODY 20082011
2008
Armenia

A. Turlikyan
M. Ritter

2009

2010

2011

Same

Same

Same

Same

Same

C. Nagl

Austria
J. Schneider
Azerbaijan

R. Guliyev

Same

0

Same

Belarus

A. Pilipchuk

Same

Same

Same

Belgium

M.-R. V. D. Hende

Same

Same

0

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

0

0

R. Radic

0

Bulgaria

I. Angelov

0

0

0

Canada

P. Blanchard

0

C. Banic

0

Croatia

S. Vidic

Same

Same

Same

Cyprus

S. K.

Same

Same

Same

J. Macoun

Same

Same

Same

Same

Same

Same

Czech
Republic

J. Santroch
T. Ellermann

Denmark

C.L. Fogh

Same

O. K. Nielsen
Estonia

0

T.
Pauklin

0

0

Finland

H. Hakola

0

Y. Viisanen

Same

France

J. P. Chang
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Georgia

L. Rouil

Same

Same

Same

M. Tushishvili

0

0

0

E. Bieber

Same

Same

Same

0

Same

0

P. Z. Ferenczi

Same

0

Same

S. Doytchinov

Same

Germany
M. W. Fiebig
Greece
Hungary

A. Papastamou

Italy

Kyrgyzstan

0

N.
Pirrone

Same

0

0

0

A. Syrgakova

0

0

P.
Djuraskovic

0

Nicola
Pirrone

Same

Same

Same

Same

R. Maas

Same

Same

Montenegro

P. Ruyssenaars
Netherlands

J.-P. Hettelingh
T. Johannessen

Same

Same

V.
Vestreng

Norway

Same
B. Kvaeven
B.L.S. Monsen

Poland

G. Mitosek

A.
Degorska

Same

G. Mitosek

Portugal

0

0

P. Torres

0

Republic of
Moldova

V. Balan

0

0

V. Balan

Serbia

D. Djordjevic

Same

Same

Same

Slovakia

M. Mitosinkova

Same

Same

Same
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Slovenia

M. Logar

Same

Same

Same

A. G. Ortiz

Same

Same

Same

X. Querol

Same

Same

Same

P. Grennfelt

Same

Same

Same

Spain

Sweden

M.
Ullerstam

K. Kindbom
R. Ballaman
R. Gehrig

Same

Same

Same

R. Weber

Same

Same

Same

The former
Yugoslav
Republic of
Macedonia

0

0

A.
Stefanovska

Same

Ukraine

L. Kozak

Same

Same

Same

P. Cassanelli

C. Dore

Same

Same

P. Coleman

Same

Switzerland

United
Kingdom

H. Harmens
USA

R. Dennis

T.
Keating

Same

Same

S.
Anenberg

Note: UNECE, 2008; 2008; 2010; 2011. “Same” denotes same participants to previous
years, and “0” denotes no delegations.
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